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Belonging:
Citizenship and Migration in the European
Union and in Germany
By
Helen Elizabeth Hartnell *
I.
INTRODUCTION

At the dawn of the twenty-first century, the European Union and Germany
are magnets for both voluntary and involuntary migrants from around the world.
Indeed, one key feature of the contemporary condition known as globalization is
a profound increase in mobility and other "more permanent forms of human
migration." I Thus ever more people face the challenge of withstanding the pulls

* Professor of Law, Golden Gate University School of Law; Ph.D. Candidate in Jurisprudence and
Social Policy, University of California, Berkeley; and Visiting Scholar, University of Cologne Legal
Centre for European and International Cooperation (R.I.Z.). Thanks are owed to Golden Gate
University for generous research support, to R.I.Z. for providing a stimulating and supportive work
environment, and to Hannah Luise Buxbaum for comments on an earlier version of this article. The
author is a naturalized American citizen who was born in Germany to American parents. She is not
now, nor has she ever been, a national or citizen of Germany, though she feels at home there.
I. SHEILA L. CROUCHER, GLOBALIZATION AND BELONGING: THE POLITICS OF IDENTITY IN A
CHANGING WORLD 16 (2004). Croucher documents rising rates of travel and air traffic, along with
steadily-if not dramatically-growing numbers of foreign born residents in Australia (24% in
1999), Canada (17.4% in 1996), and the United States (\ I % in 2000). Social anthropologists,
however, offer a different perspective:
Movement within one or two generations rather than fixed settlement has generally
characterised human populations. . .. What is really new is the awareness among many
communities that there are innumerable other such populations linked globally by rapid
transport, electronic communication systems and common access to the same consumer
goods and styles, and that these often supplement rather than replace older ties forged
through ... trade and intermarriage.
David Parkin, Foreword to LOCALITY AND BELONGING, at ix (Nadia LoveIl ed., 1998) [hereinafter
LOVELL]; see also NIKOS PAPASTERGlADIS, THE TURBULENCE OF MIGRATION: GLOBALIZATION,
DETERRITORIALIZATION AND HYBRlDITY 76·99 (2000) (exploring the linkages between modernity,
globalization, and migration).
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between here and there, of balancing potentially conflicting needs to integrate2
(or even assimilate3) and to maintain transnational ties. 4 Migrants are
differently affected by these and other forces, since their motives and individual
circumstances vary widely, yet all share the fact of dislocation. Identities can
hardly help but be reshaped in this vortex. 5 The challenge to identity is starkest
where the receiving country demands a high level of integration or

2. The term 'integration' is an alternative to 'assimilation'. The latter term has become
suspect in an era characterized by increasingly multicultural societies in many parts of the world. In
Germany, for example, "[ c]ultural 'assimilation' as a prerequisite for citizenship acquisition was
explicitly rejected and replaced by a weaker 'integration' requirement." Christian Joppke, Exclusion
in the Liberal State: The Case of Immigration and Citizenship Policy, 8 EUR. J. Soc. THEORY 43, 52
(2005). See generally ADRIAN FAVELL, PHILOSOPHIES OF INTEGRATION: IMMIGRATION AND THE
IDEA OF CITIZENSHIP IN FRANCE AND BRITAIN (2d ed., 2001). For a succinct discussion of the
Leitkultur ("leading culture") controversy that erupted in Germany in 2000, see Ernst B. Haas, Sally
Roever & Anna Schmidt, Germany and the Norms of European Governance, 20 GERMAN POL. &
SOC'y 148 (2002); see also Richard Bernstein, "A Continent Watching Anxiously Over the Melting
Pot," N.Y. TIMES, Dec. IS, 2004 (discussing German "discomfort with multiculturalism" and the
belief expressed by "[m]any politicians and commentators ... that immigrants should accept ... the
dominant culture, as their own, or they should leave").
3. Immigrant assimilation as a political project emerged during the "first wave of industrialage migration in the late nineteenth century," and thus has affinities with "imperialist state rivalry,
war, and aggressive nation-building." Christian Joppke & Ewa Morawska, integrating Immigrants in
Liberal Nation-States: Policies and Practices, in TOWARD ASSIMILATION AND CITIZENSHIP:
IMMIGRANTS IN LIBERAL NATION-STATES I, 4 (Christian Joppke & Ewa Morawska eds., 2003)
[hereinafter TOWARD ASSIMILATION]. "The essence of old-style assimilation was cultural
assimilation, a sort of alchemy through which an immigrant was transformed into a standardized unit
of the state-bearing nation." Id. at 5. The contemporary understanding of assimilation imposes "no
mandate for immigrants to adopt the substantive culture of the receiving society." Id. It instead refers
in social scientific terms to:
a multipath process involving the incorporation of immigrants and their offspring into the
economic, political and social institutions, and culture of different segments of the host
society: mainstream middle- and rising lower class (so-called upward assimilation),
struggling lower- and underclass (downward assimilation), or immigrant/ethnic enclave
(also called adhesive ... assimilation, which can also follow the intragroup middle- or
lower-class pattern).
Ewa Morawska, Immigrant Transnationalism and Assimilation: A Variety of Combinations and the
Analytic Strategy it Suggests, in TOWARD ASSIMILATION, supra at 133, 134. Morawska's updated
definition virtually erodes the distinction between assimilation and integration, and renders the term
assimilation usable in contemporary discourse by excising its "old-style" connotations. Joppke &
Morawska, supra at I, argue that there is "a trend in immigration studies. . . [to] tum away from
multicultural and postnational perspectives, toward a renewed emphasis on assimilation and
citizenship."
4. See, e.g., Wolfgang Bergem, Culture, Identity, and Distinction: Ethnic Minorities between
Scylla and Charybdis, in GERMAN MINORITIES IN EUROPE: ETHNIC IDENTITY AND CULTURAL
BELONGING I, I (Stefan Wolff ed., 2000) [hereinafter WOLFF] ("Ethnic minorities are constantly
challenged by two equally threatening perspectives-maintaining their ethnicity and insisting on
their cultural distinctiveness bears the danger of marginalisation in their host-state, while attempts
aimed at integration imply the no less troublesome possibility of being absorbed into the majority
culture and the consequential loss of their particular identity.").
5. "Transnational migration significantly affects individual and collective identities, and it
creates new identities." Martin O. Heisler, Now and Then, Here and There: Migration and the
Transformation of Identities, Borders, and Orders, in IDENTITIES, BORDERS, ORDERS: RETHINKING
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY 225, 225 (Mathias Albert et al. eds., 2001) [hereinafter
ALBERT ET AL., 180].
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assimilation. 6
Like migrants themselves, countries also vary widely in their treatment of
nationality, citizenship, and migration,7 as well as in the degree to which they
tolerate or promote multiculturalism, on the one hand, or press immigrants to
integrate into the host country, on the other. 8 Recent comparative historical
analyses of citizenship in the United States and some European countries, for
example, show that countries reflect varying sui generis combinations of
"common components of citizenship" that result from "nineteenth- and
twentieth-century state-building,,,9 as well as from social and political factors
that may "pre-date the era of mass politics and even the nation-state."iO In the
context of European integration, however, there is a strong trend towards
coordination and in some cases even harmonization in these two fields, and thus
towards at least partial convergence. 11
One such component of citizenship, or avenue for conceptualizing
membership in a political community, is the notion of belonging. The American

6. The terms 'assimilation' and 'integration' have an historical relationship:
The old nationalizing and assimilationist idiom ... was carried along until the I960s; but it
remained largely rhetorical, and was mostly not accompanied by related policies. Only
when the problem of 'integrating' postcolonial, labor, and new settler migrants, and
especially their offspring, seriously emerged in the I970s and I980s, was the postwar
liberalism and human-rights discourse applied to the immigration domain, and the notion of
integration was born.
Joppke & Morawska, supra note 3, at 4-5. My usage of these two terms arranges them along a
continuum from multi- to monoculturalism, with the latter represented by the original nationalist
notion of assimilation. Between these two poles lies a range of notions and practices. Despite Joppke
and Morawska's effort to resuscitate the term 'assimilation' for use in academic discourse, I use the
term 'integration' in this article, since it is the term actually used in both Germany and in the
European Union, even while recognizing that this term is problematic, insofar as it "rests on the
premise of an already integrated, bounded society." Joppke & Morawska, supra at 3. This premise
has been discredited by postclassical sociology, which takes a more "systemic, decentered view of
society." Id.
7. The term 'migration' is used here to refer to the sum total of emigration and immigration,
without regard to the reasons people leave home in the first place. This topic is addressed infra in
Parts ILB and Ill.B.
8. Joppke & Morawska, supra note 3, at 1, argue that the "scope of official multiculturalism
policies and programs has either been exaggerated in public and academic perception, or, where such
policies have actually been in place, there has recently been a covert or overt move away from
them."
9. Richard Bellamy, Introduction: The Making of Modern Citizenship, in LINEAGES OF
EUROPEAN CITIZENSHIP: RIGHTS, BELONGING AND PARTICIPATION IN ELEVEN NATION STATES 1,4
(Richard Bellamy et al. eds., 2004) [hereinafter Bellamy, The Making of Modern Citizenship and
BELLAMY ET AL. respectively] (explaining variation in the citizenship regimes of the European
Union, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Portugal, the Netherlands, Scandinavia, Spain, and the
United States).
10. Id. at 14. Notably, these factors include "the ways state-church relations were resolved in
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, whether industrialization came early or late, and the stamp
placed on the political system by the earlier struggles occasioned by the growth of monarchical
power." Id.
11. European Union developments relating to citizenship and migration are discussed infra
in Parts ILA and II.B, respectively.
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myth promising that all can belong l2 is traditionally viewed as the antithesis of
ethno-cultural notions of belonging of the sort that have historically prevailed in
Germany: 3 This contrast, while overdrawn, marks the range of perspectives
between the 'primordialist' and 'constructivist' poles of the membership
spectrum,14 and takes a first step towards grasping the multifaceted nature of
belonging.
Belonging is an imperfect analytical concept that tears a jagged path across
pertinent legal categories and available ~olitical opportunities. This concept has
strong appeal to writers in many fields,1 since it supplements the usual analytic
categories and thus refracts a wider spectrum of contemporary conditions. 16

12. "America itself was a myth long before it was a place, a people. It was imagined as a
New World, a new beginning where orphans and refugees could build a new way of belonging to
each other and to the world." MADONNA KOLBENSCHLAG, LOST IN THE LAND OF OZ: THE SEARCH
FOR IDENTITY AND COMMUNITY IN AMERICAN LIFE xi (1990). "States, such as the United States,
may deliberately foster myths of a shared 'melting-pot' nationhood." Thomas M. Franck, Clan and
Superclan: Loyalty, Identity and Community in Law and Practice, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 359, 362
(1996). For Franck's definitions of 'nation' and 'state' see infra notes 23 and 28, respectively. The
nineteenth-century model of assimilation in countries such as Australia, Canada, and the United
States expected migrants to transfer their political identity from "home to host state," usually in
connection with "the act of renouncing home country citizenship and taking an oath of allegiance
during naturalization." Rey Koslowski, Demographic Boundary Maintenance in World Politics: Of
International Norms on Dual Nationality, in ALBERT ET AL., lBO, supra note 5, at 203, 214-15.
13. The romantic notion of the German people as a Volk was popularized in the eighteenth
century by Johann Gottfried Herder. See generally ROGERS BRUBAKER, CITIZENSHIP AND
NATIONHOOD IN FRANCE AND GERMANY (1992). Regardless of the salience this notion once enjoyed
(or may continue to enjoy), it is necessary to differentiate between the myth, on the one hand, and
the reality of German laws and practices connected with migration and citizenship, on the other
hand. See, e.g., DIETER GOSEWINKEL, EINBURGERN UND AUSSCHLIESSEN: DIE NATIONALISIERUNG
DER STAATSANGEHORIGKEIT VOM DEUTSCHEN BUND BIS ZUR BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND
[INCLUSION AND EXCLUSION: THE NATIONALIZATION OF CITIZENSHIP FROM THE GERMAN
CONFEDERATION TO THE FEDERAL REpUBLIC OF GERMANY] (2001); Joppke, supra note 2; Ulrich K.
PreuB, Citizenship and the German Nation, in BELLAMY ET AL., supra note 9, at 22-45.
14. See generally Alain Dieckhoff, Introduction: New Perspectives on Nationalism, in THE
POLITICS OF BELONGING: NATIONALISM, LiBERALISM, AND PLURALISM I, 1-2 (Alain Dieckhoff ed.,
2004) [hereinafter Dieckhofl] (noting that the literature on nationalism is divided between these two
extreme positions). However, Dieckhoff urges caution ''when using such exaggeratedly dichotomous
distinctions," since both are problematic. !d. at 5. Franck, supra note 12 at 362, draws a sharp
contrast between the constructivist term 'state' and the primordialist terms 'nation' and 'tribe'.
15. See, e.g., BELLAMY ET AL., supra note 9; STEPHEN CASTLES & ALASTAIR DAVIDSON,
CITIZENSHIP AND MIGRATION: GLOBALIZATION AND THE POLITICS OF BELONGING (2000);
CROUCHER, supra note I; Dieckhoff, supra note 14; MARKUS FUNCK ET AL., SACRIFICE AND
NATIONAL BELONGING IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY GERMANY (Greg Eghigian & Matthew Paul Berg
eds., 2002); THE POLITICS OF BELONGING: MIGRANTS AND MINORITIES IN CONTEMPORARY EUROPE
(Andres Geddes & Adrian Favell eds., 1999); ISABEL HUGGAN, BELONGING: HOME AWAY FROM
HOME (2003); MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, BLOOD AND BELONGING (1993); LOVELL, supra note I;
Vivienne Orchard, Culture as Opposed to What? Cultural Belonging in the Context of National and
European Identity, 5 EUR. J. Soc. THEORY 419 (2002); E. PROBYN, OUTSIDE BELONGING (1996);
MIKE SAVAGE, GAYNOR BAGNALL & BRIAN LONGHURST, GLOBALIZATION AND BELONGING
(2005); VICTOR JELENIEWSKI SEIDLER, SHADOWS OF THE SHOAH: JEWISH IDENTITY AND
BELONGING (2000); Elaine R. Thomas, Who Belongs? Competing Conceptions of Political
Membership, 5 EUR. J. SOC. THEORY 323 (2002); SALLIE WESTWOOD & ANNIE PHIZACKLEA,
TRANS-NATIONALISM AND THE POLITICS OF BELONGING (2000); WOLFF, supra note 4.
16. Indeed, "belonging exists on as many dimensions as people are prepared to delineate."
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Belonging may be defined through a territorial reference point,17 but is not
necessarilr, so.18
While some authors emphasize belonging's affective
character, 9 others experience it as physical sensation20 or even as essential
quality.21 Most social scientists, however, view belonging through the optic of

Parkin, supra note I, at xii; see also Vikki Bell, Performativity and Belonging: An Introduction, 16
THEORY, CULTURE & SOC'y I, 3 (1999) ("Belonging is an achievement at several levels of
abstraction."). As Hedetoft and Hjort explain:
[B)elonging constitutes a political and cultural field of global contestation ... summoning a
range of pertinent issues concerning relations between individuals, groups, and
communities. It raises questions about cultural, sociological, and political transformative
processes and their impact on imagined and real boundaries, notions of citizenship and
cultural hybridization, migration and other forms of mobility, displacements and so-called
ethnic cleansing, and of course also on the extent and nature of perceived normalcies of
national belonging.
Ulf Hedetoft & Mette Hjort, Introduction to THE POSTNATIONAL SELF: BELONGING AND IDENTITY
vii, x (Ulf Hedetoft & Mette Hjort eds., 2002) [hereinafter Hedetoft & Hjort and HEDETOFT &
HJORT respectively].
17. Nadia Lovell, Introduction to LOVELL, supra note I, at I. In territorial terms, belonging
can invoke either the importance of the local in a global era, or geography-based notions of inclusion
and exclusion. As to the fonner, see SAVAGE, BAGNALL & LONGHURST, supra note 15, at 7
(arguing for the "ongoing significance of territoriality for social relationships"). The debate over
Turkey's push to join the European Union, which is sometimes characterized as being about where
to draw the line between Europe and non-Europe, provides an example of the latter approach. See
also PreuB, supra note 13 (discussing the special significance of territory in the development of the
German notion of nationality).
18. Indeed, belonging appears to be less linked to territory than it has been in the past.
Parkin, supra note I, at ix, notes that "anthropologists can no longer assume that the people they
study see themselves as attached to a particular, bounded locality. Diaspora, transnational
community and dispersed networks are typically some of the terms used to convey the image of
movements of people who retain common socio-cultural consciousness in the face of constant
displac.ement." See also PAPASTERGIADIS, supra note I, at 39 (discussing "new forms of bilocality"); id. at 100-21 (discussing the deterritorialization of culture); JOHN URRY, SOCIOLOGY
BEYOND SOCIETIES 132-33 (2000) (urging replacement of territory-based sociology by a "sociology
of flows" since contemporary belonging "almost always involve[s] diverse forms of mobility" and a
"dialectic of roots and routes").
19. Belonging, despite its "pragmatic connotations and potential for tying people to place
and social relationships, also evokes emotions, sentiments of longing to be in a particular location,
be it real or fictive." LOVELL, supra note I, at I; see also CASTLES & DAVIDSON, supra note 15, at
\30 ("[H)ome is where one feels a sense of belonging and securitY, and where one can decide on
acceptable values and forms of behaviour."); Hedetoft & Hjort, supra note 16, at vii (referring to the
"thick" view of belonging as "feelings of 'homeness'" and as a "significant determinant of identity,
that elusive but still real psycho-sociological state of being in sync with oneself under given external
conditions"); SAVAGE, BAGNALL & LONGHURST, supra note 15, at 10-11 (noting that there is "no
one space where we feel at home all the time," and defining belonging in terms of Bordieu' s notions
about "how people ... feel comfortable or not in anyone place").
20. For Huggan, supra note IS, at 4, there are
places on the planet where we belong and they are not necessarily where we are born. If we
are lucky ... we find them, ... [and] ... know that ... we belong to the earth and it to us.
Even if we cannot articulate this intense physical sensation, ... we know what home is then,
in our very bones." She likens this "magnetic ... hormonal pull" to "carnal knowledge of
landscape.
Id.
21. DIANE ACKERMAN, A NATURAL HISTORY OF THE SENSES 20 (1990) (describing the
feeling while scuba-diving that "[h]ome was everywhere" since "we carry the ocean within us; ...
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culture or identity.22 Belonging is especially salient in a discussion of
migration, since the word itself captures the potential schism of "being" from
"longing"-of physical location in a set of socio-political coordinates that may
not correspond to one's own experienced or imagined place-as well as the felt
(or compelled) need to bridge that gap. My goals here are to supplement (not
supplant) discourses of culture and identity, and to liberate 'belonging' from its
traditional association with the dark range of the membership spectrum.
At the primordialist extreme, belonging is an exclusionary concept based
on notions of shared culture and ascribed identity, and is often23 though not
necessarilr4 synonymous with nationalism. The primordial or essentialist
view-which has an affinity with "international legal norms against dual
nationality,,25 based on the presumption of exclusive attachment-has fallen out
of favor with many social scientists,26 despite the persistence of ethnic violence,
religious fundamentalism, and national or sub-national self-determination

our veins mirror the tides").
22. See, e.g., QUESTIONS OF CULTURAL IDENTITY (Stuart Hall & Paul du Gay eds., 1996)
[hereinafter QUESTIONS OF CULTURAL IDENTITY); HEDETOFT & HJORT, supra note 16; Heisler,
supra note 5; LOVELL, supra note 1; Orchard, supra note 15; Jo Shaw, The Interpretation of
European Union Citizenship, 61 MOD. L. REv. 293 (1998); WOLFF, supra note 4.
23. Belonging may be predicated on "possession of a shared culture." Bellamy, The Making
of Modem Citizenship, supra note 9, at 9. As an ideal type, "belonging" generally implies a national
community, but not necessarily an ethno-national one. Thus, for example, Article 2 of the European
Convention on Nationality defines 'nationality' as "the legal bond between a person and a State and
does not indicate the person's ethnic origin." Council of Europe, European Treaty Series, no. 166,6
November 1997 [hereinafter European Convention on Nationality]. Franck, supra note 12, at 362,
uses the terms 'nation' and 'tribe' to mean "an affinity group that has placed certain values high on
its agenda: shared genealogical origins, language and historic myths, as well as cultural and, perhaps,
religious compatibility." He argues that nations, as a form of political identity, are forged in "a
continual ebb and flow of differing, little-understood imperatives that at various times and
circumstances rearrange the self-image of persons and thereby provoke revision of the boundaries of
political communities." Id. at 365. For the view linking nationalism with intolerance, see, for
example, Hedetoft & Hjort, supra note 16, at ix ("[T]he politics of belonging has always spelled
unadulterated racism and national chauvinism" on the political right); MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, supra
note 15.
24. Franck, supra note 12, at 365, cites contemporary Israel for the proposition that
nationalist origins of a State are compatible with multiethnicity.
25. Koslowski, supra note 12, at 204. "The phenomenon of dual nationality challenges
traditional notions of political identity and ... basic assumptions of the classical European states
system." Id. Koslowski does not merely argue that this prohibition reflects the Westphalian system,
but that "[i]ntemational norms against statelessness and dual nationality helped establish [it] by
delineating its parts in terms of population." Id. at 207 (emphasis added). However, this traditional
prohibition is eroding.Id. at 205,208-13.
26. Indeed, "most modem sociologists and historians ... tend to believe that there 'is no
firm sociological mooring to the nation, not in language, not in religion, not in ethnicity. '" Franck,
supra note 12, at 364 (quoting John A. Hall, Nationalism: Classified and Explained, DAEDALUS 1,4
(Summer 1993)); see also CROUCHER, supra note 1, at 38-39 (summarizing constructivist critiques
of primordial ism); Suzanne Shanahan, Different Standards and Standard Differences: Contemporary
Citizenship and Immigration Debates, 26 THEORY & SOC'Y 421, 421 (1997) ("Ethnicity, like any
other social category, is a political construction that is less representative of palpable social
distinctions or individual and collective differences than it is a particular historical manifestation of
the boundary between states and peoples. ").
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movements in our times.27
At the opposite constructivist extreme, belonging is inclusive 28 and
vOluntary,29 and reflects the notion that identity is malleable30 and compound. 3l
This view is compatible with the notion that healthy people may have multiple
identities 32 and loyalties, and thus that little harm, and maybe even some good
can come of dual nationality. In fact, the truth of most individual lives will lie
somewhere between the extremes of prescription and choice.
My use of the term 'belonging' incorporates both internal and external
aspects, that is, the "socially constructed, embedded process in which
[particular] people reflexively judge the suitability of a given site as

27. Some who perceive the constructivist approach as inadequate to explain the "powerful
and seemingly irrational passion and sense of embeddedness that often surround identity" propose a
hybrid "constructed primordiality" approach. CROUCHER, supra note I, at 39.
28. Franck, supra note 12, at 362, draws a sharp contrast between the constructivist term
'state' and the primordialist terms 'nation' and 'tribe.' "[T]he multicultural state reflects quite
different social values: a civil society sharing a preference for the civic virtues of liberty and material
well-being, as well as a desire to associate for protection and security." Id. The term 'national
identity' can thus refer simply to a "common civic consciousness and allegiance to the state and
one's fellow citizens" such as may be cultivated through "[n]ational systems of education." Bellamy,
supra note 9, at 7. See, e.g., Cecile Laborde, Republican Citizenship and the Crisis of Integration in
France, in BELLAMY ET AL., supra note 9, at 46.
29. 'Voluntary' in this context must be understood as constrained, since belonging is not
simply a matter "of individual choice, but rather the confluence of state laws and policies regarding
the ascription, acquisition, and renunciation of nationality." Koslowski, supra note 12, at 214.
30. "Distinctly different tribes or nations, for historic reasons and to different degrees, do
sometimes merge their identities and submerge their origins, opting to become partly or entirely
assimilated into a larger tribe/nation identity." Franck, supra note 12, at 367. Bauman argues that
"the modem 'problem of identity' was primarily how to construct an identity and keep it solid and
stable," whereas the "postmodem 'problem of identity' is primarily how to avoid fixation and keep
the options open." Zygmunt Bauman, From Pilgrim to Tourist; or, A Short History of Identity, in
QUESTIONS OF CULTURAL IDENTITY, supra note 22, at 18.
31. Multiple identities and loyalties are not, however, an innovation of our time. Indeed,
"persons have often had multiple or compound identities" in the past. Franck, supra note 12, at 359.
"Except during the latter part of the nineteenth and most ofthe twentieth centuries, it was normal for
persons ... to define themselves by multiple loyalties." Id. at 377 (citing examples from the Roman,
Ottoman, and Holy Roman Empires). Historically, however, individuals did not choose their
multiple loyalties, but these were rather "imposed on [them] by virtue of who they were and where
they lived." Id.
32. "Identities are not like hats. Human beings can and do put on several at a time." LINDA
COLLEY, BRITONS 6 (1992). Contemporary European conditions are marked by the development of
"a more diffuse and fragmented set of attachments that are both sub-national and transnational in
character .... The ties of family, work, identity, religion and sport, for example, increasingly
operate either below or beyond the nation-state, competing with and diluting any sense of a purely
national identity." Richard Bellamy & Alex Warleigh, Introduction: The Puzzle of European
Citizenship, in CITIZENSHIP AND GOVERNANCE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 3, 5 (Richard Bellamy &
Alex Warleigh eds., 2001) [hereinafter Bellamy & Warleigh and BELLAMY & WARLEIGH
respectively). Unlike mUltiple or compound identities in prior historical contexts, "[t]oday a person's
loyalty system is increasingly likely to be a compound of subjectively chosen external references."
Franck, supra note 12, at 362. However, multiple identities cannot simply be assumed-not even
from the fact of dual nationality, which is ambiguous. As Koslowski points out, dual nationality
"may be an actualization of multiple political identification," supra note 12, at 216, but it may also
"be indicative of neither assimilation nor homeland political identification, but rather of ... an
ambivalent political identity, or even an apolitical identity." Id. at 215.
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appropriate,,33 in view of their own circumstances, as well as the process by
which others in that site judge the appropriateness of their presence there. These
internal and external aspects imply a two-way process based on mutual
adaptation and tolerance. In the end, belonging is not limited to either the nation
or the state for its frame of reference, but incorporates social and psychological
dimensions as well.
German history, at least since unification in the late nineteenth century,
reveals an abiding preoccupation with the question of who belongs to or in
Germany.34 This issue was omnipresent during the twentieth century.35
Migration and its consequences emerged after 1989 as a "leading political,
social, and cultural issue,,36 in Germany, as elsewhere in much of Europe, when
the collapsing bi-polar postwar order and new wars-both inside Europe and
beyond its borders-set even more migrants into motion. 37
Though
traditionally a sending country, Germany has in fact become one of the largest
migrant-receiving countries in the world,38 and continues to wrestle with the
challenges posed by its changing population and by the persistent demographic
pressures to allow and even solicit further imrnigration. 39
Germany and the European Union ("EU") have both scrambled to provide
an adequate legal framework for this changing human landscape. The EU has

33. SAVAGE, BAGNALL & LONGHURST, supra note 15, at 12. These authors also stress that
belonging is "not a given but is itself unstable." Id. at 11. For "newcomers [who] seek to construct a
place that they can again call home," they must engage in "negotiations with neighbours." CASTLES
& DAVIDSON, supra note 15, at 130.
34. BRUBAKER, supra note 13; GOSEWTNKEL, supra note 13; CHALLENGING ETHNIC
CITIZENSHIP: GERMAN AND ISRAELI PERSPECTIVES ON IMMIGRATION (Daniel Levy & Yfaat Weiss
eds., 2002) [hereinafter CHALLENGING ETHNIC CITIZENSHIP]; Michael Minkenberg, The Politics of
Citizenship in the New Republic, in GERMANY: BEYOND THE STABLE STATE 219 (Herbert Kitschelt
& Wolfgang Streeck eds., 2004); ELI NATHANS, THE POLITICS OF CITIZENSHIP IN GERMANY:
ETHNICITY, UTILITY AND NATIONALISM (2004); Preufi, supra note 13; see also Franck, supra note
12, at 374 (referring to German "romantic nationalism and its tribal definition ofthe nation").
35.

Id.

36.

Tobias Brinkmann, German Migrations: Between Blood and Soil, 20 GERMAN POL. &
SOC'Y 137, 137 (2002) [hereinafter Brinkmann, German Migrations].
37. See Migration Policy Institute, Migration Information Source: Global Data Center
(showing stock of foreign population in Germany by country of nationality by year; inflow of
foreign population by country of nationality; top ten sending countries to Germany by nationality;
and related data), available at http://www.migrationinformation.orgiGlobaiData (last visited Nov.

21,2005).
38. See Minkenberg, supra note 34, at 220 ("[B]etween 1954 and 1999, Germany became
one of the largest immigrant-receiving countries in the world; the net balance of nine million
immigrants during this period accounts for more than ten percent of today's population."). This
accepted wisdom has recently been challenged by revised official statistics, which purport to have
cleaned up the registry of foreign nationals in Germany. According to the revised statistics, only 6.7
million non-German nationals were legally residing in Germany at the end of 2004. Deutschland:
Bereinigtes Ausliinderregister [Germany: Sanitized Alien Registry], 5 MIGRATION UND
BEVOLKERUNG I (June 2005) [hereinafter Bereinigtes Ausliinderregister].
39. See Minkenberg, supra note 34, at 220; GUNTER RENNER, STAATSANGEHORIGKEITSRECHT 1M ZEICHEN DES NEUEN ZUWANDERUNGSRECHTS [CITIZENSHIP LAW
UNDER THE NEW IMMIGRATION LAW] (Oct. 2004), at 4, MIGRATIONS RECHT. NET (last visited Nov.

29,2005).
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moved gradually but nonetheless dramatically into this formerly exclusive area
of Member State sovereignty and created an elaborate legal framework to
address some of these pressing issues at the regional level. However, the EU's
legal framework on nationality/citizenship and on migration remains a highly
contested work in progress. Member States retain considerable room to
legislate, along with great flexibility when it comes to implementing EU norms.
For its part, Germany has passed comprehensive new legislation governing both
nationality/citizenship40 and immigration41 within the past five years. Thus, at
both the national and the supranational levels, dramatic legal reforms testify to
the continuing salience of nationality, citizenship, and migration, and make it
safe to predict that the question of belonging will remain at the forefront of elite
as well as popular concern in Germany and in the EU well into the twenty-first
century.
This article investigates the evolving notion of belonging through the lens
of Germany's new frameworks for nationality/citizenship and migration. 42
Given the quantity of EU activity in the fields under consideration here,
European developments are also analyzed, though less for their own sake than
for the sake of staking out the parameters within which Germany remains
sovereign to act.
Throughout this article, the question of how concrete developments bear on
larger questions about belonging will recur. I make two main arguments. First,
however welcome Germany's dramatic legal reforms may be, they will not
necessarily solve the problems such legislation was intended to address. With
regard to the new German law governing nationality/citizenship, the experience
of German Jews teaches, among other lessons, that the legal status of citizenship
does not automatically resolve the question of belonging. Tolerance cannot be
legislated, but must-and can-be learned, albeit with difficulty.43 While

40.
41.
42.

The reform of German nationality/citizenship law is discussed infra in Part III.A.
The reform of German immigration law is discussed infra in Part III.B.
This article does not provide a rigorous comparative analysis of German developments,
but does make occasional comparative references when doing so casts German developments into
sharper contour. Numerous comparative analyses are available. See, e.g., FROM MIGRANTS TO
CITIZENS: MEMBERSHIP IN A CHANGING WORLD (T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Douglas Klusmeyer
eds., 2000); THE POLITICS OF IMMIGRATION IN WESTERN EUROPE (M. Baldwin-Edwards & Martin
Schain eds., 1994); CHRISTIAN JOPPKE, IMMIGRATION AND THE NATION-STATE: THE UNITED
STATES, GERMANY, AND GREAT BRITAIN (1999); RIVA KASTORYANO, NEGOTIATING IDENTITIES:
STATES AND IMMIGRANTS IN FRANCE AND GERMANY (Barbara Harshav trans., 2002);
CHALLENGING ETHNIC CITIZENSHIP, supra note 34; Liza Schuster & John Solomos, Rights and
Wrongs Across European Borders: Migrants, Minorities and Citizenship, 6 CITIZENSHIP STUD. 37
(2002) (analyzing Britain, France, Germany and Italy); Dietrich Thranhardt, Einwanderungs- und
Integrationspolitik in Deutschland und den Niederlanden [Immigration and Integration Policy in
Germany and the Netherlands], 30 LEVIATHAN, June 2002, at 220; Patrick Weil, Access to
Citizenship: Comparison of Twenty-Five Nationality Laws, in CITIZENSHIP TODAY: GLOBAL
PERSPECTIVES AND PRACTICES (T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Douglas Klusmeyer eds., 2001)
[hereinafter CITIZENSHIP TODAY]'
43. "Germans have a certain joy about cultural plurality, but then there's this other intriguing
thing .... To learn tolerance is difficult." Axel Honneth, quoted in Jeffrey Fleishman, Debate Over
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public opinIOn data from the 1990s showed an overall high degree of
convergence between the values held by Germans and other Europeans, the data
also provide some evidence that Germans may be less tolerant of diversity.44
Second, despite even the best intentions, some aspects of recent legal reforms in
Germany have the potential to exacerbate rather than alleviate social tensions.
While many affected persons in Germany welcome the new integration
requirements,45 Germany's revamped legal regime has simultaneously set off a
storm of debate that is unlikely to dissipate any time soon. 46
Questions surrounding tolerance, multiculturalism, and the existence of
'parallel societies' have returned to the forefront of contemporary debates in
Germany, particularly since the eruption of ethnic violence in the neighboring
Netherlands in the summer of 200447 and in France in October 2005. 48 The
recent wave of 'honor killing' (Ehrenmord) of Muslim women by family
members49 and controversies over extremist preaching in mosques 50 have kept
Los ANGELES TIMES, July 13,2003, at A5.
44. Germans were slightly more likely (75.8%) to mention tolerance as an important value to
teach children than other Europeans (74%), and were also more likely to say they would like to like
to have immigrants as neighbors (17.1%) than other Europeans (12.1%). Results were virtually
identical on general questions about tolerance of minority groups. However, Germans endorsed
diversity less enthusiastically (53%) than other Europeans (64%), and were less likely to find other
religions "not disturbing" (76%) than other Europeans (83%). Haas, Roever & Schmidt, supra note
2, at 155-56. These results are hardly conclusive and are in dire need of updating, but are interesting
insofar as they pinpoint the most salient differences the researchers uncovered between Germans and
other Europeans in the available survey data.
45. See, e.g., Bereitschaft zur Integration [Readiness to Integrate], KOLNER STADTANZEIGER, Dec. 23, 2004, at 8 (Minister for Social Affairs in North Rhine-Westphalia seeks to
counteract "wide-spread prejudice" among Germans by means of data showing a "great willingness
to integrate," such as high demand to participate in German language classes).
46. The call for integration is not new, but was already part of German policy in the 1970s.
Minkenberg, supra note 34, at 220 (citing the 1977 government report on immigration); see also
Katharina Stankiewicz, Changing Immigration and Integration Politics in Germany (unpublished
2002 manuscript, on file with author) [hereinafter Stankiewicz, Changing Politics], at 8 (on the
implementation of naturalization guidelines-Einbiirgerungsrichtlinien-in 1977). What is new is
the threatened loss of welfare benefits and even potential deportation of migrants who do not make
concrete efforts to integrate. Timm Kriigenow, Bundesamt siebt Zuwanderer aus [Federal Office
Sifts Out Migrants], FIN. TIMES DEUTSCHLAND, Jan. 20, 2005, at 1. See generally Ulrike Davy,
Integration of Immigrants in Germany: A Slowly Evolving Concept, 7 EUR. J. MIGRATION & L. 123
(2005).
47. Violence erupted in the neighboring Netherlands after the murder of filmmaker Theo van
Gogh by Islam extremists. See Niederlande: Serie von Anschliigen nach Mord an Filmemacher,
[Netherlands: Series of Attacks Following Murder of Filmmaker], 9 MIGRATION UND
BEVOLKERUNG I, I (Dec. 2004). The events in the Netherlands contributed to the renewal of
integration debates in Germany, as well as to the discussion of integration at the EU level. See
Deutschland: Neue Integrationsdebatte [Germany: New Integration Debate], 9 MIGRATION UND
BEVOLKERUNG I, 1-2 (Dec. 2004); EU: Grundprinzipien zur Integrationspolitik [EU: Basic
Principles on Integration Policy], 9 MIGRATION UND BEVOLKERUNG 3, 3-4 (Dec. 2004).
48. See, e.g., Craig S. Smith, Riots Spread from Paris to Other French Cities, NEW YORK
TIMES, Nov. 6,2005, at AI3.
49. As of the end of 2005, the latest such murder of a young Muslim woman in Germany by
a family member occurred in Wiesbaden in June 2005. Zwangsheirat Thema im Bundesrat
[Bundesrat Discusses Forced Marriage], 3SAT ONLINE, at http://www.3sat.delbookmarklsendungl
80388 (last visited Oct. 17, 2005). Before that, six such crimes occurred in Berlin during a fourTolerance Hangs Over Germany,
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these issues in the German headlines. The list of prominent German politicians
who have declared multiculturalism a dead letter includes the new federal
chancellor, Angela Merkel. 51 Migrants in Germany thus remain in a precarious
situation, despite legislative and other efforts to improve their conditions. The
situation could polarize even further, as Germany moves ahead with plans to
deport more than a hundred Muslim 'extremists' .52 This already tense ethnocultural milieu is further strained by bleak economic conditions in Germany
itself. 53
During tense times, it is important to ratchet up the exchange of ideas about
the relationship between law and belonging. The lens of belonging, by drawing
attention to the distance between rules and aspirations at the normative level, on
the one hand, and conditions on the ground, on the other, navigates a dynamic
middle course between the polar extremes of primordialist and constructivist
approaches to the topics of citizenship and migration. 54 At the same time, this
month
period.
Klaus
Weisner, Ehrenmord---"honor crime
(March
2005), at
http://www.dekomnetz.de (last visited Oct. 17, 2005). Between 1996 and 2004, around 45 such
murders occurred in Germany. Wisebadener Ehrenmord kein EinzelJall [Wiesbaden Honor Killing
Was
Not
an
Isolated
Case],
HESSISCHES
SOZIALMINISTERIUM,
at
http://www.sozialministerium.hessen.de/ca/ilbgv (last visited Oct. 17, 2005).
50. In 2004, a Berlin imam was caught on camera telling worshipers that Germans would
"bum in hell" because they were non-believers. Ray Furlong, Germans Argue Over Integration,
BBC NEWS (Nov. 30, 2004), at http://news.bbc.co.uklllhi/woridieurope/4056109.stm (last visited
Nov. 29, 2005). The response to this event is discussed infra in note 289.
51. See, e.g., Werner Shiffauer, Die Tiirken, ein deutscher Gliicksfall [The Turks: Germany's
Lucky Break], FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE SONNTAGSZElTUNG, Nov. 28, 2004, at 31 (quoting
Merkel's reference to the "grandiose failure of multiculturalism"). Former Chancellor Helmut
Schmidt caused further furor by suggesting that the decision to invite guest workers to Germany in
the 1960s had been a mistake. Furlong, Germans Argue Over Integration, supra note 50.
52. lslamisten droht Ausweisung [Islamists Face Deportation], FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU,
Jan. 24, 2005, at 4. The threatened deportations are being pursued by the Lander-not by the federal
government-on the basis of changes in the new immigration law, which has been in effect since
January 1, 2005. Another potential source of destabilization, at least among the large Turkish
population living in Germany and elsewhere in the EU, has been forestalled by the EU's October
2005 decision to open accession (that is, membership) negotiations with Turkey. EU Opens Historic
Accession Talks with Turkey, EUOBSERVER.COM (Oct. 3, 2005) (last visited Oct. 17, 2005).
53. The Hartz IV reforms that took effect in January 2005 have radically reformed and
reduced welfare benefits, and pushed the number of registered unemployed in Germany past the five
million post by February 2005. Arbeitslosigkeit auf Rekordhoch [Unemployment at a Record High],
FAZ.NET (Feb. 2, 2005) (last visited Oct. 17, 2005). The last time Germany saw such high
unemployment was during the Great Depression. Funf Millionen [Five Million], FAZ.NET (Feb. 2,
2005) (last visited Oct. 17, 2005).
54. By aiming to avoid the excesses of both primordialist/cultural and constructivist/identity
approaches to the matter of membership, I do not claim that such approaches are necessarily flawed.
Indeed, some of the most compelling contemporary accounts of European developments are framed
in terms of identity. See, e.g., Shaw, supra note 22, at 294 (focusing on "the interaction between a
narrow and formal legal concept of citizenship ... and a broader notion of 'membership' comprising
constitutional, political and socio-economic elements in a multilevel (non-state) polity which is
developing under post-national conditions involving fractured (state and individual) identities"}.
However, cultural and identity-based approaches often suffer from conceptual vagueness. They pose
methodological dangers as well. For example, cultural approaches can fall prey to overdetermination or reification, whereas identity-based approaches may privilege agency over more
immutable structural factors. Some particularly meticulous observers of European integration argue
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approach helps to denature the notion that attachments form primarily, if not
solely at the level of the nation. This aspect renders belonging congenial for
examining developments in the EU and in Germany that are driving a wedge
between nationality and citizenship, between the nation and the state. 55 But
while national identity in Germany appears to be in decline,56 it is too soon to
predict whether it will stand its ground or yield to other forms of sub- or
supranational attachment. The lens of belonging offered here turns away from
such ultimate questions and looks instead at different levels where it may be
experienced and constructed, ranging from the family through group, city,57
community and nation, to international society58 and beyond. Belonging,
understood as the experience or practice of embeddedness, may become more
salient as rights migrate 'upward' from the local communities that first granted
them 59 towards increasingly abstract entities.
I tum now to a concrete examination of the legal frameworks within which
belonging must be negotiated. This article proceeds by first providing a
conceptual framework and addressing European-level developments pertaining
to nationality/citizenship (Part II.A) and migration (Part II.B), then turns to

that "[ c Julture and identity are useful concepts only to delineate the baseline of a process ... that
constitutes the single most striking case of wholly peaceful and voluntary political change in world
history. They are not useful for describing and analyzing that phenomenon." Haas, Roever &
Schmidt, supra note 2, at 151.
55. See, e.g., Joppke, supra note 2, at 53-54:
The picture that. . . emerges is that of the dissociation of state and nation in the liberal
state's membership policies. States certainly continue to be 'nation-states', identifiable by a
name like an individual, and embodying a unique history and collectivity. However, they
have become wide open for new entrants, who can no longer be included or excluded on the
basis of ascribed group characteristics, but only as individuals.
This trend marks a departure from the traditional view of the "powerful and assumed relationship"
between belonging (understood as membership in the nation) and rights (understood as membership
in the state). DAVID JACOBSON, RIGHTS ACROSS BORDERS: IMMIGRATION AND THE DECLINE OF
CITIZENSHIP ix, 107 (1996).
56. According to the public opinion data analyzed by Haas, Roever & Schmidt, supra note 2,
at 154-55, Germany (like other European countries) is experiencing a decline in the salience of
national identity. Conversely, Germans are more likely than other Europeans to claim European
identity.
57. For example, a recent immigrant to the U.S. from Kazakhstan joined the U.S. military
after the September II attacks, explaining that it "doesn't matter that America is not my country.
New York is my city." War on Terror: Perspectives, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 5,2001, at 25. See also
SAVAGE, BAGNALL & LONGHURST, supra note 15 (on local belonging and attachment).
5S. See generally INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY AND ITS CRITICS (Alex J. Bellamy ed., 2005)
(surveying debates in the fiel:! of international relations); URRY, supra note IS, at 6 (providing a
sociological perspective and arguing that contemporary challenges to traditional notions of '''nationstate-society' ... suggest that maybe Thatcher was oddly right when she said there is no such thing
as society").
59. The rise of international and supranational human rights law is discussed infra in Part
Il.A.I. It bears mention here that, although states are becoming less essential as a source of rights,
they remain "critical as the mediating mechanism, the node, of a variety of international institutions
and global processes . . . . [IJt is primarily through the state that international human rights law is
realized (and contested), and it is through the state that different groups and organizations (or
individuals) can seek to shape interpretations of that law." JACOBSON, supra note 55, at x.
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consider the recent changes in German law on nationality/citizenship (Part lILA)
and on migration (Part III.B). The discussion of integration in Part IV provides
the common thread that ties the two strands of analysis in Parts II and III
together. The emerging integration paradigm evidences a pragmatic approach to
both the internal and external dimensions of belonging, but also contains the
seeds of future conflict.

II.
FRAMING GERMAN DEVELOPMENTS

A. BELONGING TO: NATIONALITY AND CITIZENSHIP

1. Overview

'Nationality' and 'citizenship' both capture fundamental aspects of the
content and meaning of belonging. Unfortunately, neither of these terms can lay
claim to a clearly bounded definition. Moreover, these English terms are often
treated as synonymous, when in fact they refer to different, albeit overlapping,
statuses. Some official EU languages use the same term for both concepts,
whereas others, including English, employ different terms. 60 The task of
defining and delineating the English terms 'nationality' and 'citizenship' poses a
major threshold challenge to any inquiry in this field. This difficulty is
compounded when one grafts a transnational or supranational dimension onto
the territory-based system in which these phenomena emerged. Thus, an
attempt at conceptual clarification must precede any examination of recent
developments in the ED and in Germany.
Nationality is the traditional international legal term that refers to the link
between an individual and a state. 6l International law leaves questions of
nationality largely up to each country, which can "settle by its own legislation
the rules relating to the acquisition of its nationality, and to confer that
60. For a detailed analysis of the terminology corresponding to these two English terms in
other EU languages, along with a comparison of how these terms are used in England, Ireland, and
the United States, see Gerard-Rene de Groot, Towards a European Nationality Law, 8.3
ELECTRONIC J. COMPo L. I, 2 (October 2004), available at http://www.ejcl.org (providing detailed
etymological analysis of the terminology used in all EU member states) (last visited Nov. 29, 2005).
Yet de Groot notes that despite the existence of parallel terminology in various languages (including
the German terms Staatsangehorigkeit and -burgerschaft), the "relationship between these two
concepts ... is not fully clear." Id. at 2-3.
61. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 211
cmt. a (1987) ("[T]he principal relationship that links an individual to the state is nationality."). I
refrain from using the term nation-state since "there are very few states that consist of a single nation
or ethnie." Franck, supra note 12, at 360. Nationality has also been described as "citizenship's
external face." Alex Warleigh, Purposeful Opportunists? EU Institutions and the Struggle over
European Citizenship, in BELLAMY & WARLEIGH, supra note 32, at 19,24. See also Alice Ludvig,
Why Should Austria be Different from Germany? The Two Recent Nationality Reforms in Contrast,
J3 GERMAN POLITICS 499, 500 (2004) ("[T]he rules on naturalization ... are the institutional
expression of who is to be included and who is to be excluded from membership in the demos.").
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nationality b~ naturalization granted by its own organs in accordance with that
legislation." 2 This explains why questions of nationality have thus far63 been
regulated by domestic legislation, such as the Immigration and Nationality Act
in the United States. 64 Under international law, nationality implies a host of
rights and obligations for the individual, including "being subject to a nation's
laws, its taxes, and military conscription while enjoying the right of protection
by the state even when abroad.,,65 Whereas this term is still commonly used in
English, particularly in international legal discourse, it has fallen into disrepute
in some Continental countries, where it evokes abhorrent ethnic notions of
nationalism.
Citizenship is a tougher notion to grasp because it lies at the intersection of
law, social science, and political theory. Whereas the meaning of nationality has
remained relatively stable within the so-called Westphalian system from which
it emerged, the meaning of citizenship has evolved over time and differs from
place to place. 66
Citizenship implies "full membership" in a political
community. 67 Before the state emerged as the predominant form of political
organization, citizenship referred to membership in smaller governmental units
and implied the rights enjoyed by, as well as the duties imposed on, those lawful
residents who were entitled to the status of citizen. 68 Later, in the Westphalian

62. Nottebohm Case (Liech. v. Guat.), 1955 l.C.J. 4, 20-21 (Nov. 29, 1955); see also,
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 211 cmt. c (\987) ("A
state is free to establish nationality law and confer nationality as it sees fit."). However,
international law does impose some limits on each state's sovereignty in regard to nationality. Thus,
"other states need not recognize a nationality that is involuntary. .. or that is not based on an
accepted 'genuine link.'" Id.
63. De Groot, supra note 60, at 20 suggests that the EU is on its way to adopting a common
nationality law. Others "emphasize the enduring importance of nationality, in opposition to the thesis
of a postnational age in which state membership is fading in significance, eclipsed by the rise of
transnational identities and human rights protections." Gerald L. Neuman, Book Review, 96 AM. J.
INT'L L. 514, 514 (2002).
64. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.c. §§ 1101-1537 (2000). Section lI03(a)(3)
defines "alien" as "any person not a citizen or national of the United States." A U.S. "national" is a
person who is either "(A) a citizen of the United States, or (B) ... who, though not a citizen of the
United States, owes permanent allegiance to the United States." § llOl(a)(22).
65. Koslowski, supra note 12, at 205.
66. Bellamy, The Making of Modern Citizenship, supra note 9, at 5, doubts whether "a
history of the concept from ancient Greece to the present could plausibly be written," given that:
[T]he term 'citizen' has had different meanings in different historical periods and
languages. It can signify the member of a city and/or a given class, as in the Greek polities
or the original usage of the German Staatsbuerger, or be equated with subjecthood of a
monarchy, as in Britain, or membership of a state, as in France, or be associated primarily
with belonging to a people or nation, as was the case in Germany.
Id.
67. Shaw, supra note 22, at 297 (noting that citizenship is not merely a "formal legal
status").
68. Maarten Prak, Burghers into Citizens: Urban and National Citizenship in the
Netherlands during the Revolutionary Era (c. 1800), 26 THEORY & SOC'y 403 (\997). These
historical origins explain the high level of variance that prevailed from one governmental entity to
another in the early conditions of citizenship. Tilly notes as well that the "rights and obligations
linking citizens to states have formed through struggle." Charles Tilly, A Primer on Citizenship, 26
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system, citizenship came to mean membership in a particular state. This familiar
meaning has come under increasing attack, particularly in the wake of the
development ofEU citizenship.69
The term citizenship itself can "denote a relationship to a polity, a social
status, an activity, a package of rights, or a package of responsibilities.,,70 It is a
sociological and political concept as well as a legal one. From the legal
perspective, citizenship has been rooted in domestic law and has not
traditionally been a concept of intemationallaw?l In contemporary usage, the
concept of citizenship serves as the marker for membership in democratic
society, regardless of the form that the political community happens to take.
Citizenship is an "institution which has.. . been developed and refined to
nurture and protect" the homo politicus, who embodies the democratic
expectation that individuals should "playa part in the social and political life of
the society in which they reside."n Viewing citizenship solely through a legal
or constitutional lens thus misses much of the "functional significance of the
relevant polity for individual citizens.,,73 Consequently, it is relatively easy to
pinpoint the legal content of citizenship, but much more difficult to fathom its
political and social meaning?4
Citizenship is a "contested truth,,75 that has in recent years enjoyed the

THEORY & SOC'Y 599, 601 (1997); see also Pietro Costa, From National to European Citizenship: A
Historical Comparison, in BELLAMY ET AL., supra note 9, at 207.
69. In order to render the evolving nature of political community, Tilly, supra note 63, at
600, has proposed a more generic definition that does not limit citizenship to any particular type of
governmental entity, but rather defines it as a "set of mutually enforceable claims relating categories
of persons to agents of governments." While broad enough to capture some emerging forms of
membership, Tilly's referential frame is too narrow to embrace all notions of citizenship found in
contemporary discourse. In particular, there appears to be no room in Tilly's definition for
discussions of cosmopolitan citizenship based on membership in international society. See, e.g.,
DANIELE ARCHIBUGI & DAVID HELD, COSMOPOLITAN DEMOCRACY: AN AGENDA FOR A NEW
WORLD ORDER (1995); RE-IMAGINING POLITICAL COMMUNITY: STUDIES IN COSMOPOLITAN
CITIZENSHIP (Daniele Archibugi et al. eds., 1998); DAVID HELD, DEMOCRACY AND THE GLOBAL
ORDER: FROM THE MODERN STATE TO COSMOPOLITAN GOVERNANCE (1995). Moreover, Tilly's
emphasis on "claims" misses the full range of practices involved in the construction of citizenship.
See, e.g., Antje Wiener, Making Sense of the New Geography of Citizenship: Fragmented
Citizenship in the European Union, 26 THEORY & SOC'y 529 (1997) [hereinafter Wiener,

Fragmented Citizenship J.
70. Neuman, supra note 63, at 514.
71. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 211 cm!. h
(1987) (observing that not all States recognize this distinction).
72. Michelle Everson, The Legacy of the Market Citizen, in NEW LEGAL DYNAMICS OF
EUROPEAN UNION 73, 76 (Io Shaw & Gillian Moore eds., 1995) [hereinafter SHAW & MOORE]
(noting that citizen is "both governor and governed").
73. R.I. Barry Jones, The Political Economy of European Citizenship, in BELLAMY &
W ARLEIGH, supra note 32, at 145 ("[T]he sets of legal definitions and provisions that endow
individuals with formal membership of a polity are important, but remain only a small part of the
picture of substantive and meaningful citizenship." (citations omitted».
74. Everson, supra note 72, at 76; see also Rainer BaubOck, Recombinant Citizenship,
Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna Political Science Series No. 67 (1999) (distinguishing "thick"
and "thin" conceptions of citizenship).
75. M.R. Sommers, Rights, Relationality and Membership: Rethinking the Making and
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attention of scholars from across the disciplinary spectrum.16 Despite the great
range of opinion found in the massive literature on citizenship, most authors
agree that citizenship includes, at the very least, the "bundle of civil, political,
and social rights possessed by individuals,,77 by virtue of their relationship to a
governmental entity. However, this is an unsatisfactory definition of citizenship
because it overlaps substantially with that of nationality. Thus, most authors
take this rights-based definition as a starting point for their analysis of
citizenship, then elaborate upon it by expanding on the list of rights granted 78 or
creating typologies that differentiate the internal structure of citizenship.1 9
Some authors emphasize the important distinction between passive80 and active
citizenship, and draw attention to the constitutive role of practices,81 while still
Meaning of Citizenship, 19 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 63, 64 (1994).
76. Even the best legal scholars recognize the need for an interdisciplinary approach to the
study of European citizenship. See, e.g., Shaw, supra note 22, at 309-10. However, Shaw has also
observed that "lawyers ... were the first group of writers to begin to extrapolate concepts of
citizenship out of the materials of what was then EEC law." Id. at 297 n.lO. For examples of
different frames of analysis, see CITIZENSHIP, DEMOCRACY AND JUSTICE IN THE NEW EUROPE
(Percy B. Lehning & Albert Weale eds., 1997); Symposium, Changing Citizenship Theory and
Practice, 38 PS: POLITICAL SCIENCE & POLITICS 667-99 (Oct. 2005); Y ASEMIN NUHOGLU SOYSAL,
LIMITS TO CITIZENSHIP: MIGRANTS AND POSTNATIONAL MEMBERSHIP IN EUROPE (1994); Joseph
H.H. Weiler, To Be a European Citizen: Eros and Civilization, in JOSEPH WEILER, THE
CONSTITUTION OF EUROPE: "Do THE NEW CLOTHES HAVE AN EMPEROR?" AND OTHER ESSAYS ON
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 324 (1999) [hereinafter Weiler, Eros and Civilization]; Antje Wiener, The
Embedded Acquis Communautaire: Transmission Belt and Prism of New Governance, 4 EUR. L.J.
294 (1998) [hereinafter Wiener, Embedded Acquis].
77. See, e.g., Koslowski, supra note 12, at 205. Here Koslowski, like most other experts on
citizenship, invokes "the almost canonical approach to citizenship issues taken by the sociologist
T.H. Marshall." Shaw, supra note 22, at 297 (quoting T.H. MARSHALL, CITIZENSHIP AND SOCIAL
CLASS) (1950». Everson argues that "entitlement by right" is the "core of citizenship," supra note
72, at 84, and explains that "entitlements are the classic rights of citizenship, arranged in a series of
concentric circles, with civil or civic rights forming the core, then political rights, and with social
rights situated beyond these." Id. at 83.
78. For example, Baubock has argued that cultural citizenship constitutes a fourth kind of
citizenship. Rainer Baubock, Cultural Citizenship, Minority Rights and Self-Government, in
CITIZENSHIP TODAY, supra note 42, at 319-48.
79. Bellamy, The Making of Modern Citizenship, supra note 9, identifies three components
of citizenship (that is, rights, belonging, and participation), whereas Jones claims that citizenship has
formal, instrumental and affective facets that provide the "foundations of effective polities." Jones,
supra note 73, at 144, 146.
80. Bellamy, The Making of Modern Citizenship, supra note 9, at 7, stresses the distinction
between citizenship and "mere subjecthood," which I understand as a form of passivity or nonagency. See also PreuB, supra note 13, at 23 ("As part of the evolution of modern statehood,
nationals changed from being mere passive subjects of the nation-state in which they lived to
become active citizens who constituted the state-as-nation."). This semantic distinction appears to
have a rough parallel in the field of public international law, where some experts similarly reject the
term "subjects of' international law, and use the term "persons in" international law instead. See
Introductory Note to Part 2 of RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW (cautioning
against use of the term "subject" since it "may have more limited connotations, suggesting that such
entities have only rights and obligations," whereas "entities that are persons under international
law ... have legal status, personality, rights, and duties under international law").
81. See, e.g., Richard Bellamy, The 'Right to Have Rights ': Citizenship Practice and the
Political Constitution of the EU, in BELLAMY & W ARLEIGH, supra note 32, at 41-70 [hereinafter
Bellamy, Citizenship Practice]; Riva Kastoryano, Citizenship and Belonging: Beyond Blood and
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others proceed by recognizing and analyzing further dimensions of citizenship,
such as its relational character82 or its nonnative nature,83 that help to
distinguish it from mere nationality. Thus, the contemporary understanding of
citizenship refers less to an overarching status, than to a set of rights and
obligations that the individual must negotiate across various levels of
governance, from concrete local communities and institutions on up to higher
levels of abstraction.
With these basic definitions in place, we can now reconsider the
relationship between nationality and citizenship. First, as already noted, the two
concepts overlap in tenns of their content since rights and duties play a central
role in defining each tenn. Second, in the Westphalian system, where the state
is understood as the main source of rights and personal identity,84 nationality
and citizenship may be, but are not necessarily identical in the fonnal legal
sense. Nationality is in one sense broader and more inclusive, since it is a
necessary but not always sufficient condition for citizenship. Thus, "every
citizen is a national, but not every national is necessarily a citizen of the State
concerned.,,85 For example, c02'0rations, ships and aircraft possess nationality
but do not possess citizenship. 8 This may also be true of individuals in some
countries. For example, not all British nationals enjoy the privileged status of
British citizen,87 nor do all American nationals enjoy fuJI rights of citizenship. 88

Soil, in HEDETOFT & HJORT, supra note 16, at 120-36; Warleigh, supra note 61; Wiener,
Fragmented Citizenship, supra note 69.
82. Tilly, supra note 68, at 600 (arguing that citizenship "has the character of a contract:
variable in range, never completely specificable, always depending on unstated assumptions about
context, modified by practice, constrained by collective memory, yet ineluctably involving rights
and obligations sufficiently defined that either party is likely to express indignation and take
corrective action when the other fails to meet expectations built into the relationship").
83. The normative aspect of citizenship "concerns the manner in which people feel their
particular community should be organized." Everson, supra note 72, at 80. See, e.g., Bellamy,
Citizenship Practice, supra note 81; LEHNING & WEALE, supra note 76; Nikos Prentoulis, On the
Technology of Collective Identity: Normative Reconstructions of the Concept of EU Citizenship, 7
EUR. L.J. 196 (2001); Shaw, supra note 22, at 294,315.
84. "Since the Reformation, the Peace of Westphalia and the writings of Hugo Grotius, the
state has been the alpha and omega of personal identity." Franck, supra note 12, at 360.
85. PAUL WEIS, NATIONALITY AND STATELESSNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 5-6 (1979);
see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 211 cmt. h (1987) ("A citizen under
national law is generally a national for purposes of international law, but in some states not all
nationals are citizens.").
86. Koslowski, supra note 12, at 205. The following discussion pertains only to individuals
and does not explore further implications of nationality or citizenship for corporations, ships or
aircraft.
87. For an overview of the various statuses recognized under the British Nationality Act, see
de Groot, supra note 60, at 2 and text accompanying note 7 (noting the categories of British
Overseas Territories Citizen, British Overseas Citizen, British Subject without Citizenship, and
British Protected Person).
88. Currently, persons born in an outlying possession of the United States (that is, American
Samoa and Swains Island) fall into this category. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 308 (8
U.S.C. §1408 (2000). Moreover, U.S. felons may lose their citizenship rights, but still retain their
nationality. Koslowski, supra note 12, at 205. Historically, Black Americans were treated as noncitizen nationals prior to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Dred Scott v.
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As these examples show, citizenship may constitute a narrower and more
exclusive category, or subset, of nationality, when viewed in terms of
membership. Yet in such cases, citizenship simultaneously implies a broader
range or greater quantum of rights and duties than those attached to mere
nationality, when viewed in terms of its content. 89 In addition, neither
nationality nor citizenship inherently requires that the relationship between
individual and state be an exclusive one. Rather, the Westphalian presumption
of singular allegiance is an historical artifact of relatively recent modernist
origin. "Human beings for millennia have defined themselves in terms of loyalty
to more than one system of social and political organization.,,90 This stricture of
the Westphalian system began eroding after World War II and was noticeably
diminished by the turn of the millennium, though it still retains considerable
force. 91
Citizenship, like nationality, is still largely defined with reference to the
state, despite the advance of new forms of belonging. It has, however, taken on
a wealth of post-Westphalian meaning, particularly since its formal introduction
at the EU level by the 1992 Maastricht Treaty on European Union ("TEU,,).92

Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 404-05 (1857).
89. This distinction roughly parallels the one under international law between absolute and
relative human rights, where "absolute rights are rights that everyone has against everyone else,"
while relative rights are those "that every member of every legal community has in her respective
legal community." Rut Rubio Marin & Rory O'Connell, The European Convention and the Relative
Rights of Resident Aliens, 5 EUR. L.J. 4, 4 (1999). For example, the European Convention on
Human Rights accords "some rights to all persons within the jurisdiction of the state, but reserves
certain rights for the nationals of each country." !d. at 5; see European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950 (ETS No.5), 213 U.N.T.S.
222, entered into force Sept. 3, 1953, as amended [hereinafter ECHR]; see also International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, GA Res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. N6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, entered into force Mar. 23, 1976.
90. Franck, supra note 12, at 370. In Western Europe, the "common accommodation of
multiple loyalties ... generally ceased in late Tudor England and in the Sun King's France, when the
state became sovereign and the sovereign became the state." [d. at 371. The French and American
revolutions substituted "horizontal" loyalty to the sovereign people for "vertical" personal fealty to
the monarch, and transformed individuals from subjects into citizens, but did not abandon the
insistence on exclusive loyalty to one sovereign. [d. at 372. In that historical context, the term
'nation' referred to the "new sovereign" constituted by "the people ... themselves, conjoined in
liberty, equality and fraternity," and thus meant "something entirely different from its current
usage." [d. In the late eighteenth century, "the state became the nation: not the nation of ethnic
compatibility but the nation of kindred ideals." [d. Only towards the end of the nineteenth century
were the terms 'nation' and 'nationalism' "appropriated" and "twisted into new loyalty patterns
based on exclusive and xenophobic loyalty to myth-history, race, language, ethnie and culture. The
French nation that emerged in 1789 was not even remotely related conceptually to the German
nation created and led a century later by Prussia." !d.
91. Franck, supra note 12; Koslowski, supra note 12; Peter J. Spiro, Dual Nationality and
the Meaning of Citizenship, 46 EMORY L.J. 1411, 1413 (1997) (noting that the U.S. "has moved
towards almost complete toleration of dual nationality"). German views on dual nationality are
discussed infra in Part IILA.
92. Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 OJ. (C 191) I [hereinafter TEU]. The
TEU entered into effect on November 1, 1993. A consolidated version containing subsequent
amendments to the TEU is available at 2002 OJ. (C 325) 5.
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Contemporary practices of citizenship are "increasingly decoupled from
belon~ing in the national collective" and occur in a proliferating number of
sites.
As the state's role as exclusive provider of rights characteristic of
citizenship declines,94 the breach between nationality and citizenship widens.

2. Nationality and Citizenship in the European Union
EU citizenship demonstrates both continuity and rupture with the
prevailing Westphalian system. This section offers an overview of the nature
and content of this complex phenomenon. My aims here are to identify key
continuities and discontinuities, and to pinpoint areas where further
developments are brewing, in order to illuminate the shifting parameters within
which Germany and other FU Member States remain sovereign over matters
pertaining to nationality and citizenship. Article 17 of the EC Treaty provides:
Citizenship of the Union is hereby established. Every person holding the
nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union. Citizenship of the
Union shall complement and not replace national citizenship.,,5

On its face, this formulation reveals a fundamental continuity between
state-based and EU citizenship. Additional continuities, along with a number of
important discontinuities, can be discerned upon further analysis of the nature
and content of EU citizenship. Particular care must be taken to differentiate
these facets of EU citizenship, since they reflect and are thus key to appreciating
the EU's sui generis nature,96 which combines characteristics of international'
93. Yasemin Nuhoglu Soysal, Citizenship and Identity: Living in Diasporas in Postwar
Europe?, in HEDETOFT & HJORT, supra note 16, at 137, 139; see also Veit Bader, Citizenship and
Exclusion: Radical Democracy. Community. and Justice. Or. What's Wrong with
Communitarianism?, 23 POL. THEORY 224 (1995) (calling for "democratic citizenship ... to be
disentangled from citizenship as state membership"); KASTORYANO, supra note 42, at 132
(observing the increasing "dissociation of citizenship from nationality").
94. Today, the "consolidated state remains the most important locus of rights," but is "no
longer their only locus." Michael Hanagan, Recasting Citizenship: Introduction, 26 THEORY &
SOC'y 397, 399 (1997). This is particularly true in the EU, but can also be taken to refer to the
increasing role of international law as a source of rights that might be characterized as pertaining to
citizenship, such as the ECHR, supra note 89.
95. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, March 25, 1957,298 U.N.T.S.
11,4 EUR. Y.B. 412, as amended [hereinafter EC Treaty]. A consolidated version incorporating
subsequent amendments to the EC Treaty-which is still often referred to as the Rome Treaty-is
available at 2002 OJ. (C 325) 33. The first sentence of Article 17 was added as Article 8 to the preexisting EC Treaty by the 1992 Maastricht Treaty of European Union, supra note 92. The second
sentence of Article 17 was added by the Treaty of Amsterdam, which entered into force on May I,
1999. Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing the
European Communities and Certain Related Acts, Oct. 2, 1997, 1997 0.1. (C 340) I [hereinafter
Treaty of Amsterdam]. The Treaty of Amsterdam renumbered the citizenship provisions in the EC
Treaty, with the effect that former Article 8 became Article 17. The Treaty of Nice, which entered
into effect on February 1, 2003, did not alter the EC Treaty in regard to citizenship. Treaty of Nice
amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing the European Communities and
Certain Related Acts, Feb. 26, 2001,2001 OJ. (C 80) 70 [hereinafter Treaty of Nice).
96. Curtin asserts that the "true world-historical significance" of this sui generis entity lies in
its conferral of "rights on individuals." Dierdre Curtin, The Constitutional Structure oJthe Union: A
Europe oj Bits and Pieces, 20 COMMON MARKET L. REv. 17, 67 (1993); see also Bellamy &
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organizations with those found in different types of states. 97 EU citizenship
creates "schizophrenic" citizens who are simultaneously linked to "two
divergent forms" ofpolity.98
a. The Link Between Nationality and Citizenship

The first and most overt continuity is that nationality remains a necessary
precondition of EU citizenship,99 just as it is required in the context of the
Westphalian state. EU citizenship also hews to tradition insofar as "the question
whether an individual possesses the nationality of a Member State shall be
settled solel~ by reference to the national law of the Member State
concerned.,,1 0 Further continuity exists insofar as Member State nationality,
while necessary, does not always suffice to confer EU citizenship. Thus, some
persons possessing Member State nationality do not enjoy full membership in
the EU. IOI However, there are indications that these traditional foundations of
EU citizenship are under strain and that "full [Member State] autonomy cannot
be maintained ... in all circumstances.',102
This pressure towards convergence with regard to nationality comes from
various directions. First, the EU's expanding role in the field of immigration 103
increases the practical need to devise common approaches to some aspects of
nationality law, such as the treatment of stateless persons lO4 and rules on

Warleigh, supra note 32, at 8 (noting the EU's "betwixt-and-between character").
97. Everson, supra note 72, at 77, suggests that a "tenuous analogy may be drawn between
this supranational citizen/diluted alien and the federal/state citizen of orthodox constitutional
government." See generally Peter Schuck, Citizenship in Federal Systems, 48 AM. 1. COMPo L. 195
(2000).
98. Everson, supra note 72, at 77.
99. De Groot, supra note 60, at 2, points out that the meaning of the term "national
citizenship" is unclear, but presumes that it refers to "possession and exercise of 'citizenship rights'
at the national level."
100. Declaration (No.2) on Nationality of a Member State, 1992 0.1. (C 191) 98. This
principle is not contradicted by the existence of the optional European Convention on Nationality,
supra note 23, which was prepared under the auspices of the Strasbourg-based Council of Europe.
De Groot, supra note 60, at 30, urges the EU to "cooperate with the Council of Europe" in regard to
harmonization of rules on acquisition and loss of nationality; Gerard-Rene de Groot, The European
Convention on Nationality: A Step towards a Ius Commune in the Field of Nationality Law, 7
MAASTRICHT 1. EUR. & COMPo L. 117 (2000).
101. See de Groot, supra note 60, at 8-9. De Groot claims that "Fidel Castro himself could
immediately opt for European citizenship while continuing to reside in Cuba" by virtue of recent
changes in Spanish nationality law. !d. at 10.
102. De Groot, supra note 60, at 10; see also A EUROPEAN NATIONALITY: CITIZENSHIP,
IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY LAW IN THE EU (Randall Hansen & Patrick Wei I eds., 2001).
Numerous authors have called explicitly for decoup1ing Union citizenship from nationality. See
generally Norbert Reich, Union Citizenship-Metaphor or Source of Rights?, 7 EUR. L.J. 4, 15-19
(2001) (summarizing the debate on this topic, including the possibility of taking residence as a
central criterion for citizenship).
103. See the discussion of the emerging EU framework for migration, infra Part II.B.
104. European Parliament Resolution (Sept. 18, 1981) on the British Nationality Bill, 1981
0.1. (C 260) 100 (issued in connection with the British Nationality Act 1981).
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naturalization. 105 For example, the 1999 Tampere Council I 06 endorsed the
"long-term objective that long-term residents should be offered the opportunity
to obtain the nationality of the Member State in which they are resident," and
thereby also to gain EU citizenship. 107 In line with that objective, the
Commission-ostensibly "without prejudice to the fact that the Member States
alone remain competent in the area of nationality laws,,108-subsequently
prepared a report presenting its views in favor of naturalization as a means to
promote further integration of legal immigrants. 109
Second, evolving
applications of the principles of non-discrimination and equality may drive
further harmonization. For example, the existence of "striking ... differences"
in the treatment of descendants of persons originating in the territory of the
various Member States provides an occasion that may tempt EU institutions to
limit Member State sovereignty in regard to nationality. I 10 The European Court
of Justice ("ECJ") has already made clear that it will review Member State
nationality laws to assess their compatibility with principles of Community
law. III While none of these sources of pressure spell the certain end of
Member State sovereignty with regard to nationality, when taken together, they
portend further development at the EU level and concomitant constraints on
Member State action in this field.

105. De Groot, supra note 60, at 20 n.92, points out that Article I, Section 8, Clause 4 of the
U.S. Constitution granted the Congress the power to "establish an unifonn Rule on Naturalization,"
in order to prevent the States of the Union from developing different policies on naturalization and
immigration. In contrast, other matters of nationality law, such as acquisition by birth and loss of
nationality, were regulated by the States and not by the Federal Government until 1868, when the
14th Amendment came into force.
106. In October 1999, during the Finnish Presidency, the European Council held a special
meeting to elaborate the "policy orientations and priorities" necessary to implement the Area of
Freedom, Security and Justice ("AFSJ") that had been established by Article 2 of the Treaty of
Amsterdam. Presidency Conclusions of the Tampere European Council (Oct. 15-16, 1999), Bull.
EU 10-1999, ~~ 1.3 - 1.11, ~ 1.3.9 [hereinafter Tampere Milestones). This special meeting of the
European Council adopted the tenn "genuine European area of justice" to describe the telos of the
justice component of the AFSJ. Id. ~ 1.8.
107. Commission o/the European Communities, Fourth Report on Citizenship o/the Union,
COM (2004) 695 final (Oct. 26, 2004), at 4 [hereinafter Fourth Citizenship Report).
108. Fourth Citizenship Report, supra note 107, at 4.
109. Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Immigration,
Integration and Employment, COM (2003) 336 final (June 3, 2003) [hereinafter COMMISSION
COMMUNICATION ON IMMIGRATION, INTEGRATION AND EMPLOYMENT].
110. De Groot, supra note 60, at 21 (arguing that "[i]t will be difficult to continue to accept
such unequal treatment").
Ill. De Groot, supra note 60, at 11-20, summarizes a number of cases in text accompanying
notes 49-90. Among these is the 1992 Micheletti case, in which the ECJ stated that "[t]he definition
of the conditions of acquisition and loss of nationality is, in confonnity with international law,
within the competence of each Member State, which competence must be exercised with due regard
to Community law." Case 369/90, Micheletti v. Delegacion del Gobiemo European Cantabria, 1992
E.C.R. 1-4258 (emphasis added).
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b. The Centrality of Rights

The second major continuity between EU and State-based citizenship
comprises the centrality of rights in defining EU citizenship. 112 Primary (that
is, treaty) law is supplemented by a growing body of secondary legislation at the
EU level. However, this perspective oversimplifies the picture in two respects.
First, cataloging the formal legal rights that make up EU citizenship is just the
first step towards comprehending this phenomenon.t 13 The picture of EU
citizenship as a juridical status based on conferred rights is too limited. Rather,
a holistic inquiry into the active, engaged citizen "as political being" is
needed,114 given the proliferation of both individual and institutional practices
that constitute EU citizenship in action. 115 Second, while it is clear that Union
citizenship supplements the rights of national citizenship, it is less clear to what
extent it really improves the position already enjoyed by individuals under EC
law. 116 From this perspective, Union citizenship is "less than revolutionary
[but] far from a dead letter." 117
A fully rendered portrayal of Union citizenship would require projecting its
content against the double backdrops of Member State citizenship and the
acquis communautaire. However, such a comprehensive analysis is beyond the
scope of the following sketch of the contours of Union citizenship. In the
narrow sense of provisions found in Part II of the EC Treaty, EU citizenship
bestows four limited but nonetheless "genuine" 118 new rights upon nationals of

112. "Citizens of the Union shall enjoy the rights conferred by this Treaty and shall be
subject to the duties imposed thereby." Article 17, EC Treaty, supra note 95. To date, no concrete
duties have been imposed on EU citizens. But see Reich, supra note 102, at 20-23 (discussing the
notion of "duty ofloyalty" and other concepts that might be used to limit individuals' rights).
113. Antje Wiener has traced "the roots of citizenship policy and actual citizenship
practice ... over a period of about two decades ... since the early 1970s." Wiener, Fragmented
Citizenship, supra note 69, at 537-38.
114. CROUCHER, supra note I, at 46-47 (contrasting the legalistic Roman notion of
citizenship with the political, Aristotelian view). A number of leading scholars on EU citizenship
stress the importance of the political facet of citizenship. See, e.g., Bellamy, Citizenship Practice,
supra note 81; Shaw, supra note 22, at 294 (EU membership is "an ideal type" based on "an active
conception of social citizenship based on a politically defined community"); Warleigh, supra note
61.

115. Citizenship is a "dynamic" concept, Wiener, Fragmented Citizenship, supra note 69, at
530, that embodies "the institutional struggle over the development of the EU itself." Warleigh,
supra note 61, at 21; see also Wiener, Embedded Acquis, supra note 76.
116. Many commentators on EU citizenship have examined whether, and if so, how and to
what extent, it has altered the existing position of individuals under Community law. See, e.g.,
Everson, supra note 72; Reich, supra note 102; Shaw, supra note 22; Wiener, Embedded Acquis,
supra note 76. For example, one leading author argues that EU citizenship departs from the "market
citizen" role traditionally ascribed to the individual in the context of European integration. Everson,
supra note 72, at 79 ("The forerunner to the Union citizen, the market citizen, was also distinguished
as a bearer of rights vis-a-vis an international organization.").
117. Warleigh, supra note 61, at 23.
118. Fourth Citizenship Report, supra note 107, at 4. "Citizenship of the Union has
developed over twelve years of existence into a source of real and concrete rights." Id. at 10.
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its Member States. 119 Among them, the first merely extends the rights already
existing under Community law, while the latter three constitute real innovations
at the supranational level. In the broader sense, EU citizenship also comprises
the emergence and development of rights based on an array of other treaty
provisions and legal sources.
i. Citizenship in the Narrow Sense: Rights Based on Part Two of
the EC Treaty

The first right laid down is the personal right to free movement and
residence throughout the EU. 120 This provision represents a de jure expansion
of the free movement rights of workers (and their families) based on Article 39
of the EC Treaty. At the formal level, EU citizenship enhances pre-existing
rights by expressly extending the right of free movement to persons "not seeking
economic advantafe or services.,,121
To a large extent, however, this
"decommodified,,1 2 EU citizenship simply codifies accrued developments
under Community law. Still, Article 18 of the EC Treaty provides a firm
foundation for further expansion of this fundamental right under Community
law. Thus, in the spirit of modernizing and extending the basic legal framework
governing free movement of persons, the EU enacted a new directive in April
2004 that revamps the rights of Union citizens and their family members
(including in some cases registered fartners) to move and reside freely within
the territory of the Member States. 12

119. The formal legal content of EU citizenship comprises numerous elements that are
spread throughout the treaties, along with related secondary Community legislation. The principal
source for ascertaining the content of EU citizenship is Part Two of the EC Treaty, supra note 95,
Articles 17-22, the provisions of which confer four types of rights on EU citizens.
120. "Every citizen of the Union shall have the right to move and reside freely within the
territory of the Member States, subject to the limitations and conditions laid down in this Treaty and
by the measures adopted to give it effect." Id. at Art. 18(1). This right is akin to a purported right
under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the U.S. Constitution to "enter any State of the Union,
either for temporary sojourn or for the establishment of permanent residence therein." Edwards v.
California, 314 U.S. 160, 183 (1941) (Jackson, J., concurring).
121. Everson, supra note 72, at 89.
122. Iyiola Solanke, The Decommodification of European Citizenship 2 (2005) (unpublished
manuscript on file with author) (noting that the "'market' citizen whom the member states have
slowly and in some cases unwillingly learnt to accept is being recast as a 'social' citizen").
123. European Parliament and Council Directive 2004/38 On the Right of Citizens of the
Union and Their Family Members to Move and Reside Freely Within the Territory of the Member
States, 2004 O.J. (L 158) 77. Member States must implement the provisions of this Directive, which
has the potential to affect millions of lives, by April 20, 2006. The Commission asserts that this
Directive "marks a major step forward in terms of freedom of movement and residence" for all
European citizens and their family members (broadly defined). Fourth Citizenship Report, supra
note 107, at 5. First, this Directive revamps the legal framework in this field by codifying "in a
single instrument the complex legislative corpus and the rich case-law on free movement and
residence." Id. at 6. It does not quite amount to a clean sweep, but replaces the bulk of former
legislation in the field, and amends the few old measures that remain in place. Second, this new
framework simplifies conditions and formalities, and will thus facilitate the exercise of the right of
residence. Third, it creates a permanent right of residence in the host Member State after five years
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Second, EU citizenship confers "heavily circumscribed,,124 political rights
on EU citizens. In particular, EU citizens have the right to stand and to vote in
European Parliament and municipal elections in their Member State of
residence, even if they are not nationals of that state. 125 A body of secondary
law is slowly developing to put these measures into effect. 126 Even at its
current embryonic stage of development, this element of Union citizenship
significantly expands the type of rights enjoyed by individuals within the EU's
constitutional legal order, at least in most Member States. 127 There is some
pressure for further Europeanization in the field of electoral rights, insofar as EU
citizens regularly express growing concern about the underdeveloped state of
their rights to political participation. 128
Third, Union citizenship creates new options for EU citizens who find
themselves abroad and in need of diplomatic or consular help. In particular, EU
nationals of one Member State can tum to the authorities of another Member
State for help in cases involving death, illness, arrest, and other forms of
distress, provided that their own Member State has no embassy or consulate in
the third country where help is needed. 129 This right does not provide an
of continued residence. Fourth, the Directive treats registered partners as family members in defined
cases, and requires at the very least that Member States in other cases "facilitate entry and residence
of partners with whom the Union citizen has a durable relationship." Jd. at 6.
124. Everson, supra note 72, at 89; see also Jones, supra note 73, at 147-48 (arguing that the
participatory rights "remain at the level of polity-maintenance and do not encroach far into areas of
substantial interest to the majority of the population of the EU").
125. "Every citizen of the Union residing in a Member State of which he is not a national
shall have the right to vote and to stand as a candidate at municipal elections in the Member State in
which he resides, under the same conditions as nationals of that State." EC Treaty, supra note 95,
Art. 19(1).
126. The Commission has reported the following developments in the field of electoral
rights. First, common principles for conducting elections to the European Parliament came into
force on April I, 2004. Council Decision 20021772 of 25 June 2002 and 23 September 2002,
amending Act Concerning the Election of the Representatives of the European Parliament by Direct
Universal Suffrage, 2002 OJ. (L 283) I, amending 1976 Act [annexed to Decision 7617871ECSC,
EEC, Euratom of 20 September 1976, O.J. (L 278) 5]. Second, new rules have been adopted that
establish a framework for financing European political parties from the Community budget.
European Parliament and Council Regulation 200412003 on the Regulations Governing Political
Parties at European Level and the Rules Regarding Their Funding, 2003 O.J. (L 297) I. See
generally Fourth Citizenship Report, supra note 107, at 8-9.
127. Some current Member States-including Sweden, Denmark, and the Netherlands"extended municipal voting rights to noncitizens" as early as the mid-1970s. CROUCHER, supra note
I, at 56. See generally Rainer Baubock, Expansive Citizenship-Voting beyond Territory and
Membership, 38 PS: POLITICAL SCIENCE & POLITICS 683 (Oct. 2005).
128. Some EU citizens perceive "a gap in electoral rights" that deprive them of the "right to
participate in national or regional elections" when they exercise their personal freedom of
movement. Fourth Citizenship Report, supra note \07, at 8-9 (reporting "[r]ecurrent petitions,
parliamentary questions and public correspondence"). Among EU Member States, only Ireland and
the United Kingdom "grant electoral rights at national or regional elections to nationals of other
Member States residing in their territory." Id. at 9.
129. "Every citizen of the Union shall, in the territory of a third country in which the
Member State of which he is a national is not represented, be entitled to protection by the diplomatic
or consular authorities of any Member State, on the same conditions as the nationals of that State."
EC Treaty, supra note 95, art. 20(1).
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alternative to protection by the Member State whose national the EU citizen is,
but merely a back-up for cases where that state is not in a position to help the
citizen in need. In such circumstances, Union citizenship broadens the classic
duty of states toward their own nationals under international law to include
nationals of fellow Member States. Secondary legislation implementing this
right became effective in May 2002, after a slow ratification process. 130
The fourth element of citizenship in the narrow sense pertains to the
relationship between the citizen and the institutions of the Union. In particular,
Union citizenship introduced two non-judicial means of redress for citizens, 13 I
one via the European Parliament l32 and the other (in cases involvinj
maladministration by Community institutions or bodies) via the Ombudsman. 13
These rights are bolstered by a guarantee that EU citizens may correspond and
be answered in any of the official languages with the EP, the Ombudsman, and
other EU institutions and advisory bodies. 134 However, the fact that neither of
these rights of access is available solely to Union citizens diminishes their
significance as markers for citizenship. 135
ii. Citizenship in the Broad Sense: Rights Based on Other

Sources

In terms of content, the last major component of EU citizenship is an array
of rights 136 whose sources are found outside Part Two of the EC Treaty. 137 For
130. Council Decision 951553 Regarding Protection for Citizens of the European Union by
Diplomatic and Consular Representations, 1995 0.1. (L 314) 73. See generally Fourth Citizenship
Report, supra note 107, at 9.
131. "Every citizen of the Union shall have the right to petition the European Parliament in
accordance with Article 194. Every citizen of the Union may apply to the Ombudsman established in
accordance with Article 195." EC Treaty, supra note 95, art. 21.
132. "Any citizen of the Union, and any natural or legal person residing or having its
registered office in a Member State, shall have the right to address, individually or in association
with other citizens or persons, a petition to the European Parliament on a matter which comes within
the Community's fields of activity and which affects him, her or it directly." EC Treaty, supra note
95, art. 194. The European Parliament received 1283 petitions during its 2001-2002 term, of which
744 were admissible, and 1514 during its 2002-2003 term, of which 642 were admissible. Fourth
Citizenship Report, supra note 107, at 9.
133. The Ombudsman is appointed by the European Parliament and is "empowered to
receive complaints from any citizen of the Union or any natural or legal person residing or having its
registered office in a Member State concerning instances of maladministration in the activities of the
Community institutions or bodies, with the exception of the Court of Justice and the Court of First
Instance acting in their judicial role." EC Treaty, supra note 95, art. 195(1). The Ombudsman has
seen a steady rise in the number of complaints received in recent years. Fourth Citizenship Report,
supra note 107, at 9.
134. EC Treaty, supra note 95, art. 21. Reich, supra note 102, at 11-14, explores some of the
more difficult questions of citizenship that arise in connection with the use of one's own (or a
preferred) language when dealing with public authorities.
135. Moreover, the eroding margin of preference between citizens and resident aliens may
help to explain declining rates of naturalization in some states. CROUCHER, supra note I, at 55-58.
136. Thorough analysis of this important topic is beyond the scope of this article. A good
starting point in the voluminous literature is de Burca, who surveys the usages of the language of
rights in Community law and provides an overview of the various contexts in which rights had arisen
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the most part, such rights are based either on other treaty provisions,
jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice, or both. The Commission has
proclaimed that the "most significant,,138 among citizenship rights in this
broader sense are those derived from Article 12 (ex 6) EC Treaty, which
prohibits "any discrimination on grounds of nationality.,,139 Yet this right,
together with the right of free movement noted above, has been a core principle
of Community law since the beginning of European integration. As such, it is
difficult to view it as an innovation attributable to the emergence of Union
citizenship. 140
Broader notions of individual rights extending beyond this traditional
core l41 have emerged slowly and awkwardly under Community law. The ECJ
opened the door to the development of individual rights as general principles of
Community law,142 often at the behest of German litigants or courts. 143
However, efforts to formalize rights in the treaties have encountered resistance
along the way. This has been particularly true for two categories of rights: first,
social rights,144 and second, civil and political liberties. 145 Both these
by 1995. Gniinne de Burca, The Language of Rights and European Integration, in SHAW & MOORE,
supra note 72, at 29, 29-54.
137. "[M]uch of what makes EU citizenship worth having is scattered throughout the acquis
rather than encapsulated in Articles 17-22." Warleigh, supra note 61, at 27.
138. Fourth Citizenship Report, supra note 107, at 4.
139. EC Treaty, supra note 95, art. 12. See generally Gareth Davies, 'Any Place I Hang My
Hat?' or: Residence is the New Nationality, 11 EUR. L.J. 43 (2005).
140. The "rights of the market citizen, particularly that of free movement, have not merely
been transferred to the Union citizen but continue to form the very core of that citizenship."
Everson, supra note 72, at 79.
141. The continuing special role of these principles is acknowledged by their restatement in
Part 1 of the EU Constitution, which provides:
(I) The free movement of persons ... shall be guaranteed within and by the Union, in
accordance with the Constitution.
(2) Within the scope of the Constitution, and without prejudice to any of its specific
provisions, any discrimination on grounds of nationality shall be prohibited.
Art. 1-4, EU Constitution. The EU Constitution has not yet entered into effect.
142. Already in the 1970s, the ECJ declared various "fundamental rights" to be part of the
general principles of Community law. See, e.g., Case 11/70, Intemationale Handelsgesellschaft v.
Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle fur Getreide und Futtermittel 1970 E.C.R. 1125; Case 4/73, Nold v.
Commission 1974 E.C.R. 491; Case 44/79, Hauer v. Land Rheinland-Pfalz 1979 E.C.R. 3727. These
early cases focused on "economic, commercial, and property rights, such as the right to trade, the
right to use land, and economic liberty." De Burca, supra note 136, at 31. The ECJ also recognized
so-called "rights of the defense" early on, such as "the privilege against self-incrimination, the right
to a hearing, freedom from search and seizure, confidentiality of information, and protection from
excessive penalties." Id. at 32.
143. See, e.g., de Burca, supra note 136, at 39 (noting that the "challenge to the supremacy
of Community law... came first from the German legal system, in which constitutionally
recognized rights were allegedly infringed by Community measures"). For those challenges, see
Decision of the Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] (Federal Constitutional Court) of May 29,
1976,37 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] (Decisions of the BverfG) 271
(F.R.G.); Decision of the BVerfG of Oct. 22, 1986, 73 BVerfGE 339 (F.R.G.); available at
http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen (last visited Nov. 21,2005).
144. Social rights are not primarily judicial creations in Community law, but have emerged
through a fitful process involving agreements among the Member States themselves and secondary
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categories of human rights have gradually been incorporated, at least to some
degree, into the EU's legal order. Yet not even the EU Charter of Fundamental
Rights succeeded in fully incorporating such rights into the corpus of
Community law. 146 Absent a constitutional settlement to resolve these long-

legislation enacted at the European level in cases where the Member States have agreed to establish
legislative bases for such measures in the EU's treaty framework. Willing Member States have
articulated two charters of social rights, and tried (but largely failed) to incorporate them into the
EU's treaty framework. The high-water mark achieved thus far is the Treaty of Amsterdam, supra
note 95, which amended the TEU's Preamble to confirm the Member States' "attachment to
fundamental social rights as defined in the European Social Charter signed at Turin on 18 October
1961 and in the 1989 Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers." This
commitment is operationalized by Article 136 (ex 117) of the EC Treaty, supra note 95, which
provides in this regard that the "Community and the Member States ... shall have as their objectives
the promotion of employment, improved living and working conditions, ... proper social protection,
dialogue between management and labour, the development of human resources with a view to
lasting high employment and the combating of exclusion." However, Article 136 does not provide
for full harmonization in this field, but merely calls for the implementation of "measures which take
account of the diverse forms of national practices ... and the need to maintain the competitiveness
of the Community economy." Art. 136, para. 2. The social policy fields in which the Community
may act are spelled out more clearly in Article 137 (ex 118A), which embodies the strained
compromise between Community and Member State competences in this contested field. Secondary
legislation in the field of social policy has also been adopted at European level pursuant to a variety
of other treaty provisions, including Article 141 (ex 119) relating to equal pay for male and female
workers.
145. This category of rights, like social rights, has developed gradually in Community law,
and not without controversy. One of the key challenges for the EU has been to work out the
relationship between the Community legal order and the ECHR, supra note 89, which all Member
States have adopted, as well as with the European Court of Human Rights. See generally Joseph
H.H. Weiler, Fundamental Rights and Fundamental Boundaries: On the Conflict of Standards and
Values in the Protection of Human Rights in the European Legal Space, in WEILER, THE
CONSTITUTION OF EUROPE, supra note 76, at 102. Community institutions expressed their view early
on that the ECHR framework should be viewed as part of the Community legal order. See Joint
Declaration on Fundamental Rights, 1977 O.J. (C 103) I. For its part, the ECJ has referred to the
ECHR in numerous cases, though it has been careful to preserve its own role as sole interpreter of
fundamental rights within the EU's legal order. More recently, explicit references to fundamental
rights and even to the ECHR have been incorporated into the EU's own treaty framework. For
example, the Preamble to the TEU, supra note 92, confirms the Member States' "attachment to the
principles of liberty, democracy and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule
of law," while Article 6(1) (ex F) of the TEU asserts that the "Union is founded on the principles of
liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law,
principles which are common to the Member States." The most explicit statement of the relationship
can be found in Article 6(2) of the TEU, which states that "[t]he Union shall respect fundamental
rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 and as they result from the
constitutional traditions common to the Member States, as general principles of Community law"
(emphasis added). These general statements are not mirrored in the concrete policy areas delineated
in Article 3 of the EC Treaty. However, the Treaty of Amsterdam did add a new provision
empowering Community institutions to take concrete steps to expand non-discrimination beyond the
traditional concern with nationality by taking "appropriate action to combat discrimination based on
sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age, or sexual orientation." EC Treaty, supra
note 95, art. 13.
146. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2000 OJ. (C 364) I. The
charter was annexed to the Treaty of Nice but is not legally binding. See generally Erik Oddvar
Eriksen, Why a Charter of Fundamental Human Rights in the EU?, 16 RATIO JURIS 352 (2003). See
also Fourth Citizenship Report, supra note 107, at 9 (noting the "close link" and numerous overlaps
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standing complexities, the status and contours of rights in the EU, as well as the
proper relationship between Union citizenship and human rights in the EU,147
remain vital arenas of contestation.
.
Linking human rights (that is, those based on sources other than Part Two
of the EC Treaty) to the overarching concept of Union citizenship might open a
new avenue for embedding such rights in Community law. Yet this tactic is not
without risk. The more recent invention of EU citizenship, which claims to have
"placed the individual at the heart" of the Union's activities,148 consolidates and
bolsters the EU's commitment to rights, but does not fully encompass it. An
institutional decision has been taken to gather the increasingly dense and
coherent body of rights taking shape within the EU's legal order under the
umbrella concept of citizenship, in order to fill out the contours of Union
citizenship and render it more legitimate in the eyes of the affected persons.
While it makes conceptual sense to link citizenship to rights in the broader
sense, particularly given the central role of rights in Marshall's canonical
definition of citizenship, doing so runs the risk of further complicating an
already complex area of EU law. Moreover, any effort to squeeze human rights
into the corset of citizenship risks stifling their development. These risks
caution against subordinating rights to citizenship, at least until such time as the
discourse or techniques of citizenship can contribute fruitfully to the
development of rights jurisprudence in the EU.
iii. Conclusions on Citizenship and Rights

The relationship between rights and citizenship in the EU is likely to
remain ambiguous for some time to come, not least in the wake of the obstacles
encountered by the EU Constitution during the ratification process in 2005. Yet
regardless of how the overarching ambiguities surrounding the relationship
between rights and citizenship are ultimately resolved, the fact remains that
citizenship and rights (in the narrow and broad senses identified above) are both
experiencing a boom phase in the EU. Future research should attend to the
evolving relationship between citizenship and rights, particularly to how
developments in one arena affect developments in the other, and whether their
developmental trajectories converge or diverge.
c. Functional Continuity Between National and Union Citizenship

The third dimension of continuity between national and EU citizenship
between Union citizenship and the Charter).
147. Weiler, Eros and Civilization, supra note 76, at 334, takes issue with the "conflation of
citizenship with (human) rights," while O'Leary criticizes the EU for its "failure to recognize an
explicit link between fundamental rights and the scope and operation of [Union] citizenship." Siofra
O'Leary, The Relationship Between Community Citizenship and the Protection of Fundamental
Rights in Community Law, 32 COMMON MARKET L.R. 519,537 (1995).
148. Fourth Citizenship Report, supra note 107, at 9.
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comprises the function of citizenship. Both types of membership constitute a
fundamental means ofpromotinr, democratic legitimacy, and hence allegiance to
the institutions of governance. 49 In practice, the EU's traditional "marketbased citizenship has proved insufficient as a means of generating support for,
and loyalty to, the EU.,,150 Whether Union citizenship can tum around the EU's
legitimac~ deficit and win the 'hearts and minds' of its citizens remains an open
question. 51 The success of citizenship as a means of generating collective
identity must ultimately be measured by the extent to which it actually
encourages "political engagement with the Union and its decision-making.,,152
Viewed in this light, EU citizenship reduces in some measure to a chicken-andegg problem: What comes first, the (supra)nation or its (supra)national
citizens? 153
d. Conclusions on Nationality and Citizenship in the EU

The apparent continuity between national and Union citizenship is
deceptive. On the one hand, EU Member States retain sovereignty to defme
who 'belongs to' them by drawing the "cultural, horizontal boundary between
insiders and outsiders, that is between members and non-members of the
nation.,,154 Yet notwithstanding their formal authority, these states are

149. See de Burca, supra note 136, at 40-41; Everson, supra note 72, at 83-84, 89 (referring
to the functional requirement of allegiance); Warleigh, supra note 61, at 21 (arguing that the EU had
a "double rationale" for creating EU citizenship: first, "a utilitarian justification, centred on making a
success of the single market," and second, "a more normative te/os of helping reduce the notorious
democratic deficit").
150. Bellamy & Warleigh, supra note 32, at 12 ("So far, Union citizenship has failed to
provide the mechanism for a significant attachment between either the publics of the member states
or the Union and the various national demoi. ").
151. Warleigh has shown that the "take-up rates and the actual influence of those citizens
and citizens' groups who rise to the [citizenship] challenge are often relatively low." Warleigh,
supra note 61, at 19. The mechanisms available to the EU "appear weak ... compared with those of
sovereignty and status evolved at national level," Everson, supra note 72, at 89, particularly insofar
as the EU lacks the capacity to "bribe" its way into the "hearts of citizens through the provision of
public welfare." Bellamy & Warleigh, supra note 32, at 12.
152. Bellamy & Warleigh, supra note 32, at 12. Those authors argue that the "EU has ...
largely failed to capitalize on the opportunity to provide citizens with an alternative means of
effecting political change," and that "for EU citizenship to be meaningful, it must be reinvented as
an instrument of political engagement: a tool for the expression of opinions and the resolution of
problems rather than simply a batch of entitlements." !d. at 12-13.
153. Another way to conceptualize this dilemma is in terms of building citizenship from the
'bottom-up' or from the 'top-down'. On the one hand, it is hard not to see parallels between Union
citizenship and earlier top-down nation-building efforts, such as followed the French revolution. See,
e.g., Franck, supra note 12, at 372-73 (discussing the creation of "a new [French] nation of shared
political ideals, from the top down" through the efforts of a "new and much broader-based elite of
officialdom, professionals, educators and intellectuals," who "deliberately ... [spread] a national
language, culture and identity"). In contrast, Wiener argues that "identities are never generated by
the institutions of the state but have been created through practice." Wiener, Fragmented
Citizenship, supra note 69, at 531.
154. Preu/3, supra note 13, at 23 (contrasting this cultural criterion of belonging with the
"socio-economic, vertical, dimension of top and bottom, that is, of class cleavages").
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increasingly subject to universalistic non-discrimination and equality norms that
constrain them to make such decisions on the basis of individual rather than
group characteristics. 155 The autonomy of the Member States is further
constrained by developments at ED level that erode their ability to define the
rights of persons within their territory.156 Thus the continuities identified
above, while substantial, appear to be of declining significance. Moreover, the
continuities between national and Union citizenship do not negate the novelty of
the latter, nor should they be allowed to blur the distinctions between the
two. 157
Despite persistent "ambivalences and worries,,158 about its meaning, EU
citizenship clearly marks "a dramatic deviation from modem concepts of
citizenship," I 59 and offers the most vivid contemporary example of
postnational1 60 membership. Four actual or potential points of departure from
the Westphalian model of state-based citizenship have been identified in the
preceding analysis. First, although Union citizenship is still derived from
Member State nationality, there are numerous signs that this nexus is eroding de
jacto, as rights in the European legal space are increasingly uncoupled from
nationality and citizenship. Second, the traditional Member State autonomy on
matters of nationality faces a potential de jure threat, insofar as ED institutions
appear poised to encroach on their prerogatives. Third, the creation of ED
citizenship departs from the exclusivity inherent in Westphalian orthodoxy by

ISS. "[ejollective and ascriptive modes of exclusion have been replaced by individualist
modes of exclusion." Joppke, supra note 2, at 46. In Joppke's view, "nation-states ... continue to
exist but national particularisms can no longer be enforced through their membership policies ...
[despite] (almost) unfettered state sovereignty in matters of immigration and nationality law," id. at
44, since "[I]iberal non-discrimination and human rights norms have put brakes on the particularistic
nation-building possibilities of the state. Its membership policies may still be notionalIy 'nationbuilding', but only in the generic sense of forging non-ethnic, liberal-democratic colIectivities that
are not different here from elsewhere." Id. at 54. Moreover, as noted supra in note III, the ECJ
keeps a watchful eye to ensure that the Member States have due regard for Community law when
exercising their competence over nationality.
156. For example, Warleigh, supra note 61, at 26, observes that citizenship "clips the wings
of the member governments" in terms of "national sovereignty over the welfare state, since member
governments no longer have the right to decide on whether certain non-nationals are entitled to
receive social security benefits."
157. That relationship is more ambiguous than meets the eye. BelIamy & Warleigh, supra
note 32, at 8, argue that the appearance of Union citizenship as "a discrete and detachable addition
to, with no effect upon, national citizenship" is misleading, and insist rather that "Union citizenship
reflects the fragmentation of national citizenship and not only supplements but replaces, interacts
and occasionally competes and conflicts with it."
158. BelIamy & Warleigh, supra note 32, at 4.
159. Wiener, Fragmented Citizenship, supra note 69, at 530. See also Bellamy & Warleigh,
supra note 32, at 16 (Union citizenship "is more than symbolically important.").
160. I adopt Shaw's use of the term 'postnational' to describe EU citizenship, which is a
"vital building block in the ongoing process of polity-formation within Europe." Shaw, supra note
22, at 294. This usage of the term is narrower than Soysa\'s, for whom the term refers to the
situation in which "what were previously defined as national rights become entitlements legitimized
on the basis of personhood." SOYSAL, supra note 76, at 3.
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reinstating the earlier European tradition of tolerating mUltiple loyaIties. 16l And
fourth, the EU's sui generis nature is clearly revealed in the division of labor
between the Union and its Member States, as well as in the nature of rights
appurtenant to EU citizenship. Union citizenship "comprises rights and
practices which distinguish the EU from any other international
organization.,,162 In particular, EU citizenship tacks the most basic rights
accorded to individuals under international law (e.g., diplomatic protection) onto
those accorded to individuals within a domestic constitutional order (e.g.,
democratic participation) and in a federally arranged political community.
EU citizenship constitutes a dramatic adaptation to an environment
characterized by increasing intra-EU migration ('mobility') and decreasing
Member State salience. Yet the dramatically changing nature of citizenship
captures only part of larger debates about belonging in the EU. Indeed,
questions about "the community of belonging and more specifically, about how
to define borders of belonging" I 63 are not limited to the realm of nationality or
citizenship. Rather, other forms of social exclusion-such as those based on
"ethnicity, race, and gender"-ma~ be (or become) more salient than those
based on nationality or citizenship. 64 From this perspective, the development
of rights in the EU legal order, including the evolving notion of equal
opportunities for migrants discussed below in Part II.B.2., may be a more
important arena for contests over belonging than the arena of citizenship itself.
B. BELONGING IN: THE REGULATION OF MIGRATION

1. Overview

Immigration policy is a field of increasingly circumscribed Member State
soverei~ty.
Indeed, the EU's role in regard to immigration (as well as
asylum 65) is much greater than it is in connection with citizenship, where the
161. "In historical tenus, both nationalism and transnational regimes have long bid
(sometimes competitively) for the adherence of persons. Indeed, in the past, persons have often had
multiple or compound identities." Franck, supra note 12, at 359. Compare Richard Falk, The
Decline of Citizenship in an Era of Globalization, 4 CITIZENSHIP STUDIES 5, 6 (2000)
(distinguishing "thin" from "thick" affinities in this context).
162. Bellamy & WarIeigh, supra note 32, at 16. "EU citizenship is a novel mixture of
nation-state-based and innovative supranational and transnational practices." /d. at 12.
163. Wiener, Fragmented Citizenship, supra note 69, at 529. Wiener notes that the question
"[w]ho has a legitimate right to belong legally to [the EU] has become a much debated issue." Id.
Particular debates over exclusion and inclusion have focused on the status of non-Member State
nationals who reside within the EU, as well as on the other fonus of social exclusion, such as race
and gender. !d. at 551-52 n.5.
164. Id. at 530-31 ("[M]obilization around questions of ethnicity, race, and gender ...
represent a second challenge to the concept of citizenship, suggesting that the 'language of
citizenship' is becoming outdated . . . . [T]he borders of citizenship are challenged both internally
and externally."). Wiener refers to this phenomenon as the "erosion of citizenship 'from below' by
the trend to extend rights on bases other than nationality-based citizenship alone." Id. at 531.
165. Due to space limitations, this article does not address the related field of refugee and
asylum law, which has recently become an area of EU competence. The first phase of the Common
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Member States remain (to date) largely in control over questions of nationality.
In contrast, Member States retain an essential, but clearly subsidiary role
regarding the regulation of immigration. In this field, as in so many others,
developments at the regional (EU) level are unprecedented, rapidly changing,
and bear close watching. This section, like the previous one on citizenship,
provides an overview of the regulation of immigration at EU level, in order to
frame dramatic recent German legal reforms.
In concrete terms, immigration policy regulates "access to the territory of
[a] state," as well as to "selected sectors of society, most notably the labour
market.,,166 Immigration policies thus regulate not only which migrants may
enter a country, but also what such persons may do and how they must behave
once they are there. In particular, some immigration laws address themselves
not only to technical matters of entry, stay and deportation, but also proscribe
the aim and, in some cases, the means of their int~ation into that state's social,
In this sense, migrants find
economic, cultural, and even political structures. I
themselves "at the cross-section of external and internal exclusion.,,168 This
nexus points to the close, and potentially continuous relationship between
immigration and citizenship, where an emerging "non-discrimination norm
regulates the legal transition from entry to residence to citizenship in the
contemporary liberal state.,,169
From a historical perspective, both immigration and citizenship laws in
liberal states have moved away from exclusion on the basis of ascriptive group
distinctions, such as ethnicity and race. 170 Instead, contemporary immigration

European Asylum System was adopted at EU level in 2004. Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29
April 2004 on minimum standards for the qualification and status of third country nationals or
stateless persons who otherwise need international protection and the content of the protection
granted, 2004 0.1. (L 304) 12. For discussions ofEU asylum law, see generally Gisbert Brinkmann,
The Immigration and Asylum Agenda, \0 EUR. L. J. 182, 193-96 (2004); Sonia Boutillon, The
Interpretation of Article I of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status ofRefogees by the European
Union: Toward Harmonization, 18 OEO. IMMIGRATION L.J. III (2003); Rosemary Byrne et aI.,
Understanding Refugee Law in an Enlarged European Union, 15 EUR. J. INT'L L. 355 (2004).
166. Joppke, supra note 2, at 49.
167. See infra Part IV for a discussion of the integration requirements under EU, as well as
under German law.
168. Joppke, supra note 2, at 49.
169. Joppke, supra note 2, at 49. As a consequence, liberal states facing anti-immigration
public sentiment face limited options: they can close "all immigration," but cannot close "particular
immigration" from one group or another. /d. at 50 (emphasis in original).
170. As noted in the discussion of citizenship, however, Germany continues to offer what
Joppke describes as a "narrowly circumscribed" preferential treatment on the basis of ethnicity to
some migrants. Id. at 49 (citation omitted). However, "[i]f one surveys the evolution of Western
states' immigration policies since their first systematic elaboration at the beginning of the twentieth
century, one notes their increased universalism, and the reduced scope of ascriptive group
distinctions in them... [S]uch ascriptive group distinctions have notionally disappeared from
immigration policies." Id. From these trends, Joppke draws the conclusion that the immigration
policies of contemporary Western states "are no longer at the service of reproducing particular
nationhood." Jd. at 50.
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policies tend to be based on "individual criteria of skills and family ties.,,171 As
a consequence of this trend, the term 'alien' is no longer a "national or ethnic
category but [rather] a formal leral category" positioned at the opposite end of
the spectrum from 'citizen'. 17
The fact that "nationalist or xenophobic
tendencies" in liberal states "are no longer institutionalized in [their]
immigration policies (as used to be the case in the early twentieth century)" does
not mean that they have been abolished; rather they have been relocated to the
level of civil society.173 States that permit or even encourage inward mifation
"inevitably risk the ethnic and racial transformation of their societies,,,17 along
with the social tension that might accompany diversification of their
populations.
This trend towards non-discrimination in the context of entry does not
necessarily imply an overarching loss of state control over immigration. Liberal
states, including the Member States of the EU in general and Germany in
particular, retain and continue to exercise numerous levers of control over
immigration. In addition to those techniques already noted-that is, policies
defining the permitted bases for residence, imposing integration requirements on
migrants, and setting criteria and procedures for deportation-states also
exercise numeric control over the number of inward migrants to their territory.
2. Regulating Migration in the EU

Migration law, like Union citizenship, is a key component of the EU's Area
of Freedom, Security and Justice ("AFSJ"),175 which in tum is one of the
biggest growth areas in the EU's legal order. 176 Growing EU competence in
171.

!d. at 49.
Id. ("The only legitimate group distinction left is that between 'citizens', who have a
right to enter and cannot be expelled, and 'aliens' who have no such rights and are subject to a
state's 'immigration' or 'foreigners' policies.").
173. Id. at 50-51. It is a different (but important) empirical question whether liberal states
apply such facially non-discriminatory criteria for entry, stay, and deportation in a manner that
suggests defacto discrimination on the basis of ethnicity, nationality, or race.
174. Id. at 50.
175. As already noted, the "policy orientations and priorities" needed to elaborate the AFSJ
were first laid out in October 1999 in the Tampere Milestones. See supra note 106 and references
cited therein. For an overview of the development of the AFSJ, see Helen E. Hartnell, EUstitia:
Institutionalizing Justice in the European Union, 23 NORTHWESTERN J. INT'L L. & Bus. 65 (2002).
176. See, e.g., Simon Green, Immigration, Asylum and Citizenship in Germany: The Impact
of Unification and the Berlin Republic, 24 W. EUR. POL. 82, 99 (Oct. 200 I) ("Undoubtedly, the main
new paradigm is the increasing importance of the EU in asylum and immigration policy."). In
substantive terms, immigration law and policy in the EU covers a wide range of issues, including
labor migration, family reunification, political asylum, social integration, and the fight against illegal
immigration (including human trafficking). See generally Terry Givens & Adam Luedtke, The
Politics of European Union Immigration Policy: Institutions, Salience, and Harmonization, 32
POL'y STUD. J. 145 (2004); Matthias Knauff, Europiiische Einwanderungspolitik: Grundlagen und
aktuelle Entwicklungen [European Immigration Policy; Foundations and Current Developments], 1
ZEuS 11 (2004); Adam Luedtke, One Market, 25 States, 20 Million Outsiders?: European Union
Immigration Policy (February 2005) (unpublished manuscript on file with the author); Jiirg Monar,
Justice and Home Affairs, 43 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 131 (2005); Steve Peers, Key Legislative
172.
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this field partly reflects the fact that it tends to be "the EU as a whole, rather
than individual countries, [that] is emerging as an immigration destination."I77
Yet despite enormous changes in this recently-and increasinglyEuropeanized field, it remains one in which Member States continue to play an
active role, as illustrated below by the recent German immigration reform.
The EU Member States committed themselves to "develop close
cooperation on justice and home affairs" in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty of
European Union ("TEU,,).178 At the same time, they supplemented the
Community's institutional architecture by erecting a common justice and home
affairs policy ("1HA") as the intergovernmental Third Pillar of the newly
established European Union. 179 Most of the provisions formally incorporated
into the EU's treaty structure in 1992 codified practices that had already
emerged, particularly in the areas of asylum, immigration and police
cooperation. The original treaties establishing the European Communities did
not address any of the JHA matters that were formally brought within the scope
of European integration by the TEU. However, both of these recent policy
endeavors-the JHA and the AFSJ-are rooted in the free movement of
persons, which is one of the freedoms 180 at the core of the European integration
project. 181

Developments on Migration in the European Union, 7 EUR. J. MIGRATION & L. 87 (2005).
177. Green, supra note 176, at 99. "With the fall of the Iron Curtain ... migration to,
through, and within Europe is the norm rather than the exception." Brinkmann, German Migrations,
supra note 36, at 149. For a broader historical perspective on EU developments in the field of
migration, see Claude Moraes MEP, The Politics of European Union Migration Policy (2003), at I,
available at http://www.europeananalysis.org.uklresearchlmoraes2.pdf (last visited Nov. 23, 2005)
(arguing that "a complex but steady process ofEU cooperation has taken place from the 1980's").
178. TEU, supra note 92, art. 2.
179. Title VI (Provisions on Cooperation in the Fields of Justice and Home Affairs), TEU,
supra note 92, art. K-K.9; see generally Peter MUller-Graff, The Legal Bases of the Third Pillar and
its Position in the Framework of the European Union Treaty, 3 I COMMON MKT. L. REv. 493 (1994).
The Third Pillar crystallized into institutional structure those practices that had emerged for
cooperation in the fields of justice and home affairs (JHA). Elspeth Guild, The Constitutional
Consequences of Lawmaking in the Third Pillar of the European Union, in LAWMAKING IN THE
EUROPEAN UNION 65, 65 (Paul Craig & Carol Harlow eds., 1998). The nine "areas of common
interest" identified by the TEU include: asylum policy; rules governing the crossing by persons of
the external borders of the Member States; immigration policy and policy regarding nationals of
third countries; conditions of residence by national of third countries (including family reunion and
access to employment); combating unauthorized immigration, residence and work by nationals of
third countries; and police cooperation for the purposes of preventing and combating terrorism,
unlawful drug-trafficking, and other serious forms of international crime. TEU art. K.I (before
modification by the Treaty of Amsterdam).
180. EC Treaty, supra note 95, tit. III, art. 39-42 (ex 48-51). In the preamble to the preAmsterdam version of the TEU, supra note 92, the Member States "[reaffirmed] their objective to
facilitate the free movement of persons, while ensuring the safety and security of their peoples, but
including provisions on justice and home affairs in this Treaty." Jd. at pmbl.
181. Freedom of movement of the individual is increasingly linked to the notion of "free
movement of his or her fundamental rights." Elspeth Guild, Editorial, 10 EUR. L.J. 147, 149 (2004).
In tum, this "security of rights for the individual"-irrespective of whether he or she is a citizen of
the Union or of some third country-"is the essence of' the AFSJ. /d. See generally Norbert Reich,
The Constitutional Relevance of Citizenship and Free Movement in an Enlarged Union, II EUR. LJ.
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The 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam substantially altered the preliminary JHA
framework that had been established by the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992. 182
Since the Treaty of Amsterdam entered into force on May 1, 1999, the TEU
obliges the Member States "to maintain and develop the Union as an area of
freedom, security and justice, in which the free movement of persons is assured
in conjunction with appropriate measures with respect to external border
controls, asylum, immigration and the prevention and combating of crime.,,183
Also effective that date, a new Title IlIa on "Visas, Asylum, Immigration and
other Policies related to Free Movement of Persons" was added to the EC
Treaty. 184 This change in the EC Treaty demonstrates one of the key
innovations introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam, which was to
'communitarize' some JHA issues by moving them from the intergovernmental
Third Pillar to the supranational First Pillar. 185 Indeed, since the Treaty of
Amsterdam entered into force, the only issues remammg in the
intergovernmental Third Pillar are police and judicial cooperation in criminal
matters. 186
The communitarization of migration law, while dramatic, did not effect a
wholesale transfer of law and policy in this field to the EU. It did, however,
substantially expand EU involvement in these volatile arenas. The Treaty of
Amsterdam laid down a five-year timetable for adopting certain measures aimed
at building the AFSJ. 187 The Member State ministers of justice and home
(interior) affairs met for the first time as an EU body in Tampere in October

675 (2005).
182. The Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 95, amended both the EC Treaty, supra note 95,
and the TEU, supra note 92. The Member States resolve "to facilitate the free movement of persons,
while ensuring the safety and security of their peoples, by establishing an area offreedom, security
and justice in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty." TEU pmbl. (emphasis added). In the
consolidated version of the TEU, JHA provisions are found in art. 29-42.
183. TEU, supra note 92, art. 2.
184. EC Treaty, supra note 95, art. 61-69 (as amended by the Treaty of Nice, supra note 95).
185. See generally Kay Hailbronner, European Immigration and Asylum under the
Amsterdam Treaty, 35 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 1047 (1998); Pieter Jan Kuijper, The Evolution of the
Third Pillar from Maastricht to the European Constitution: Institutional Aspects, 41 COMMON MKT.
L. REv. 609 (2004). "In the sphere of the third pillar, the Member States are the actors; the
institutional framework created by the Maastricht Treaty enables them to use Community institutions
to facilitate their cooperation. The main actor in the sphere of the first pillar is the Community,
acting on the basis of legislative powers conferred upon it by the Treaties." Hailbronner, supra at
\047. A further consequence of communitarization is that "[i]mmigration and asylum decisions by
the Community. . . will not only be binding for the EU Member States, but also be capable of
having direct effect within the national legal orders, provided that they meet the general
requirements ... developed by" the ECJ. Id. at 1048.
186. TEU, supra note 92, tit. VI, art. 29-42, as amended by the Treaty of Nice, supra note
95. The main innovation at Nice was the introduction of Eurojust. Kuijper, supra note 185, at 609.
187. This timetable applied to many, but not all obligations created in the Treaty of
Amsterdam, supra note 95. For present purposes, the only immigration measure required to be
adopted during the five-year period was the adoption of measures on "illegal immigration and illegal
residence, including repatriation of illegal residents" set forth in Article 63(3)(b) of the EC Treaty,
supra note 95.
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1999, where they adopted an ambitious five-year plan l88 aimed at progressive
adoption of the measures called for by the Treaty of Amsterdam. The target
date for completing these "Tamp ere Milestones"-May I, 2004--is the same
date on which the EU was enlarged from fifteen to twenty-five members. 189 In
its final report l90 at the end of this live-year term, the Commission poignantly
noted that the "original ambition" regarding the AFSJ had been "limited by
institutional constraints" as well as by the "lack of sufficient political
consensus." 191
Legal immigration is one of the main fields in which there was a marked
gap between ambition and achievement dUrin the first five-year program
marked out by the 1999 Tampere Milestones,19 although a concerted push in
2003 and 2004 narrowed that gap considerably.193 Yet despite the tone of
disappointment audible in the Commission's late scoreboards and in the AFSJ
Report,194 the EU has taken numerous steps towards harmonization in the field

f

188. See supra note 106 and accompanying text (describing the Tampere Milestones). This
program resulted in a virtual explosion of legislative activity, which was chronicled in the
Commission's bi-annual 'scoreboard' reports. Each scoreboard appeared in the form of a
Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament bearing the title
Biannual Update of the Scoreboard to Review Progress on the Creation of an Area of "Freedom.
Security and Justice" in the European Union. The scoreboards can be found in the following
documents: COM (2000) 167 final; COM (2000) 782 final; COM (2001) 278 final; COM (2001) 628
final; COM (2002) 261 final; COM (2002) 738 final; COM (2003) 291 fmal; COM (2003) 812 final.
189. PETER J. VAN KRIEKEN, THE CONSOLIDATED ASYLUM AND MIGRATION ACQUIS: THE
EU DIRECTIVES IN AN EXPANDED EUROPE vii (2004); Joanne van Selm & Eleni Tsolakis, The
Enlargement of an "Area of Freedom, Security and Justice"; Managing Migration in a European
Union of 25 Members, I MIGRATION POLICY INSTITUTE POLICY BRIEF 4 (May 2004), available at
http://www.migrationpolilcy.orglpubl/eu_enlargement.pdf (last visited Nov. 19, 2005).
190. In lieu of a final scoreboard report at the end of the five-year term, the Commission
instead prepared the Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European
Parliament, Area of Freedom. Security and Justice; Assessment of the Tampere Programme and
Future Orientations, SEC (2004) 680 & SEC (2004) 693, COM (2004) 401 final (June 2, 2004)
[hereinafter AFSJ REpORT].
191. Jd. at 5. In its report, the Commission anticipated further progress towards building the
AFSJ in the wake of further liberalization of decision-making procedures. In this regard, it noted that
some new procedures "automatically entered into force on I February 2003 and on I May 2004,"
and in addition that Article 67(2) of the EC Treaty, supra note 95, calls upon the Council "to take a
decision with a view to providing for all or parts of the areas covered by Title IV to be governed by
the co-decision procedure." Jd. Declaration 5 concerning Article 67 of the EC Treaty, which was
annexed to the Treaty of Nice, supra note 95, contains a "precise political commitment to change
over to the co-decision procedure immediately after I May 2004 for measures ... concerning the
free movement of third-country nationals for a maximum three-month period and illegal immigration
and residence, including repatriation." Jd. at n.6. See Council Decision 2004/927, 2004 O.J. (L 396)
45 (providing for certain areas covered by Title IV of Part Three of the EC Treaty to be governed by
the procedure laid down in Article 251 of that Treaty); see also Peers, supra note 176, at 87-89.
192. See. e.g., Scoreboard for the First Half of 2003, COM (2003) 291 final, at 4 ("[T]he
degree of harmonisation is at risk of being reduced to the lowest common denominator at the
expense of value added by common action at European level [in the field oflegal immigration].").
193. VAN KRIEKEN, supra note 189, at vii, notes that "[the] Commission and Council more
or less met the deadline."
194. AFSJ REpORT, supra note 190, at 5. The most significant measures adopted to date
have been in the fields of expulsion, social security, family reunification, the status of long-term
residents who are not EU citizens, entry and residence for the purpose of studies, vocational training
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of immigration law since 1999.
While Member States and EU institutions have renewed their commitment
to pursue further harmonization in the field of immigration law and policy, as
urged by the Commission's AFSJ Report,195 the field is characterized by a
delicate balance between Member State and EU competence. This tension is
already visible in the Commission's report. On the one hand, the AFSJ Report
urges the need for a "realistic approach taking account of economic and
demographic needs, to facilitate the legal admission of immigrants to the Union,
in accordance with a coherent policy respecting the principle of fair treatment of
third-country nationals.,,196 On the other hand, however, the Commission
explicitly acknowledges that the EU's ability to regulate this field remains
constrained by the "right of Member States to set the actual numbers of thirdcountry nationals admitted to work in an employed or self-employed
capacity.,,197
The second five-year plan aimed at achieving the AFSJ was adopted by the
Brussels European Council in November 2004. 198 This so-called Hague
or voluntary service, and illegal migration. Despite this impressive list, the Commission's
disappointment does not appear to be out of place. As van Selm has noted,
the policy documents on which the EU has managed to agree since 1992, when the EU first
decided to cooperate on migration and asylum issues, have generally taken a minimalist
approach. This has mean that few, if any, changes have been necessary in individual
Member States to put new community laws into effect. Also, it often means a new EU law
can allow some states to become more restrictive-although the EU law is intended only to
set the minimum level of asylum or immigration practice permitted.
Joanne van Selm, The Hague Program Reflects New European Realities, MIGRATION POLICY
INSTITUTE MIGRATION INFORMATION SOURCE (Jan. I, 2005), at I, available at
http://www.migrationinformation.org(lastvisited Nov. 19,2005).
195. The AFSJ REpORT, supra note 190, at 16, calls for the elaboration of a "second
European programme for the area of freedom, security and justice, with detailed priorities and a
precise timetable" following the Tampere method.
196. AFSJ REpORT, supra note 190, at 9. The EU's economic and demographic needs,
which were already articulated in the 1999 Tampere Milestones, pertain largely to labor shortages
and to the "growing, if controversial, view that the EU as a whole will need more immigration as its
population ages." Moraes, supra note 177, at 8-9; see Tampere Milestones, supra note I 06, ~ lIL20.
197. AFSJ REpORT, supra note 190, at 9. However, it asserts at the same time the need for
"an overall framework including the respect of Community preference" as well as the "interests of
countries of origin." Id. at 9-10. See generally Luedtke, supra note 176, noting that Germany was
responsible for inserting the limitation to this effect in the EU Constitution.
198.
Conclusions of the Presidency, Brussels European Council (Nov. 4-5, 2004),
1429211104 REV I, ~ 15 (stating that the goal is to "enable the Union to build on [previous]
achievements and effectively meet the new challenges it will face"). The Hague Programme
Strengthening Freedom. Security and Justice in the European Union [hereinafter Hague Program] is
attached to the Conclusions of the Presidency from that Brussels European Council (14292/1/04
REV I) as Annex L The new Hague Program-which was initially referred to as "Tampere 1I"covers "all aspects of policies relating to the area of freedom, security and justice, including their
external dimension, notably fundamental rights and citizenship, asylum and migration, border
management, integration, the fight against terrorism and organised crime, justice and police
cooperation, and civil law." Id. ~ 16. A European Strategy on Drugs 2005-2012 was added in
December 2004. Conclusions of the Presidency, Brussels European Council (Dec. 16-17,2004),
16238/1104 REV I, CONCL 4 (Feb. I, 2005), ~ 37. See generally Luedtke, supra note 176; van
Selm, supra note 194, at I (noting that the Hague Program is "more of a 'wish list'" than a "detailed
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Program introduces a new conceptual scheme organized around the "specific
orientations" of freedom, security and justice, in lieu of the former organization
along functional lines. 199 Within this new framework, asylum, migration and
border policy are ironically conceived of as ~olicy measures that contribute
toward "strengthening freedom" within the EU. 00 Among other objectives, the
Hague Program aims to "improve the common capability of the Union and its
Member States to ... regulate migration flows.,,201
The Hague Program specifically addresses four aspects of migration. First,
the European Council stressed the importance of legal migration and
employment for "enhancing the knowledge-based economy in Europe" and for
"advancing economic development. ,,202 In this context, the European Council
called upon the Commission to formulate a plan for the regulation of legal
migration, while simultaneously acknowledging that Member States remain
competent to determine the number of labor migrants to be admitted to their
territories. 203 The Commission quickly obliged by adopting a Green Paper on
economic migration in January 2005,204 which document aims to stimulate a

policy document").
199. Hague Program, supra note 198, Heading III, 14292/1/04 REV I ANNEX J, at 16. The
Commission's scoreboards subdivided the heading "A Common EU Asylum and Migration Policy"
as follows: partnership with countries of origin, a common European asylum system, fair treatment
of third country nationals, and management of migration flows. See, e.g, Scoreboard for the First
Half of 2003, COM (2003) 291 final, at 18-37. Separate headings existed inter alia for the Unionwide fight against crime, id. at 55-85, policies on internal and external borders (including visas and
Schengen), id. at 86-94, citizenship, id. at 95-96, and cooperation against drugs, id. at 97-100. The
scheme used in the Commission Scoreboards is based on that found in the 1999 Tampere
Milestones, supra note 106. See generally van Selm, supra note 194, at 2 (noting the "subtle, but
important ways in which [the Hague Program] diverges from the four themes included in the
previous Tampere program").
200. Hague Program, supra note 198, ~ \.2, 14292/1/04 REV I ANNEX I, at 16. In this
regard, the European Council urges the "Council, Member States and the Commission to pursue
coordinated, strong and effective working relations between those responsible for migration and
asylum policies and those responsible for other policy fields relevant to these areas." /d. at 17.
Moreover, it emphasizes the need for a "common analysis of migratory phenomena in all their
aspects" and stresses the importance of collecting, providing, exchanging and efficiently using "upto-date information and data on all relevant migratory developments." /d. Two of the issues relevant
to strengthening freedom are not discussed here, since they nominally fall outside the narrow scope
of migration matters that I wish to consider. In particular, I do not examine the provisions of the
Hague Program dealing with citizenship of the Union, id. ~ 1.1, at 16, or the Common European
Asylum System, id. ~1.3, at 17-18.
201. Hague Program, supra note 198, 14292/1/04 REV I ANNEX I, ~ I, at 12.
202. Hague Program, supra note 198, 14292/1/04 REV I ANNEX J, ~ 1.4, at 19. These
goals were linked to "implementation of the Lisbon strategy," id., which program Commission
President Barroso abandoned in February 2005.
203. Hague Program, supra note 198, 14292/1/04 REV I ANNEX I, ~ 1.4, at 19. In
particular, such a plan should include "admission procedures capable of responding promptly to
fluctuating demands for migrant labour in the labour market." ld.
204. Green Paper: On an EU Approach to Managing Economic Migration, COM (2004)
81 I final (Jan. I 1,2005) [hereinafter Migration Green Paper]. The promptness of the Commission's
response reflects its hitherto frustrated efforts to move the economic migration agenda forward. A
directive proposed by the Commission in 2002 pursuant to the Tampere Milestones foundered for
lack of political support and never became law. See Proposal for a Council Directive on the
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public debate among Member States, EU institutions, and "civil society, In
particular the social partners" on this controversial topic. 205
The second major aspect of migration addressed by the Hague Program is
the integration of third-country nationals. In this context, the Hague Program
largely reiterates and extends the objectives articulated in the 1999 Tampere
Milestones, which called for a "common approach ... to ensure the integration
into our societies of those third country nationals who are lawfully resident in
the Union.,,206 Despite Tampere's call for a common approach, there is to date
no harmonized definition of integration, and Member State policies and
practices differ.
After studying the issue, the Commission proposed a
"holistic,,207 understanding of integration, which it conceptualizes "as a twoway process based on mutual rights and corresponding obligations of legally
resident third country nationals and the host society which provides for full
participation of the immigrant.,,208 The European Council has endorsed this
"comprehensive,,209 and "incremental,,21 0 approach to integration, and thereby

Conditions of Entry and Residence of Third-Country Nationals for the Purpose of Paid Employment
and Self-Employed Economic Activities, COM(2001) 386 final (July II, 2001); see also
COMMISSION COMMUNICATION ON IMMIGRATION, INTEGRATION AND EMPLOYMENT, supra note
109; Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, First Annual Report on
Migration and Integration, COM (2004) 508 final (July 16,2004).
205. Migration Green Paper, supra note 204.
206. Tampere Milestones, supra note \06, ~ 4. In particular, under the heading "fair
treatment of third country nationals," the Tampere Milestones called for a "more vigorous
integration policy" which aimed at granting third country nationals "rights and obligations
comparable to those of EU citizens." Id. ~ HU8 (emphasis added). The Tampere European Council
simultaneously called for enhancing "non-discrimination in economic, social and cultural life" and
for developing "measures against racism and xenophobia." Id.
207. COMMISSION COMMUNICATION ON IMMIGRATION, INTEGRATION AND EMPLOYMENT,
supra note \09, ~ 3.2, at 18 ("[AJ holistic approach takes into account not only the economic and
social aspects of integration but also issues related to cultural and religious diversity, citizenship,
participation and political rights."). In particular, a holistic approach "calls for comprehensive
integration policies" in regard to integration into the labor market, education and language skills,
housing and other urban issues, health and social services, the social and cultural environment, and
nationality, civic citizenship and respect for diversity. Id. ~ 3.3,3.3.1-3.3.6, at 19.
208. COMMISSION COMMUNICATION ON IMMIGRATION, INTEGRATION AND EMPLOYMENT,
supra note I 09, ~ 3.1, at 17. In the Commission's view, such a holistic approach
implies on the one hand that it is the responsibility of the host society to ensure that the
formal rights of immigrants are in place in such a way that the individual has the possibility
of participating in economic, social, cultural and civil life and on the other, that immigrants
respect the fundamental norms and values of the host society and participate actively in the
integration process, without having to relinquish their own identity.
Id. ~ 3.1, at 17-18. This Communication draws upon earlier Commission Communications. See
COM (2000) 757 final and COM (2001) 387 final.
209. Hague Program, supra note 198, 14292/1/04 REV I ANNEX I, ~ 1.5, at 19 (noting the
link between successful integration and social "[s]tability and cohesion" and expressing the need to
"prevent the isolation of certain groups"). Moreover, a comprehensive approach is one that involves
"stakeholders at the local, regional, national, and EU level." Id.
210. An incremental approach is based on the idea that rights and obligations develop and
come into balance over time. COMMISSION COMMUNICATION ON IMMIGRATION, INTEGRATION AND
EMPLOYMENT, supra note 109, ~ 3.1, at 18. "[T]hus, the longer a third country national resides
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taken a large step in the direction mapped out by the Commission. The Hague
Program goes beyond Tampere's insistence upon "fair treatment of legally
resident third-country nationals in the EU," insofar as it calls for "the creation of
equal opportunities to participate fully in society.,,211 To this end, and in view
of the "need for greater coordination of national integration policies and EU
initiatives in this field," the Hague Program expressly calls for establishing a
"coherent European framework on integration.,,212 This call was quickly
answered by the JHA Council, which adopted "Common Basic Principles for
Immi~rant Integration Policy in the European Union" on November 19,
2004. 13 These principles expressly preserve the Member States' leading role in
regard to integration, which "must engage the local, regional, and national
institutions, with which immigrants interact, in both the public and private
realms.,,214 In addition, the principles recognize that inte~ation policies "will
differ significantly from Member State to Member State." 15 This framework
was readily visible in the two prior EU immigration directives, which deferred
to Member States to determine what kind of integration requirements, if any,
could be imposed on third country nationals. 216
Third, the Hague Program articulates the need to address in a more
systematic way the external dimension of migration, which it views as essential,
given the inherently international nature of this field. 217
legally in a Member State, the more rights and obligations such a person should acquire." Id.
211. Hague Program, supra note 198, 14292/1/04 REV I ANNEX I, ~ 1.5, at 19. It bears
mention in this context that the Hague Program insists that "[i]ntegration ... includes, but goes
beyond, anti-discrimination policy." Id. at 20.
212. Hague Program, supra note 198, 14292/1/04 REV I ANNEX I, ~ 1.5, at 20 (laying
down minimum "common basic principles" intended to "form the foundation for future initiatives in
the EU, relying on clear goals and means of evaluation").
213. Conclusions of the 2618th Council Meeting, Justice and Home Affairs (Brussels, Nov.
19,2004), reported in Press Release C/04/321, 14615/04 (Presse 321) (Nov. 19, 2004), at 11-13,
plus Annex, id. at 13-18 (containing explanations that "are intended to give direction to the common
basic principle") [hereinafter Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration]. This meeting of
the JHA Council is occasionally referred to as the "Ministerial Conference on Integration." See, e.g.,
Conclusions of the Presidency, Brussels European Council (Dec. 16-17,2004), 16238/1/04 REV I,
CONCL 4 (Feb. I, 2005), ~ 38 (welcoming the "establishment of common basic principles for
immigrant integration policy of the Member States").
214. Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration, supra note 213, pmbl., ~ 3 ("The
development and implementation of integration policy is therefore the primary responsibility of
individual Member States rather than of the Union as a whole.").
215. Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration, supra note 213, pmbl., ~ 6 ("They
must be geared to the individual needs of the receiving society, reflecting each individual Member
State's history and legal framework. They may also target diverse audiences, the mix of which varies
between the Member States.").
216. See, e.g., Council Directive 2003/86IEC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family
reunification, 2003 OJ. (L 251) 12, art. 7(2); Council Directive 2003/10/EC of 25 November 2003
concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long-term residents, 2004 O.J. (L 16) 44,
art. 5(2). Both of these directives provide that Member States "may" require third country nationals
to comply with integration conditions laid down by national law.
217. Hague Program, supra note 198, 14292/1/04 REV I ANNEX I, ~~ 1.6 & 1.6.1, at 20. In
particular, the Hague Program calls for forming partnerships with third countries, id. ~ \.6.1, at 2021, and for development of a return and re-admission policy, id. ~ 1.6.4, at 22-23.
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Fourth and last, the Hague Program addresses a range of issues pertaining
to technical aspects of managing migration flows,2l8 which are particularly
relevant to the fight against illegal immigration, cross-border crime and
terrorism. In this context, the EU's primary objective is to "fully abolish
internal borders while providing the maximum security and orderly passage at
external borders.,,2l9
Overall, the ambitious Hague Program still falls short of a "truly common
European policy on immigration (and asylum).,,220 It preserves the current
arrangement under which Member States first must agree on new measures
within the Council, then subsequently implement the agreed measures into their
domestic legal systems. This arrangement has resulted in relatively "low and
slow" harmonization22I thus far in the highly contested migration arena. 222
The Treaty of Amsterdam, subject to the later developments noted above,
provides the relevant framework within which Member States can act, at least
until such time as an EU Constitution or further treaty revisions enter into force.
Three criteria constrain Member State sovereignty in this field. First, in terms of
scope, EU institutions may adopt migration policy measures within three areas:
conditions of entry and residence (including standards on procedures for the
issue by Member States of long-term visas and residence permits);223 illegal
immigration and illegal residence;224 and measures defining the rights and
conditions under which nationals of third countries who are legally resident in a
Member State may reside in other Member States. 225 Second, the principle of
subsidiarity is relevant in the migration field. 226 The Treaty of Amsterdam

218. Hague Program, supra note 198, 1429211104 REV I ANNEX I, ~ 1.7, at 23-27.
219. Van Selm, supra note 194, at 4.
220. Van Selm, supra note 194, at 5.
221. Under the Hague Program, "Member States can be expected to continue to seek
legislation that is similar to their existing national laws," which are "perceived as much weaker than
ones based on a 'clean sheet' developed at the EU level." Van Selm, supra note 194, at 5. Moreover,
not even the move to qualified majority voting in this field is likely to "speed up this slow-moving
process." Id. The decision to leave control over legal immigration and immigrant integration in
Member States hands suggests that "the political will to truly have a European immigration policy is
still lacking, in spite of rhetoric to the contrary." !d. at 5.
222. On the one hand, Member States face domestic political pressure to 'do something'
about immigration. Seen from this perspective, Member State governments might well be reluctant
to relinquish what control they still possess. Luedtke, supra note 176, at 4 (arguing that "one might
not expect to see national governments willingly giving up what control they do have" over
immigration, given the fact that they are often accused-and indeed, may be politically vulnerablefor "losing control" over immigration). On the other hand, this propensity is counterbalanced by fact
that some Member States perceive transferring such issues to the supranational level as offering a
measure of relief from domestic left-right contention. See Brinkmann, supra note 165, at 199
(suggesting that some countries perceive Community legislation on immigration as a way to shortcut domestic political contestation).
223. EC Treaty, supra note 95, art. 63(3)(a) (including those for the purpose of family
reunion).
224. EC Treaty, supra note 95, art. 63(3)(b) (including repatriation of illegal residents).
225. EC Treaty, supra note 95, art. 63(4).
226. Hailbronner, supra note 185, at 1051.
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specifies that Member States remain competent to act in regard to these issues,
and thus that EU competence is shared rather than exclusive in regard to these
issues. 227 Germany, which is particularly protective of its prerogatives in this
field, submitted a letter to the President of the Council setting forth its
interpretation of Article 63. 228 And finally, Member State sovereignty is
expressly preserved ''with regard to the maintenance of law and order and the
safeguarding of internal security.,,229
3.

CONCLUSION

Even without its own Constitution and in the face of severely
circumscribed powers regarding citizenship and migration, EU regional
governance of these traditional state concerns has taken enormous strides in
recent years. Yet despite increasing activity at the EU level regarding both
issues, crucial questions of belonging remain in Member State hands. In regard
to citizenship, the crucial question of inclusion or exclusion is largely tied up
with the issue of nationality, which thus far remains a Member State prerogative.
In connection with migration, the EU has taken minimal steps towards a
common approach to the question of integration, but defers to the Member
States to do what they deem necessary to make diversity work. Belonging thus
remains largely a local issue, except where Member States tread upon rights
defined by public international or EU law.
III.
REFORMING GERMAN LAW AND PRACTICE

Two major legal enactments have transformed the German landscape in
recent years: first, the overhaul of the Citizenship Act (Staatsangehorigkeitsgesetz),230 which entered into force on January I, 2000, and second, the

227. EC Treaty, supra note 95, art. 63. National provisions must, however, be "compatible
with [the EC Treaty] and with international agreements," id., because Member States "did not intend
to give up any national control on immigration." Hailbronner, supra note 185, at 1050.
228. Hailbronner, supra note 185, at 1051-52.
229. Hailbronner, supra note 185 at 1052, rightly observes that this provision is ambiguous.
Although immigration law "is traditionally considered as being part of the national public order," it
does not follow that Article 64 means "that Member States keep a primary responsibility" in regard
to these issues. Id. Rather, he suggests that Article 64 must be interpreted as referring "to the
exercise of police power rather than to the formulation of an immigration policy and the legal
conditions under which ... third-country nationals will be permitted to enter Union territory." !d. at
1053.
230. The current Staatsangehorigkeitsgesetz (StAG) [hereinafter Citizenship Act] is an
amended and consolidated text based on the Reichs- und Staatsangehorigkeitsgesetz (RuStAG).
RGBI. I 583 (July 22, 1913) [hereinafter 1913 Citizenship Act], as amended, inter alia by the
StaatsangehorigkeitsreJormgesetz, BGBI I 1618 (July 15, 1999) [hereinafter Citizenship Reform
Act). Among other changes, the Citizenship Reform Act, which entered into effect on January I,
2000, retitled the 1913 Citizenship Act by dropping the Imperial reference from its title. Subsequent
references to the "Citizenship Act" refer to its current consolidated version, including amendments
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omnibus Immigration Act (Zuwanderungsgesetz),231 which entered into force
on January 1, 2005. The Citizenship Act represents an exercise of legislative
sovereignty to determine which individuals .... elong to the German state. In this
context, Germany's regulatory power is barely constrained by public
international or EU law. In contrast, the Immigration Act is of a more hybrid
nature, since its broad scope encompasses some issues that fall within the
exclusive German domain, along with others regarding which Germany shares
competence with the institutions of the EU. The Immigration Act thus includes
a number of measures that are affected by, and in some cases already regulated
by EU law. Indeed, some provisions of the new Immigration Act implement EU
rules that are binding on Germany. Regardless of their implications for German
legal sovereignty, both new Acts render Germany a more inclusive state, at least
on the books.
A. NATIONALITY AND CITIZENSHIP

After reunification, Germany extensively revised its 1913 Citizenship
232
Act.
The new Citizenship Ac~33 has important implications, both in light of
Germany's own past and with regard to the future prospects for postnational
citizenship. The new Citizenship Act not only illustrates the government's "new
pragmatism" in the face of demographic changes and labor-market imperatives,
but also points towards a possible "transformation" of nationhood in

made subsequent to the date of the Citizenship Reform Act. There is considerable disagreement over
the proper translation of Staatsangehorigkeit. I use the term 'citizenship' in this article, despite the
fact that I consider 'nationality' to be the more accurate translation of this German term.
Staatsangehorigkeit literally invokes the notion of belonging to the State, and may be contrasted
with Staatsbiirgerschaji, which term was explicitly coined by German authors such as Wieland and
I consider
Kant to render the French term citoyen. PreuB, supra note 13, at 22-23.
Staatsburgerschaji to be the better counterpart to the English term 'citizenship'. Indeed, Austria uses
the term Staatsbiirgerschaji in its law regulating nationality/citizenship, in lieu of
Staatsangehorigkeit. However, usage by scholars is inconsistent. Compare Ludvig, supra note 61
and PreuB, supra note 13, with Minkenberg, supra note 34. I opt to use the term 'citizenship' here,
in part because it is the term that the German government itself uses in English translations, but also
because it is more consistent with the aim of the recent legal reform, which is to drive a wedge
between citizenship and nationhood. See generally Joppke, supra note 2, at 54.
231. Gesetz zur Steuerung und Begrenzung der Zuwanderung und zur Regelung des
Aufenthaltes und der Integration von Unionsburgem und Ausliindem ("Zuwanderungsgesetz ")
[Law to Manage and Limit Immigration and to Regulate the Residence and Integration of Union
Citizens and Foreigners), BGBI I 1950 (July 30, 2004) [hereinafter Immigration Act). Most
provisions of the new Immigration Act entered into effect on January 1,2005.
232. Citizenship Reform Act, supra note 230. For historical analy~es of the development of
German citizenship law prior to the foundation of the Federal Republic in 1949, see GOSEWINKEL,
supra note 13; NATHANS, supra note 34.
233. Citizenship Act, supra note 230. For a detailed analysis of key provisions, see Holger
Hoffmann, The Reform of the Law on Citizenship in Germany: Political Aims, Legal Concepts and
Provisional Results, 6 EUR. J. MIGRATION & L. 195 (2004). For an analysis of the political debates
behind the new Citizenship Act, supra note 230, see Green, supra note 176; Randall Hansen & Jobst
Koehler, Issue definition, political discourse and the politics of nationality reform in France and
Germany,44 EUR. J. POL. RESEARCH 623 (2005); Minkenberg, supra note 34, at 220-25.
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Germany.234 While too early to predict such dramatic consequences with any
degree of confidence, it is already apparent that the new law is having a major
impact on the persons affected, for good or ill.
Germany is typically viewed as exemplifying the primordialist or organicist
view that belonging presupposes ethno-cultural homogeneity.235 The new
Citizenship Act has taken a first step away from "a model of ethno-cultural
exclusion towards a model of multicultural inclusion.,,236 To be sure, the
Citizenship Act is just the first of what are likely to be many steps in the years
ahead, but it is an important one nonetheless. 237 Brief conceptual and historical
frames are provided to contextualize the ensuing discussion of the key changes
and implications of Germany's new Citizenship Act.
In conceptual terms, one must begin by qualifying the common
characterization of Germany as a practitioner of ethno-cultural exclusion. It is
more accurate to recognize that Germany, like many other countries, recognizes
a distinction between the particularistic notion of nationality and the more
universalistic notion of citizenship. These notions emerged separately in
German history, but later became entangled, and even fused, during the Nazi era
and thereafter. 238 However, post-war developments in general, and the new
Citizenship Act in particular, show an incremental but nonetheless salutary
tendency to decouple these two notions again. The developments surveyed
below provide thus provide modest support for the hopeful claim that "the
tradition of nationhood is not condemned to remain constant.,,239
In historical terms, the ethnification of German nationhood and citizenship
234. Stankiewicz, Changing Politics, supra note 46, at 2. That author considers Gennany's
"developing republican self-conception," but also discusses at length some of the problems that have
arisen in that regard. /d. at 15-16, 27. See also Andrea Klimt, The Myth of Heimkehrillusion, 20
GERMAN POL. & SOC'y 115 (2002) (discussing the myth that foreign guest workers were temporary
residents in Gennany).
235. See, e.g., BRUBAKER, supra note 13; KASTORYANO, supra note 42, at 121
("Gennany . .. is considered 'exclusivist' because of the significance accorded to criteria of
membership based on ancestry .... [T]he German nation is defined as a cultural and ethnic unity
based on common descent as a sign of belonging."). In contrast, some contemporary historians argue
that "ethnicity was. . . not the only factor that detennined whether a foreigner might become a
Gennan citizen. Decisions ... often reflected considerations of interest and utility that were distinct
from the pursuit of ethnic homogeneity." NATHANS, supra note 34, at I. In his path-breaking
analysis of Gennan citizenship between 1815 and 1949, Gosewinkel emphasizes the importance of
religious confession, military service, and gender for explaining Gennan citizenship policy prior to
the Nazi takeover. GOSEWINKEL, supra note 13. See also NATHANS, supra note 34, at 1-2 (arguing
that economic utility, military recruitment, and relations with neighboring states were important
explanatory factors).
236. Stankiewicz, Changing Politics, supra note 46, at 3.
237. RENNER, supra note 39, provides a detailed analysis of the current state of the
Citizenship Act, supra note 230, including amendments since that law entered into effect on January
1,2000.
238. The "extreme nature of [Gennan] ethnic preferences ... does not apply only to the Nazi
period." NATHANS, supra note 34, at I. Rather, "[f]rom the 1880s to the 1980s Gennan
naturalization policies assumed ethnically exclusive fonns that can best be described as anxious and
even obsessive." [d.
239. Stankiewicz, Changing Politics, supra note 46, at 5.
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resulted from a long process characterized by complexity and contingency. The
concept of German nationhood that emerged in the context of the old Empire,
and later became enmeshed with the formation of a German nation-state in
1871, was a cultural one. 240 Nationalist forces24I seeking an ethnically
homogeneous German nation-state in the nineteenth century mobilized this
cultural and linguistic242 notion of nationhood for their own purposes. Those
nationalist forces were countered in the nineteenth century-and again after
1949-by proponents of a universalistic notion of citizenship that reflected the
yearning "to live under the representative government of a single polity" and
aimed to realize "the ideals of the French Revolution.,,243 During the nineteenth
century struggle against authoritarian rule, the "German liberation movement"
regarded as "mutually reinforcing" the goals of national unification and
constitutionalism. 244 The ensuing "ethnification of German nationhood and

240. This historical overview relies heavily on PreuB, supra note 13. The original concept of
"German Nation" had a different meaning from the modern concept that links nation to statehood
and peoplehood. Rather, in the context of the medieval Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation,
the original concept of nation "was embodied by the Imperial Estates" who ruled the old Empire. Id.
at 24. Thus, unlike in France, England and Spain, where the idea of the nation became "associated
with the monarchy and its emerging ius territaria/e," the German concept of nation was prepolitical, and was viewed as the alternative to a bounded nation-state. Id. at 24-25.
The Germans lived in a plurality of territories and were ruled by a plurality of princes, while
the single king who existed, the Emperor, had no immediate power over them. Moreover,
none of the sovereign princes, including the hegemonic Prussian king, wished to establish a
German nation-state. Thus, in eighteenth-century Germany the idea of a German nation
emigrated into the sphere of culture.
Id. at 25.
241. PreuB, supra note 13, at 28. The nineteenth century proponents of particularism were
"xenophobic and anti-Semitic" and "oscillated between ... ethno-cultural and ... biological racist"
definitions of "'Germandom' (Deutschtum)." Id. The Nazis "realized the goals of the nationalist
movement" by providing a "racist definition of Germanness" in the "Greater German Empire"
(GrafJdeutsches Reich) in 1933.1d.
242. PreuB, supra note 13, argues that the terms 'deutsch' and 'deutsches Va/k' were
originally used to designate "a linguistic community" and were not limited to the "neutral
designation of a particular collectivity in a delineated territory." !d. at 26. It was the latter
"particularistic notion... which... anticipated important elements of the right-totalitarian
movements of the twentieth century." !d. at 28. With regard to the notion of linguistic community,
however, Franck argues that
to the historically trained eye, this linguistic affinity is not a natural given. It has evolved
through a synthesis of persons whose tribal origins and language may have been Visigoth,
Prussian, Rhenish, Alsatian, Westphalian, Hannoverian, Saxon, Bohemian, Frisian, Sorb,
Bavarian, Tyrolean, Celt, Slavic or Danish. These languages, to the extent they have
survived, even today show differences from one another. German, like almost every other
living language, is to a degree synthetic. Germany, moreover, is only in a mythic sense the
manifestation of an eternal genetic or cultural unity.
Franck, supra note 12, at 366.
243. PreuB, supra note 13, at 27-28.
244. PreuB, supra note 13, at 27 ("[T]hey were convinced that Germans could achieve
political freedom in a constitutional state only through being united in one single nation-state. As we
know, this belief proved to be over-optimistic."). In other words, Germany tried to achieve in one
step what France had achieved in "two consecutive and protracted steps, and with great difficulties,
suffering and violent struggles." Id.
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consequently of German citizenship" resulted not from some innate
characteristic of the German people, but rather from the concrete political
circumstances surrounding state-formation in 1871. 245 Indeed, one leading
scholar finds the "definition of nationhood in ethnic terms" and ensuing
"distortion of the concept of nation... surprising," since "geographical,
religious and socio-economic fragmentation" were "constant in German
society ... ever since the Middle Ages.,,246 In the alternative, it may have been
precisely this experience of fragmentation that produced a "longing for social
homogenization.,,247
Whatever constellation of factors generated the assumptions about
membership that prevailed in the latter part of the nineteeth century, those
assumptions were crystallized in the 1913 Citizenship Ac2 48 enacted during the
Wilhelmine era. That law remained in effect through the Weimar Republic, the
Nazi reign of terror, and the Cold War division of Germany, though it was
amended numerous times. The 1913 Citizenship Act applied the principle ofjus
sanguinui49--or the principle of descent-to determine who belonged to
Germany.250 While some view this legal rule as proof of German racism, it
245. PreuB, supra note 13, at 33, argues that the top-down nature of state formation was
"probably ... the main cause" of ethnification. In particular, he argues that the "congenital defect of
the Empire, namely its establishment from above ... without the participation of significant parts of
the population" produced a "latent tendency towards aggressiveness, scapegoating and the need for
identified enemies." !d.
246. PreuB, supra note 13, at 34. This outcome is also surprising, because "Prussia was the
hegemonic power in the Empire and had a record of having a universalist state ethos." !d. Compare
NATHANS, supra note 34, at I ("It would not have been hard to predict in the mid-nineteenth century
that if a German nation-state were founded it would attempt to promote a feeling of ethnic solidarity
among its inhabitants," given that "German national feeling did stress the bonds created by a
common ethnicity and culture.").
247. PreuB, supra note 13, at 34 ("[T]he trauma of territorial, religious and political
splintering created a more or less conscious longing for social homogenization among large
segments of the German population. This desire entailed the suppression of the tradition of openness
in German society and gave way to the high degree of authoritarian rule characteristic of both the
Wilhelmine Empire and the ... Third Reich.").
248. The 1913 Citizenship Act, supra note 230, was in tum, a revision of the 1870
Citizenship Act (Gesetz iiber die Erwerbung und den Verlust der Bundes- und Staatsangehorigkeit),
RGBI I 355, which had "by and large standardized the particularistic rules of the member states."
PreuB, supra note 13, at 33. It may be a tel1ing parallel to contemporary European conditions that the
German Empire founded in 1871 "rendered national membership of the Empire ... dependent on the
possession of nationality in one of its member states." !d. at 32. Thus, prior to 1871, there was no
such thing as German 'nationality' but rather only individual membership in one of the 40 German
states, pursuant to each state's rules on Landesangehorigkeit, which was the conceptual predecessor
of Staatsangehorigkeit. [d. at 31. One author has argued that unlike Imperial Germany, "there is no
equivalent of an intimidating Prussian state that can dictate policy changes" in the EO. Tobias
Brinkmann, Book Review, 22 GERMAN POL. & SOC'y 65, 68 (Winter 2004).
249. Jus sanguinus implies that "every person born to non-citizen parents will remain a
foreigner unless he or she naturalises." Ludvig, supra note 61, at 502. Seen in historical context, the
emergence of jus sanguinus represented a progressive break with feudal traditions that treated the
individual as "a mere appurtenance of the soil." PreuB, supra note 13, at 31. "The defeat of the
estatist orders by the state required the emancipation of the individual from several obligations to
feudal lords, and the establishment of a singly and exclusive duty to obey the unifYing ruler." !d.
250. Nazi elements of the 1913 Citizenship Act, supra note 230, were eliminated after
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bears mention that although the jus sanguinus principle "[can] be used as an
instrument of ethnification," it does "not necessarily entail an ethnic definition
of belonging.,,251 Indeed, even before the new Citizenship Act entered into
effect in 2000, the principle of jus sanguinus meant that one "became a German
citizen at birth simply by being born to a German parent, irrespective of the
'ethnicity' of the citizen parent.,,252 Yet such arguments about the ethnic
neutrality of jus sanguinus, while technically correct, beg the question of how
one becomes a German parent in the first place. Moreover, where there is a
large foreign population, as in Germany since the Second World War, the jus
sanguinus principle "constantly reproduces 'new-born' foreigners" in practice,
since it denies citizenship to children born on German soil to foreign parents. 253
Such a regime ultimately denies equality, in particular to second- and thirdgeneration foreigners who have no opportunity to naturalize in the country of
their birth. 254 Another "systemic weakness of pure jus sanguinus is that
citizenship with some of its related rights can be transmitted over generations to
persons residing abroad, without any substantial connections to the polity,
whereas non-citizens remain non-citizens over generations, despite continuous
residence and membersh~ in a society.,,255
Group selectivit0 5 did (and does continue to) exist in Germany, but it
cannot be attributed solely to the principle of jus sanguinus. Rather, to the
extent Germany did practice group-based exclusion, it resulted not from "the
citizenship attribution viajus sanguinus" per se, but rather to a large extent from
"the administrative implementation of naturalization (which in the inter-war
period had preferred German-origin applicants from Russia and excluded
eastern Jews).,,257 Moreover, for those determined enough to apply, the process
of naturalization was time-consuming, costly, and potentially bewildering.
The new German Citizenship Act significantly alters the conditions for
acquiring, as well as for losing German citizenship. It does not wholly abandon

World War II. Stankiewicz, supra note 46, at 20. For an analysis of the Nuremburg Laws of 1935,
see GOSEWINKEL, supra note 13, at 383-93.
251. Preufi, supra note 13, at 33. Joppke, supra note 2, at 52-53, similarly observes that jus
sanguinus "does not as such imply group selectivity," and thus that the "stereotype that ethnic
citizenship is 'racist' ... does not correspond to legal reality."
252. Joppke & Morawska, supra note 3, at 53 ("German citizenship law had never been
based on a legal definition of German ethnicity.").
253. Ludvig, supra note 61, at 499.
254. Haas, Roever & Schmidt, supra note 2, at 166.
255. Ludvig, supra note 61, at 504. The Citizenship Act, supra note 230, addresses this
problem by providing a new rule that cuts off the operation of jus sanguinus under certain
circumstances in regard to the children of German citizens who are born and also reside abroad.
RENNER, supra note 39, para. 1.5, at 12 (Generationenschnitt).
256. For the contrast between group and individual selectivity, see Joppke, supra note 2.
257. Joppke, supra note 2, at 53 (citing GOSEWINKEL, supra note 13, ch. 7, at 328-68).
Under the 1913 Citizenship Act, supra note 230, "there had always been the possibility to acquire
German citizenship through naturalizing," though it was difficult to do so. [d. Still, this possibility
implies that '''blood' in the principle of 'jus sanguinus' was formal and instrumental, not
substantive." [d.

2006]

CITIZENSHIP AND MIGRATION

377

jus sanguinis in favor of the jus soli principle, which grants citizenship
according to principle of territoriality.258 However, the Citizenship Act does
mitigate the "ethnic underpinnings of the state,,259 by rendering German
citizenship "less exclusive and more accessible to the outside,,260 in a number of
important respects. First, at the symbolic level, the changes mark a clear
departure from the government's long-standing position that Germany "is not a
country of immigration.,,261 Second, and of greater practical import, Germany
has joined most of its European neighbors by introducing the jus soli principle in
certain cases. 262 And third, the new Citizenship Act continues the trend started
in the 1970s to simplify procedures, curb administrative discretion, and lower
costs, in the hope of encouraging more foreigners to naturalize. 263
Under the jus soli provisions of the new Citizenship Act, a child born in
Germany to non-German parents automatically becomes a German citizen,
provided that the parents meet certain criteria, including legal residence in
Germany for a period of eight years. 264 Citizenship is also available as a matter
of right to other persons through naturalization, if the applicant has lawfully
resided in Germany during the eight years preceding the application and satisfies

258. Under the jus soli principle, "anyone, whatever their ethnic, racial, or national origins,
will be granted automatic citizenship at birth (or optionally at a later stage)." Joppke, supra note 2, at
53. Some scholars argue that "territorial citizenship [that is,jus soli] has become the favoured form
of citizenship in international law." Id. (citing Diane Orentlicher, Citizenship and National Identity,
in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ETHNIC CONFLICT (David Wippmann ed., 1998)).
259. Dieckhoff, supra note 14, at 14 n.28.
260. Joppke, supra note 2, at 53.
261. "[S]ince 1977 successive German governments have proclaimed that, contrary to the
facts, Germany was not an immigration country." Minkenberg, supra note 34, at 220. This oftquoted statement comes from a 1977 report prepared by a joint commission of the federal and state
governments. "The Federal Republic of Germany is not a country of immigration. West Germany is
a country in which foreigners reside for varying lengths of time before they decide on their own
accord to return to their home country." Vorschliige der Bund-Liinder-Kommission zur
Fortentwicklung einer umfassended Konzeption der Ausliinderbeschiiftigungspolitik (Feb. 1977),
quoted in JOPPKE, supra note 2, at 287 (citing PETER KATZENSTEIN, POLICY AND POLITICS IN WEST
GERMANY 239 (1987)).
262. This change "marks Germany's long-overdue 'catching up' with its Western European
neighbours, that is, the modernisation of its politics of citizenship by combining a residence-based
nationality code (ius soli) in addition to the origin-based current code (ius sanguinus) with a wellregulated immigration policy." Minkenberg, supra note 34, at 219. However, Minkenberg disputes
that the recent changes amount to "full 'catching up' with the policies of other Western countries"
or, for that matter, that they constitute "an adequate response to the country's long-term needs for
immigrants to maintain the viability of its labour markets and its social insurance system." /d. at 220.
263. See generally Hoffmann, supra note 233, at 195-202 (noting various procedural
changes, including changes in the types and degree of discretion), and at 202 (noting the newly fixed
fees of 255 Euros per adult and 51 Euros per child). Prior to 2000, even the fee for naturalization
was subject to administrative discretion. [d.
264. These conditions are spelled out in Article 4(3) of the Citizenship Act, supra note 230.
See generally Hoffmann, supra note 233, at 199-200; RENNER, supra note 39, para. 2.3, at 24-28
(Geburt im Inland). In such cases, the child born in Germany must, between age 18 and 23, either
elect to retain German citizenship, or risk automatically losing it on his or her 23rd birthday, in
accordance with the provisions of Article 29 of the Citizenship Act.

378

BERKELEY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LA W

[Vol. 24:1

all other statutory criteria. 265 Naturalization may also available in other cases
on a discretionary basis. 266 The new Citizenship Act does not abandon the
presumption against dual nationality,267 but merely tolerates it during the
minority of children born in Germany to foreign parents. 268
The limited introduction of jus soli has not obliterated the legal distinction
between foreigners (Ausliinder) and resettlers (Aussiedler).269 Inclusive group
selectivity continues to exist in the form of "automatic citizenship ... for ethnic
Germans.,,270 Thus, some potential immigrants remain entitled to German
265. The Citizenship Act formally consolidates the right to citizenship by individuals on the
basis of long-term residency, provided that all statutory criteria are satisfied. These requirements are
spelled out in Article 10(1) of the Citizenship Act, supra note 230, which was Article 85 of the
Foreigners' Law prior to January 1,2005. See generally Hoffmann, supra note 233, at 200-01 and
RENNER, supra note 39, para. 2.4.4, at 31-33 (Liingerer Aufenthalt). The notion of a right to
citizenship was already introduced in 1993, at least in limited cases, but remained subject to
considerable discretion, such as connection with the requirement that naturalization be in the public
interest. Stankiewicz, Changing Politics, supra note 46, at 8.
266. See generally Hoffmann, supra note 233, at 201-02 and RENNER, supra note 39, para.
2.5, at 34-35 (Ermessungseinbiirgerung).
267. This issue was hotly contested during the debates leading up to the adoption of the new
Citizenship Act, supra note 230. The Red-Green coalition originally wanted to allow it
unconditionally, but the CDUlCSU successfully opposed it, on the ground that it "devalues German
citizenship." Haas, Roever & Schmidt, supra note 2, at 166. See also Alice Holmes Cooper, PartySponsored Protest and the Movement Society: The CDUlCSU Mobilises Against Citizenship Law
Reform, II GERMAN POLITICS 88 (2002); Minkenberg, supra note 34, at 230-32; Green, supra note
176, at 97-98; Stankiewicz, Changing Politics, supra note 46, at 12-13. In the end, the new
Citizenship Act both expands and restricts the availability of dual nationality in Germany. RENNER,
supra note 39, para. 1.5, at 13.
268. Stankiewicz, Changing Politics, supra note 46, at 13, notes that dual citizenship is also
tolerated in the case of resettlers, as well as in cases involving applicants who want to keep their old
passports for economic reasons, such as to avoid disinheritance. See generally Otto Kimminich, The
Conventions for the Prevention of Double Nationality and their Meaning for Germany and Europe
in an Era of Migration, 38 GERMAN Y.B. INT'L L. 224 (1996); RENNER, supra note 39, para. 2.6, at
35-39. Germany withdrew from the Convention on the Reduction of Cases of Multiple Nationality
and on Military Obligations in Cases of Multiple Nationality, Council of Europe, May 6,1963 (ETS
no. 43), entered into effect Dec. 22, 2002, and has been party to the 1997 European Convention on
Nationality, supra note 23, since September 1,2005.
269. Stankiewicz, Changing Politics, supra note 46, at 5. However, ethnic priority
immigration policies have been hollowed out, id. at 16-27, and "other criteria-above all languagegain importance." ld. at 27. See also RENNER, supra note 39, para. 1.4, at 10 and para. 21, at 15-20
(explaining changes affecting Statusdeutsche-including Aussiedler and Spiitaussiedler-in greater
detail).
270. Joppke, supra note 2, at 52. Article 116 of the German Basic Law (Grundgesetz)
defines Germans to include certain groups of ethnic Germans living outside the territory of the
Federal Republic, notably resettlers from Eastern Europe (Aussiedler) and from the former GDR
(Ubersiedler). In particular, Article 116 GG provides:
(I) Unless otherwise provided by statute, a German within the meaning of this Constitution
is a person who possesses German citizenship or who has been admitted to the territory of
the German Reich within the frontiers of 21 December 1937 as a refugee or expellee of
German ethnic origin or as the spouse or descendant of such a person. (2) Former German
citizens who, between 20 January 1933 and 8 May 1945, were deprived of their citizenship
on political, racial or religious grounds, and their descendants, are re-granted German
citizenship on application. They are considered as not having been deprived of their German
citizenship where they have established their residence in Germany after 8 May 1945 and
have not expressed a contrary intention.
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citizenship, while other long-term German residents who wish to naturalize still
face limited opportunities to do so.
The liberalization of voluntary naturalization has not come without a cost.
In particular, the right to naturalize on the basis of long-term residency may not
be exercised if the applicant lacks sufficient knowledge of the German language,
if he or she can be shown to have acted against the constitutional order, or if
there are grounds for deportation. 27l Further requirements include a written
commitment to uphold the liberal democratic German constitutional order,272
the ability to support him- or herself, and renunciation of his or her former
citizenship. In general, no naturalization is possible unless the applicant shows
that he or she is both willing and able to integrate into German society.273
Some of these requirements are in tension with Germany's stated goal of
curbing the high level of administrative discretion that has characterized
previous efforts to liberalize naturalization.
In particular, the renewed
integration push (discussed in greater detail below in Part IV) suggests that
discretion is likely to remain a significant factor. Still, it is significant that the
bases upon which discretion may be exercised have been reduced in principle.

University of Wiirzburg, available at http://www.uni-wuerzburg.de/law/gmOOOOO.html(source
of translation). See also 1953 Refugees' and Expellees' Law (Bundesvertriebenen- und
Fliichtlingsgesetz). See generally Rainer Miinz & Rainer Ohliger, Long Distance Citizens:
Ethnic Germans and Their Immigration to Germany, in PATHS TO INCLUSION: THE
INTEGRATION OF MIGRANTS IN THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY 161 (Peter Schuck &
Rainer Miinz eds., 1998); Stefan Wolff, Changing Priorities or Changing Opportunities?
German External Minority Policy, 1918-1998, in WOLFF, supra note 4, at 183. Germany took
special precautions in the EU context to accommodate these special interests. See, e.g., Albert
Bleckmann, German Nationality within the Meaning of the EEC Treaty, 1978 COMMON
MARKET L. REv. 435; de Groot, supra note 60, at 8 (noting that Germany was the only Member
State besides the U.K. to issue a declaration of its nationals for Community purposes).
271. Article II, Citizenship Act, supra note 230, which was Article 86 of the Foreigners'
Act prior to January I, 2005. This requirement also applies in connection with naturalizations of
spouses and minor children and in connection with discretionary naturalizations. Ludvig, supra note
61, at 507, considers the introduction of language tests for all naturalizations a "backlash" insofar as
no proof of language ability was required under the liberalized naturalization procedures that had
been introduced in the 1990s. For an historical overview of evolving linguistic and other additional
requirements, see Hoffmann, supra note 233, at 195-202.
272. The details to be included in the "declaration of loyalty" are spelled out in Section
85.1.1.1 of the Allgemeine Verwaltungsvorschrift zum StaatsangehOrigkeitsrecht (StAR-VwV) (Dec.
13,2000), GMBI. 2001, 122 [hereinafter Citizenship Regulations]. These Citizenship Regulations
are not binding on courts, but merely attempt to direct the authorities in the exercise of their
discretion and in this way to achieve a certain level of harmonization. RENNER, supra note 39, para.
1.3, at 10.
273. Stankiewicz, Changing Politics, supra note 46, at 15 suggests that "the most difficult
question within German society ... [is1into what should integration be accomplished?" In response
to this challenge, the German government has, inter alia, prepared a new guide book for immigrants.
Among other entries, it lists the d6ner kebab as Germany's most popular fast food, and provides a
large color photo of a garden gnome. Ray Furlong, Germany Welcomes Immigrants with Book, BBC
NEWS (Feb. 25, 2004), at http://news.bbc.co.uklllhi/worldleurope/3487144.strn (last visited Nov. 29,
2005). For a discussion of the positions taken by different parties in regard to integration, see Haas,
Roever & Schmidt, supra note 2, at 168. Germany's new integration requirements are analyzed in
greater detail infra in Part IV.
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One leading scholar places great theoretical weight on the importance of
such constraints on state discretion. Joppke argues that, once migrants have
"passed the hurdle of entry, ... a democratic logic enters, according to which
immigrants become cooperating members of society who are owed equal
consideration by the state under whose roof they have come to reside, and on
whose protection they now depend.,,274 Moreover, in his view, such changes
constitute "a true constitutional revolution across Western states,,,275 which is
all the more "astonishing" since it occurs in a realm where "state discretion had
previously been at its peak.,,276 Ultimately, Joppke argues that this trendcombined with the trend towards "non-discriminatory admissions and residencegranting procedures"-must result in a "decoupling of the citizenry from a
particular nation or ethnic group, and a weakening of the entire construct of
'ownership' of the state by that group.,,277 While legal developments in the EU
provide considerable evidence to support his claims about the enhanced status of
residence and its approximation to citizenship, they find little support in the new
German Citizenship Act, which constitutes a vital step, but hardly a great stride
towards the goals Joppke envisions.
For the time being, careful attention is warranted to the implementation and
effects of the Citizenship Act. One major question is whether enhanced
naturalization opportunities will actually produce a dramatic rise in German
naturalization rates.
Earlier German efforts to liberalize and encourage
naturalization produced only marginal improvements. 278 To be sure, the
naturalization rates quadrupled between 1991 and 1999 in the wake of those
reforms,279 but overall, naturalization rates have remained relatively low in
Germany, compared to other West European countries. 280 In fact, while
naturalizations in Germany rose in 2000 by 30% to an all-time high of just under
186,700, they declined steadily every year since then. 281 Naturalization rates

274. Joppke, supra note 2, at 51.
275. Jd. at 52.
Jd.
Jd. at 53.
278. Simplified naturalization procedures were adopted for two categories of persons in
1991, namely for young persons between the ages of 16 and 23, and for long-term residents-in
most cases Gastarbeiter-who had lived in Germany for at least 15 years. Ludvig, supra note 61, at
507. These rules were liberalized further in 1993, in the Anderungsgesetz zur Verwirklichung des
Asylkmopromisses (Amendment to Implement the Asylum Compromise), which converted the
former "entitlement (Regelanspruch) [into] a 'definitive right.'" [d.
However, simplified
naturalizations were "de facto abandoned" under the Citizenship Act. !d.
279. Green, supra note 176, at 95.
280. Green, supra note 176, at 95-97; Minkenberg, supra note 34, at 230.
281. The German Federal Statistical Office reports that about 178,100 foreigners were
naturalized in 2001, 154,500 in 2002, and 140,700 in 2003. DeStasis Press Release, May 24, 2004.
In each year, the largest group of persons naturalizing were Turks (40%), followed by Iranians.
Among all persons naturalized in 2003, about 61% of them were long-term residents. 2003 also saw
a big (77%) jump in the percentage of naturalizations of former German citizens who were deprived
of their citizenship for political, racist or religious reasons between 1933 and 1945, and of the
descendants of such persons. In 2004, a total of 127,150 persons were naturalized, which represents

276.
277.
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may jump again when the "third wave of migration [that] started in 1989"
reaches the minimum period of required residency,282 or around the year 2020,
when children born in Germany and entitled to invoke the jus soli principle must
choose which nationality they prefer. Meanwhile, observers are left wondering
why German naturalization rates are dropping after the greatest liberalization in
German history.
Numerous "practical and psychological disadvantages,,283 have been cited
to explain low rates of naturalization. One key practical consideration has been
the risk of subjecting male children to conscription. 284 The new language
ability requirement and the cost of naturalization are also likely to affect a
number of applicants. 285 Moreover, the general prohibition of dual citizenship
presents special practical and psychological barriers for some, if not many, lon~
term residents from non-EU countries who might otherwise opt to naturalize. 2 6
In practical terms, loss of home country nationality may entail "difficulties of
entering or returning to the country of origin, acquiring, selling or inheriting
property.,,287 In psychological terms, the prohibition of dual nationality
confronts potential German citizens with loss of identity and self-esteem. 288
Further, some may perceive the general prohibition against dual nationality as
"unwillingness" on the part of the host country to "welcome pluralism and
cultural difference.,,289 Indeed, retention of home country citizenship may well
a nearly 10% decline vis-a-vis the preceding year, thus marking the fourth consecutive year of
declining naturalization rates since the Citizenship Act entered into force. Deutschland: Riickliiufige
Einbiirgerungszahlen [Dropping Naturalization Rates], 7 MIGRATION UNO BEVOLKERUNG 1
(September 2005). By contrast, in Austria, where recent reforms tightened the citizenship
requirements, naturalization rates have risen. Ludvig, supra note 61, at 509.
282. Ludvig, supra note 61, at 509.
283. Ludvig, supra note 61, at 511.
284. Hanagan, supra note 93, at 400.
285. According to one source, around 20% of applicants during the first three months of
2000 failed the language tests, while the fees of 250 Euros discouraged others from applying.
Ludvig, supra note 61, at 507-08.
286. Randall Hansen, A European Citizenship or a Europe of Citizens? Third Country
Nationals in the EU, 24 J. ETHNIC & MIGRATION STUD. 757 (1998); Ludvig, supra note 61, at 511.
287. Ludvig, supra note 61, at 511. In this regard, it is interesting to note that Turkey
facilitated the acquisition by its nationals of German citizenship by removing restrictions on
acquiring and inheriting property, and by facilitating the process of regaining Turkish citizenship
after it had been renounced in connection with naturalization. JOPPKE, supra note 2, at 205.
288. Ludvig, supra note 61, at 511.
289. Ludvig, supra note 61, at 511. In course of the Leitkultur ("leading culture") debate that
first erupted in 2000, the CDU issued a statement that "German cultural norms" are derived from
Christianity and the Enlightenment, classical philosophy, humanism, and Roman law. Haas, Roever
& Schmidt, supra note 2, at 164. The FDP took the position that aspects of Islam are clearly
incompatible with European values. Id. More recently, CDU leader and new chancellor Angela
Merkel's statement that "[a]nyone coming here must ... tolerate our Western and Christian roots"
was prompted by the broadcast of a Berlin imam who was caught on camera telling worshipers that
Germans would "bum in hell" because they were unbelievers. Furlong, Germans Argue Over
Integration, supra note 50. In response, the conservative culture minister from Baden-Wiirttemberg,
Annette.Schavan, called for a law requiring preaching in mosques to be in the German language.
Bernstein, supra note 2. However, this proposal encountered stiff resistance, and was unambiguously
rejected by Mariluise Beck, the Federal Commissioner for Migration, Refugees and Integration
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serve non-Christian immigrants as a source of resistance in the context of
debates over the central role of Christianity in Gennan, as well as in European
identity.290
.
Judgment as to whether these changes truly represent a paradigm shift291
or mere symbolic politics292 is beyond the scope of this article, and must await
empirical analysis. 293 Despite some significant changes, the new Citizenship
Act maintains a tight clamp on the acquisition of Gennan citizenship by
foreigners. Indeed, one unanticipated consequence of the new Citizenship Act is
that many thousands of Gennan citizens of Israeli or Turkish origin face the risk
of automatically losing their Gennan citizenship.294 Still, if such a step away
from traditional exclusive modes of belonging can be successfully taken in
Gennany, a country having an ethno-cultural tradition of membership, then it
surely bodes well for the development of more inclusive fonns of belonging.
Indeed, an optimist might hope that Gennan steps toward multinational
citizenship and multicultural tolerance could set an example for the rest of
Europe, just as Gennan litigants and courts drove the incorporation of
fundamental (human) rights into the EU's legal order. 295 A realist, on the other
hand, would be cautious about making any such predictions, particularly in view

(Beauftragte der Bundesregierung for Migration, Fliichtlinge und Integration). Philip Grassmann,
Zum Patriotismus Einladen [Invitation to Patriotism], SOOOEUTSCHE ZEITUNG, Nov. 24, 2004, at
56-57.
290. Hanagan, supra note 93, at 400, argues that "[m]any immigrant identities originated in
conflict with European imperialism, sometirries in struggle against the colonialism of the very
nations to which they migrated." This reason seems particularly salient in France, but could also be
relevant in Germany, particularly in connection with the Leitkultur debate discussed supra in note
289 and infra in Part IV.A.
291. See, e.g., Green, supra note 176, at 97 ("radical reorientation of citizenship");
Stankiewicz, supra note 46, at 4. Compare RENNER, supra note 39, at 21 n.110 (arguing that one
cannot speak of a paradigm change so long as jus sanguinus maintains its traditional dominance).
292. Minkenberg, supra note 34, at 237 (arguing that "the much celebrated 'paradigm shift'
is an expression of symbolic politics rather than a reflection of truly substantial and effective
changes").
293. In the meantime, there is no shortage of proposals for further liberalization. Ludvig
suggests, for example, that "receiver states" could "stock up the budgets of [their] bureaucracies,
facilitate administrative practice, lower the fees, reduce the required periods of residence, accept
dual nationality, .increase information policies and ... turn obtaining [their] nationality into more of
a celebratory moment." Ludvig, supra note 61, at 510.
294. Article 25(1) of the Citizenship Act provides for automatic loss of German citizenship
upon the volitional acquisition of citizenship of another state. This provision has already affected
tens of thousands of German passport holders of Turkish origin who have reacquired their Turkish
nationality, as well as a smaller number of Israeli-German dual nationals. See Deutschland: Verlust
der deutschen Staatsbilrgerschaft droht [Germany: Threatened Loss of German Citizenship], 2
MIGRATION UNO BEVOLKERUNG 2 (March 2005); Israel/Deutschland: Doppelte Staatsbilrgerschaft
nicht mehr sicher [GermanylIsrael: Double Nationality No Longer Certain], 4 MIGRATION UNO
BEVOLKERUNG 2 (May 2005).
295. Paradoxically, European public opinion polls have shown that "Germans are
significantly less likely than [other] Europeans to name the guarantee of human rights and respect
for democracy in Europe as a priority matter for the European Union." Haas, Roever & Schmidt,
supra note 2, at 157. However, those authors go on to point out that "[ e]Iite opinion matters at least
as much, more if we consider decisions that result in public policy." Id. at 160.
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of the difficult demographic and employment conditions in Germany today.296
Legal reforms do not automatically resolve underlying social tensions. Indeed,
under contemporary conditions, the liberalization of citizenship--as well as of
migration, discussed below in Part m.B-might even exacerbate such tensions,
at least in the short term, particularly given the "welfare chauvinism" and
"subculture of resistance" that have been identified as part of the German
popular response to growing multiculturalism. 297 The "underlying controversy
over the degree of tolerance to be accorded to diversity remains unresolved,,,298
and is likely to stay that way for some time to come.
B. MiGRATION

Despite strict migration laws during most of the post-war period, more than
10 percent of Germany's current population is foreign. 299 Germany became one
of the world's largest immigrant-receiving countries during the second half of
the twentieth century,300 even after being virtually closed to foreign workers
296. Minkenberg, supra note 34, at 220; RENNER, supra note 39, at 4.
297. Minkenberg, supra note 34, at 237. See also Furlong, Germans Argue Over
Integration, supra note 50 (quoting a politician as saying "[I]f multiculturalism means that it's OK
for 30,000 Turks to live in a certain quarter of Berlin, and never leave, and live like they're still in
deepest Turkey, then the term is now discredited").
298. Haas, Roever & Schmidt, supra note 2, at 164. Those authors go on to note, however,
that this fact "hardly portends a return to the nationalism of yore. Nor does it differ greatly from
similar controversies raging elsewhere in the EU." /d. The issue of headscarves has become
increasingly controversial in Germany, as numerous Liinder have prohibited the wearing of religious
symbols by teachers in public schools. The German Federal Administrative Court
(Bundesverwaltungsgericht) upheld one such state law in June 2004. Deutschland: Kopftuchverbot
bestiitigt [Germany: Head Scarf Prohibition Upheld], 5 MIGRATION UND BEVOLKERUNG 2, 2-3 (July
2004). See also Das Kreuz mit dem Kopftuch, GOETHE-INSTITUT/QANTARA (2004), available at
http://qantara.de(lastvisitedNov. 21, 2005) (summarizing criticisms of the head scarf decision).
299. I use the term 'foreign' as a rough proxy to encompass the many types of persons who
may be counted as falling outside the native-born norm. Both the term and the content of such a
composite group are highly contestable. According to official German government statistics, the
foreign population has stabilized at 8.9 percent since the end of 1998. Bundesamt fur Migration und
Fliichtlinge (BAMF), Migration und Asyl in Zahlen (2004), at 65 [hereinafter BAMF 2004];
Bundesministerium des Inneren (BM!) Sachverstandigenrat fur Zuwanderung und Integration,
Migrationsbericht (Nov. 2004), at 26 [hereinafter BMI, Migrationsbericht] (reporting that, between
1992 and 2003, the percentage of foreign population in Germany rose from 8 percent to 8.9 percent,
where it has stabilized since 1998). However, the actual popUlation of foreign-born residents is
considerably larger, since these figures do not include ethnic Germans-as defined in Article 116 of
the Grundgesetz (Basic Law)-who have migrated to Germany from Central and Eastern Europe
(Spiitaussiedler). While substantial in number, these persons are not treated as foreigners for
statistical purposes. According to Minkenberg, supra note 34, at 220, "the net balance of nine
million immigrants during [the period from 1954 to 1999] accounts for more than ten per cent of
today's population," and "[b]y 1999, immigration to Germany had reached a magnitude that was
comparable only to that of the USA" with "14 per cent of the population ... born outside the
country." Id. at 223. See also Joppke, supra note 2, at 62 ("[B]etween 1950 and 1993, the net
migration balance has been an astounding 12.6 million, accounting for 80 percent of the country's
population growth."). But see Bereinigtes Ausliinderregister, supra note 38 (revised official
statistics reveal that only 6.7 million non-German nationals were legally residing in Germany at the
end of 2004).
300. See, e.g., Minkenberg, supra note 34, at 220.
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from outside the EU after the first energy crisis in the 1970s.
The first wave of post-war immigration consisted of the so-called
Gastarbeiter (guest workers) who came between 1955 and 1973. 301 These
workers, who were expected to be temporary residents, were soon followed by a
second wave consisting of their family members. 302 The illusion that the guest
workers and their families would someday return home persisted until the
1980s. 303 The third wave of post-war immigration to Germany started after
1980, when some eastern bloc countries-notably Czechoslovakia, Hungary and
Poland-allowed some of their citizens to travel to the West. Yet another wave
of post-war immigrants came to Germany under its generous asylum
procedures. 304 Indeed, between 1987 and 1992, the number of aS6;lum seekers
rose from 57,000 per year to a peak of around 438,000 per year.3 5 The latest
wave of immigrants to Germany has arrived since the collapse of the
Communism in 1989. These immigrants comprise numerous different groups,
inc1udinji ethnic German resettlers (Spiitaussiedler) from Central and Eastern
Europe, 06 Jews from the former Soviet Union,301 and persons fleeing wars,

301. Bundesministerium des Inneren (BMI), Zuwanderung - Das neue Gesetz (2005), at 6
[hereinafter BMI, Zuwanderung], available at http://www.bmi.bund.de (last visited Nov. 29, 2005).
The guest workers came from Italy, Spain, Greece, Turkey, Morocco, Portugal, Tunisia, and
Yugoslavia. Guest worker recruitment was stopped abruptly in November 1973 (Anwerbestop), in
the wake of the first energy crisis. By that time, approximately four million foreigners were residing
in the Federal Republic of Germany. The halt to recruitment after the 1973 oil crisis-in Germany as
elsewhere in Western Europe-''was country-blind, even though the preponderance of certain
national or regional origins among immigrants (Turkish in Germany and Switzerland; Algerian or
North African in France) arguably was the bone of contention." JOPPKE, supra note 2, at 50. While
the focus here is on post-war immigration, Germany has "received immigrants in growing numbers"
since the late nineteenth century. Brinkmann, German Migrations, supra note 36, at 140.
302. In 1999, 30 percent of all foreign residents in Germany had been living there for 20
years or more. Ludvig, supra note 61, at 500. At present, approximately 1.5 million foreign (that is,
non-citizen) minors are living in Germany, of whom approximately two-thirds were born there to
one or more non-German parents.
303. The Turks in Germany "abandoned the discourse of return and replaced it with talk of
permanent settlement and political rights" in the 1980s. KASTORYANO, supra note 42, at 117.
304. Asylum has been a particularly salient issue in Germany, whose post-war asylum lawembedded in Article 16 of the Basic Law-was the most liberal in Europe and granted a higher level
of protection than guaranteed by the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951,
189 U.N.T.S. 137, as modified by the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31,1967,606
U.N.T.S. 267. Minkenberg, supra note 34, at 223; Stankiewicz, supra note 46, at 9. The number of
asylum seekers in Germany rose dramatically and provoked a political crisis in the immediate
aftermath of the collapse of Communism. Green, supra note 176, at 92-95.
305. After Germany's asylum law was tightened up in 1993, the number of annual petitions
dropped again. 50,500 asylum petitions were filed in 2003. At present, some l.l million people live
in Germany who are recognized or seeking recognition as refugees. BMI, Zuwanderung, supra note
301, at 6. After the recruitment of guest workers was banned in the 1970s, "seeking asylum was,
from the immigrant's perspective, easier and more beneficial than choosing the other possible legal
path into Germany through family reunion." Stankiewicz, supra note 46, at 9.
306. The peak years for ethnic German migration were 1989 and 1990, when 380,000 and
400,000 persons respectively immigrated to Germany. All told, around 4.4 million such persons
have migrated to Germany since 1950. BMI, Zuwanderung, supra note 301, at 6.
307. Since 1990, around 188,000 Jewish persons immigrated to Germany from the former
Soviet Union, mainly from Russia and Kazakhstan. BMI, Zuwanderung, supra note 30 I, at 6.

2006]

CITIZENSHIP AND MIGRATION

385

particularly in the Balkans, Africa, and the Middle East. 308 At present, some
7.3 million foreigners live in Germany, of whom more than half have spent ten
or more years there. 309
Germany's ncw Immigration Act signals the formal end of decades of
official insistence that Germany was not a "country of immigration.,,310 The
discrepancy between de facto immigration and its political denial, which a
leading scholar has labeled the "single most enduring puzzle in the German
immigration debate,,,311 has been significantly narrowed by the reforms passed
under the Schroder government (1995-2005). Although reforms were finally
passed into law during an extended period of SPD-Ied coalition government, the
major parties on both the Left and the Right have invoked the non-immigration
trope in recent decades. 312 Indeed, even Chancellor Schroder, on whose watch
the German legal frameworks for both citizenship and migration have undergone
historical reversals, has stressed that the new Immigration Act was designed to
enable the government to regulate and in particular to limit migration, rather
than to encourage it. 313 This statement by a leading reformer suggests that the
underlying fear of migration 314 may not have subsided, but rather merely been
suppressed in view of the "demographic reality of aging societies with social
security and health care systems under the threat of collapse. ,,315

308. See sources cited supra in note 42.
309. BM!, Zuwanderung, supra note 301, at 6.
310. See sources cited supra in note 262. Minkenberg, supra note 34, at 223, calls this
policy "a Lebensluege (a false myth) of the Federal Republic" and explains its persistence "as a
feature of symbolic politics in the face of globalisation and loss of national control."
311. JOPPKE, supra note 2, at 62.
312. Brinkmann, German Migrations, supra note 36, at 140 n.l, notes that "[t]his was the
position of the CDU-Ied government between 1982 and 1998," but hastens also to add that "shortly
before its demise in 1982, the interior secretary of the SPDIFDP coalition government declared that
'the Federal Republic is not a country of immigration and that it should not become one'" (quoting
BARBARA MARSHALL, THE NEW GERMANY AND MIGRATION IN EUROPE 13 (2000». By the same
token, "all parliamentary parties put fOlWard proposals to liberalize citizenship law" in the 1990s.
Stankiewicz, supra note 46, at 10. See also Green, supra note 176, at 40-44; Irnke Kruse, Henry
Edward Orren & Steffen Angenendt, The Failure of Immigration Reform in Germany, 12 GERMAN
POLITICS 129 (2003); Malcolm MacLaren, Framing the Debate over the German Immigration Bill:
Toward Reasoned Policymaking, 2 GERMAN L. J. 16 (2001).
313. To be fair, it may be that this statement was made with the aim of smoothing passage of
the Immigration Act, supra note 231. In his first speech as Chancellor in 1998, Schroder stated that
"he did not see the basis of the national self-conception in traditions of descent, but rather in the
certainty of German democracy." Stankiewicz, supra note 46, at 19 (citing DIE WELT, Feb. 11,
1998).
314. See, e.g., Brinkmann, German Migrations, supra note 36, at 140 ("Migration by nonGermans was perceived by the state and the public as a problem, often even as a threat.").
315. Brinkmann, German Migrations, supra note 36, at 149 (noting that "Germany is not the
only country to face the contradiction between the obvious long-term need for migration to save
social networks and to fill jobs on the one hand and, on the other, popular resentment against
immigration"). See also BBC NEWS (July 9, 2004), Germany approves immigration law, at
http://news.bbc.co.uklllhi/worldieurope/388052I.stm (last visited Nov. 29, 2005) ("Supporters say
law is crucial as the country battles with an ageing population and a skills shortage" and addresses
"Germany's need for skilled migrant workers from outside the EU.") [hereinafter BBC NEWS,
Germany approves].
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Although debates over multiculturalism in Germany continue to rage,316
the last formal bastion of official resistance to Germany's multicultural fate fell
in July 2004, with the passage of the new Immigration Act
(Zuwanderungsgesetz)317 by an overwhelming majority of the Bundestag after a
tortuous journey through the legislature and the German Constitutional Court
(Bundesverfassungsgericht).318 The Immigration Act has been reported as
Germany's "first immigration law,,,319 but it is more accurate to say that it is
Germany's first comprehensive legal framework for immigration. Taken
together with the Citizenship Act, the Immigration Act constitutes a serious
attempt to adapt the German legal framework to existing conditions, and to
address current as well as future needs. An assessment of the impact of the new
Immigration Act must await further scrutiny, since it is too soon to draw lasting
conclusions about its implementation, particularly at a time of regime change
and economic difficulties. This proviso aside, the following discussion
considers experience since the Act entered into force on January I, 2005, after
examining the main features of Germany's new legal regime.
The new Immigration Act constitutes Germany's second major step, after
adoption of the Citizenship Act, towards greater openness and inclusiveness.
Like the Citizenship Act, Germany's new law on migration marks numerous
historical departures. At the same time as recognizing its historical significance,
however, it must also be acknowledged that this new regime is unlikely to prove
a stable one. Expanding EU competence and activity in the field of migration
renders developments at the level of the Member States more tentative and
vulnerable to change in the short run. For this reason, one leading German
expert on migration law has predicted that the new Immigration Act will require
substantial revision within the short span of two years. 320 But notwithstanding

316. See the discussion of the Leitkultur debates supra in note 289. Various other
controversies relating to the integration of migrants are discussed infra in Part IV.A.
317. Supra note 231.
318. The passage of the Immigration Act put an end to four years of "bitter struggle, in
which the conservative opposition fought the original government proposals in both the parliament
and in the courts." BBC NEWS, Germany approves, supra note 315. The Immigration Act was
initially passed into law in June 2002. Shortly thereafter, six "opposition-ruled state governments"
brought a case to the German Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht), arguing that "the
law should be declared invalid because of the unorthodox voting procedures by which it had been
passed." Kruse, Orren & Angenendt, supra note 312, at 134. The Court declared the Immigration
Act invalid in December 2002, shortly before it was due to enter into force on January I, 2003.
Decision of the Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfD] (Federal Constitutional Court) of December 18,
2002,37 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfDE] (Decisions of the BverfG) 271
(F.R.G.), available at http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen (last visited Nov. 21, 2005). The Act
was re-introduced in unaltered form, but subsequently altered in numerous respects. See Kruse,
Orren & Angenendt, supra note 312, at 134-43 (discussing the topics covered in the reopened debate
over the content of the Immigration Act).
319. BBC NEWS, Germany approves, supra note 315.
320. Gunter Renner, Das Staatsangehorigkeitsrecht nach der Reform reformbedurftig? [Is
the Reformed Citizenship Act in Need of Further Reform?], 24 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR AUSLANDERRECHT
UNO AUSLANOERPOLlTlK 176 (2004).
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the overarching question of its ability to stand the test of time, Germany's new
Immigration Act deserves to be analyzed on its own terms.
The 2004 Immigration Act is an omnibus bill that adds two new laws to the
books, repeals some old laws, and revises a number of existing laws (including
the Citizenship Act). The most imJlortant new law, for present purposes, is the
Residence Act (Aujenthaltsgesetz),321 which replaces the former Foreigners'
Act (Ausliindergesetz).322 The analysis below focuses on the new Residence
Act and related regulations, since these will have the greatest impact on current
and new immigrants from non-EU countries. 323
A few words about terminology are needed before proceeding to examine
the principal changes that have been introduced. The German designation
Zuwanderung was chosen in lieu of Einwanderung as the title for the new
Immigration Act. The connotations of these two terms are different, despite the
fact that both would be rendered in English as 'immigration'. During the
protracted debates leading up to adoption of the Immigration Act, the (adopted)
term Zuwanderung was preferred by those urging a more restrictive posture
towards immigration, since it implies "unwanted immigration that is tolerated
for constitutional and moral-political reasons.,,324
The rejected term
Einwanderung, on the other hand, "connotes actively solicited, wanted
immigration.,,325
Given this background, one might expect the new
Zuwanderungsgesetz to hew to tradition, yet this is far from the truth.
Paradoxically, the title ultimately chosen for the new law is at odds with its
content, at least in regard to the concrete provisions of the new Residence Act
pertaining to labor migration. The historical debate over terminology is noted
here as a reminder that the new law is a hard-fought compromise between wellarticulated positions across the political spectrum, and that conceptual debates in
this complex field must take second place to concrete analysis of legal
provisions and their implementation over time.
In substantive terms, the new Residence Act introduces a number of
important reforms aimed at simplifying the rules and procedures governing
immigration. The former complex system of five "residence titles" has been
reduced to just two: the limited-term residence permit (Aujenthaltserlaubnis)326

321. Article 1 of the Immigration Act, supra note 231, sets forth the new Gesetz iiber den
Aufenthalt, die Erwerbstiitigkeit und die integration von Ausliindern im Bundesgebiet (AufenthG)
(Act on the Residence, Economic Activity and Integration of Foreigners in the Federal Territory)
[hereinafter Residence Act]. The Residence Act entered into force on January 1,2005.
322. The Immigration Act repealed the Gesetz iiber die Einreise und den Aufenthalt von
Ausliindern im Bundesgebiet (AusIG) , BGBI 1 1990, 1354, 1356 (Law on Entry and Stay by
Foreigners in Federal Territory) (9 July 1990) [hereinafter Foreigners' Act] and related regulations.
323. Article 2 of the Immigration Act, supra note 231, sets forth the new Gesetz iiber die
allgemeine Freiziigigkeit von Unionsbiirgern (FreiziigGIEU) (Act on the General Freedom of
Movement for EU Citizens), which brings German law into compliance with EU rules on free
movement of persons.
324. JOPPKE, supra note 2, at 97.
325. JOPPKE, supra note 2, at 97.
326. Residence Act, supra note 321, § 7.
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and the unlimited-term settlement permit (Niederlassungserlaubnis).327 These,
in turn, are functionally linked to the recognized purposes of residence in
Germany (that is, education, employment, family reunification, and
humanitarian considerations).328 The new Immigration Act creates a procedure
under which students are permitted to remain in Germany for up to one year
after completing their studies, in order to gain work experience. 329
Some of the most significant changes introduced by the Residence Act
reflect an interest in attracting or retaining skilled labor. In general, it will be
considerably easier for "highly qualified persons" to immigrate to Germany,
whereas the general ban on immigration by "unqualified" persons, as well as on
those having "low" or ordinary qualifications, remains in effect. 330 As for the
favored "highly qualified" persons, they may be granted permanent residence
from the outset, under a unified ("one-stop government") procedure331 that
replaces the prior cumbersome dual procedure that separated the process of
seeking permission to work from the process of seeking a residence permit. 332
Family members of "highly qualified" persons may also work under Germany's
new rules. 333 In addition, self-employed persons may receive a residence
permit if they invest at least one million Euros and create at least ten jobs.
Asylum and family reunification continue to play an important role in
German immigration law. However, these topics are already covered to a large
extent by applicable provisions of international and EU law, and for that reason
are not considered here in detail. It does bear mention, however, that the
Residence Act extends the new integration requirements (discussed below in
Part IV) to certain family members of persons entitled to reside in Germany
under either asylum law or the rules on repatriates (Spiitaussiedler).
Finally, in institutional terms, the Immigration Act created a new Federal
Office for Immigration and Refugees (Bundesamt for Migration und
Fliichtlinge), which takes over the responsibilities of the former Federal Office
for the Recognition of Foreign Refugees. 334 This new office-known by its
acronym BAMF-will maintain the central registry of aliens and collect data
relating to migration patterns, but will also develop and implement the new

327. Residence Act, supra note 321, § 9.
328. Residence Act, supra note 321, § I.
329. Residence Act, supra note 321, § 16(4).
330. Residence Act, supra note 321, § 39(4). However, some special rules apply to socalled "qualified" persons. For one, there is an exception to the general ban that permits the
authorities to grant qualified persons a residence permit where it would be in the public interest to do
so. Residence Act, supra § 18(4). Second, there is a special rule granting priority to qualified
nationals in regard to jobs for which no German person is available. Residence Act, supra §§
39(2)(b),39(6).
331. Residence Act, supra note 321, § 39( I).
332. Residence Act, supra note 321, § 19. In other words, highly qualified persons are not
required to wait for five years before applying for permanent residency. Jd.
333. Residence Act, supra note 321, § 29.
334. Residence Act, supra note 321, § 75.
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integration programs. 335 This institutional development marks an important
change from the past, when "no federal agencies [were] specifically designed to
administer migrant-related tasks.,,336 BAMF, which is an agency of the Federal
Ministry of the Interior (BMI), does not replace the independent Federal
Commissioner for Migration, Refugees and Integration (Beauflragte for
Fliichtlinge und Integration), who since late 2005 has had cabinet status as
Minister for Integration.
IV.
INTEGRATION: TOWARDS A NEW PARADIGM?

Germany's new laws on citizenship and on immigration attest to
heightened, albeit not entirely new concerns with integration and security.
Indeed, the limitations imposed on the pragmatic openness of Germany's new
Citizenship and Immigration Acts are directly attributable to such concerns.
These are, in a sense, the political price to be paid for liberalization. In
particular, the new Immigration Act (including its amendments to the
Citizenship Act) aims to balance the needs of Germany's labor market against
its security needs, by making it easier for the authorities to deport people who
are suspected of supporting political violence. This section examines the new
rules that have been put in place, and considers available evidence regarding
their implementation to date.
The perennial topic of integration raises some of the most controversial
questions in the field of migration and citizenship.337 Scholars have long
recognized that there is no single model of integration. 338 From this theoretical
perspective, Germany's approach to integration-its "incorporation regime"consists of "strategies, policy instruments and organizational arrangements" that
differ substantially from those found in other countries339 and reflect the
peculiarities of its own notions about membership, as well as about state-society
An emerging alternate theoretical perspective emphasizes the
relations.
commonalities that are visible through the lens of comparative analysis,340 and
raises questions about whether convergence is occurring. The recent emergence
of EU Ifidelines pertaining to the integration of migrants in EU Member
States, 3 1 which appears to provide some support for each of these theoretical
335. !d. BAMF also plays a central role in regard to asylum. In particular, it decides asylum
petitions and carries out the asylum-related provisions of the Schengen regime.
336. SOYSAL, supra note 76, at 77.
337. Davy, supra note 46, at 123 (noting that integration "became the buzzword in
Germany's recent migration policy").
338. See, e.g., FAVELL, supra note 2; KASTORYANO, supra note 42; SOYSAL, supra note 76.
339. SOYSAL, supra note 76, at 2-6.
340. See, e.g., Joppke & Morawska, supra note 3, at 6-7 (arguing that the "popular notion of
national models of immigration integration has obscured the similarities of integration approaches
and assimilation concerns across liberal states").
341. Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration, supra note 213. See generally
Kees Groenendijk, Legal Concepts of Integration in EU Migration Law, 6 EUR. J. MIGRATION & L.
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A. GETTING TOUGH: INTEGRATION

With regard to integration, Germany appears to be taking a new get-tough
policy.342 But despite the presence of new rules, resources and rhetoric, it bears
asking how new any of this really is. In fact, the need to promote better social
integration of guest workers was already on the German agenda in the 1970s,343
and stayed there during the 1980s and the 1990s.344 Initiatives varied widely
from one state (Land) to another, even after the establishment of the Federal
Commissioner
for
Foreigners'
Affairs
(Ausliinderbeauftragte
der
Bundesregierung) in 1981. Early efforts consisted largely of pragmatic attempts
to integrate foreigners into existing social structures, but fell far short of cultural
assimilation. The limitations of the postnational integration postulated by
Soysal became painfully apparent during the xenophobic violence against
immigrant families in Solingen and Molin in the early 1990s,345 and have
returned with renewed force after the murder of Dutch filmmaker Theo van
Gogh in mid-2004 and the outbreak of violence in France in late 2005 and in
Denmark in early 2006.
The question of integrating immigrants has been a particularly fraught one
in post-war Germany. Policy-makers shied away from the stance of insisting
that post-war immigrants take on "membership in a tainted nation.,,346 Another
factor limiting the push towards integration of immigrants prior to German
unification was the Federal Republic's telos of achieving unification of all
Germans, defined in ethno-cultural terms. These historical conditions made it
difficult for Germans to contemplate citizenship for immigrants, and resulted in
a situation in which neither the Left nor the Right expected post-war immigrants
to assimilate. Rather, German political elites largely converged on a "mellow
concept of integration" based on the idea of a "relaxed coexistence" without any
loss of identity on the part of the immigrants. 347 This tendency to preserve
III (2004); Yongmi Schibel, Integration and the Role olLoeal Authorities, 5 EUR. J. MIGRATION &
L. 99 (2003); Katja S. Ziegler, Editorial: Integrating Integration?, 7 EUR.1. MIGRATION & L. 119
(2005).
342. Residence Act, supra note 321, §§ 43-45.
343. Minkenberg, supra note 34, at 220.
344. This discussion is based on the analysis found in SOYSAL, supra note 76, at 61-64, 7779.
345. JOPPKE, supra note 42, at 186. These tragic events galvanized the immigrant (and
particularly the Turkish) community in Germany, as well as the German political parties, and
sparked discussions that ultimately resulted in passage of the new Citizenship Act with its "civicterritorial redefinition of the traditional German model ofethno-genealogical citizenship." Id.
346. JOPPKE, supra note 42, at 187. Karl Jaspers expressed the "delegitimation of
nationhood" in the early years of the Bundesrepublik, when he proclaimed the end of the nation-state
and pronounced it "the disaster (Unheil) of Europe and of all continents." Id.
347. JOPPKE, supra note 42, at 188. Thalheimer points to a vast gulf between 'integration'
which implies fitting into society, and 'assimilation' which implies dissolving into society. Philipp
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difference was bolstered by the "few immigrant voices in the integration
debate," whose demands for "equal co-existence" between immigrants and
Germans also tended to keep these groups apart. 348 Immigrant activists in
Germany were more inclined to see citizenship as a "means of guaranteeing
residence and the political rights associated with it [than] of ensuring a cultural
integration.,,349 The growing influence of Islamic organizations in Germany
has furthered this tendency, since they opposed assimilation and pushed towards
"an institutionally complete parallel society.,,350
This rough equilibrium has been disrupted by recent legal reforms, which
have taken the first real step towards decoupling citizenship from ethno-cultural
membership in the German nation, and thrown the doors open to at least some
categories of labor migrants. As noted earlier, both the new Citizenship and
Immigration Acts hang an 'integration' price tag on the liberalizations they
offer. This is one, but by no means the only reason why debates on integration
and multiculturalism have erupted once again in Germany. The Federal
Government has taken concrete steps to facilitate, and simultaneously to push
for further integration. As one government expert pointedly put it, "integration
is particularly important for Turks, who make up more than 25 per cent of all
foreigners livin in Germany and are citizens of a country that aspires to ED
membership.,,3 s9I
The new demand that immigrants demonstrate their willingness and ability
to integrate applies both in connection with citizenship and immigration. In
practical terms, the integration requirements overlap. However, they may play
out differently in these two contexts, and considerable uncertainty remains over
how the new requirements will be implemented. These uncertainties are
exacerbated by the fact that the Lander may, and in fact do implement the
applicable federal laws in a non-uniform manner. 352
An overarching question concerns the precise nature of the German society

Thalheimer, Migration und Integration am Beispiel TUrkei, in BUNDESAMT FOR MIGRATION UNO
FLOCHTLINGE, WANDERUNGSBEWEGUNGEN: MIGRATION, FLOCHTLlNGE, UNO INTEGRATION
[FEDERAL OFFICE OF MIGRATION AND REGUGEES, MIGRATION MOVEMENTS: MIGRATION,
REFUGEES, AND INTEGRATION] (2003), at \05.
348. JOPPKE, supra note 42, at 189.
349. KASTORYANO, supra note 42, at 117.
350. JOPPKE, supra note 42, at 215.
351. Thalheimer, supra note 347, at \02.
352. The Citizenship Regulations, supra note 272, allow Liinder some leeway to make their
own rules, for example, in regard to language tests, dual nationality, and residence of less than eight
years (in the case of voluntary naturalization). RENNER, supra note 39, para. 1.3, at 10. For examples
of how these local variations play out in practice, see, for example, Ludvig, supra note 61, at 507
(noting some "high discrepancies ... in ... naturalisation rates"); RENNER, supra note 39, para.
2.4.4, at 32-33 (observing different standards in regard to linguistic capability). Ludvig, supra at
508, argues that there are many reasons why naturalization rates differ widely from one Land to
another, including "the duration of the naturalisation processes, the structures of bureaucratic
organisation and decision-making in the single cases, information policies and the differences in the
level and amount of human resources."
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into which immigrants are expected to integrate. 353 In the Leitkultur debate that
first erupted in 2000, there was "nothing specifically 'Gennan' about the culture
that immigrants were to be asked to share," indeed the "only non-procedural
element of this culture (next to the language requirement that no state qua state
can do without) was [the CSU's] commitment to 'Christian-occidental culture'
which implicitly excluded Islam.,,354 On this basis, Joppke argues that the only
"exclusionary potential" inherent in Gennany's "civic-nationalist turn" is to
"'thicken' the liberal-democratic integration requirement and to make the liberal
state for liberal people only.,,355 Yet it is precisely this requirement that collides
with religious fundamentalism and the anti-feminist practices of some minority
groups in Gennany. In fact, a major controversy of this nature erupted in early
2006 over an arguably anti-Muslim questionnaire that one of the Lander (state
governments) prepared for persons seeking to naturalize in Gennany.356
Language ability, which is the front line of integration, plays a central role
in both the naturalization and immigration contexts. It is essential to one's
ability to participate in Gennan society, and is the key to education and
While there is little
successful integration into the labor market. 357
disagreement about the importance of language training for integration and
social hannony, concerns about education appear to be a strong factor behind
Gennany's intensified commitment to language training. The PISA process
dealt Gennany quite a shock when it revealed that Gennan school graduates
made a poor showing in cross-European comparison. 358 There is some data
indicating that the foreign population among children in Gennan schools is

353. Stankiewicz, supra note 46, at 15.
354. Joppke, supra note 2, at 56-57. The Leitkultur debate has resurfaced. See, e.g., "Eitte,
lemt Deutsch!" Debatte fiber Integration, Werte, Nation ["Please learn German!" Debates over
Integration, Values, and Nation], FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, Nov. 22, 2004, at I
(reporting statements by leading CSU and CDU politicians at a CSU party convention).
355. Joppke, supra note 2, at 56-57.
356. The Baden-Wiirttemburg state (Land) government prepared a questionnaire ostensibly
designed to ascertain whether the views and values of candidates for naturalization are compatible
with the German Basic Law (Grundgesetz). This questionnaire, which inter alia asks pointed
questions about religion, gender relations and homosexuality, has offended Germany's Muslim
population in particular, and caused general uproar across the political spectrum. See Gejohle und
Zwischenrufe [Hoots and Cat Calls], K6LNER STADT-ANZEIGER, Jan. 20, 2006, at 6 (describing the
atmosphere in the Bundestag during debates over the •Stuttgart Directive '). Many politicians,
including Turkish-German politicians on the Left and Right, have labeled the questionnaire
discriminatory and called its legality into question. See, e.g., Ein ganz anderer Vorschlag [An
Entirely Different Proposal], K6LNER STADT-ANZEIGER, Jan. 20, 2006, at 6; Frageb6gen iindem
nicht das Verhalten [Questionnaires Do Not Alter Behavior], K6LNER STADT-ANZEIGER, Jan. 20,
2006, at 6; Zweifel an der Rechtsmiij3igkeit [Doubts About Legalilty], K6LNER STADT-ANZEIGER,
Jan. 20, 2006, at 6.
357. BAMF 2004, supra note 299, at 83.
358. According to the former German Federal Minister for Education and Research, "[a]
country with the top economic and political significance of Germany belongs at the top of the league
and cannot be satisfied with an education system performing at the OECD average level-never
mind below it." Edelgard Bulmahn, PISA: The consequences for Germany, OECD Observer
2311232 (May 2002), available at http;llwww.oecdebserver.org(last visited Nov. 21,2005).
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partly responsible for Germany's poor showing in the PISA studies. 359 Acute
public concern about basic education is at the very least compatible with a
greater push towards linguistic competence for immigrants. 360 This linkage
seems even more compelling, in view of official statistics showing that Turks
living in Germany are poorly educated, relative to Germans and other
immigrants, and that they have higher rates of unemployment.36I To be sure,
Thalheimer also notes the tendency of this gap to shrink as second- and thirdgeneration Turks become better educated and improve their socio-economic
position vis-ii-vis their parents. 362 Still, there are signs of a lingering perception
of Turks as an entrenched underclass. In this context, linguistic competence is
seen as a crucial intervention to break a cycle of dependency.
In the naturalization context, Article 11 of the Citizenship Act makes clear
that the right to citizenship is not available if the applicant lacks sufficient
knowledge of the German language. The language requirements are spelled out
in detail in the Citizenship Regulations (StAR-VwV), which demand not only the
ability to speak in daily life, but also to communicate with authorities in a
manner appropriate to one's age and education. 363 Early debates over the
required level of spoken, reading and written competence 364 have been largely

359. For example, Thalheimer's study of Turkish migrants in Germany shows "deficiencies
in education and vocational training," relative to the German population, among Turkish migrants
(and particularly among Turkish women) living in Germany. Thalheimer, supra note 347, at 102-03.
The implication of this study is that the poor performance of migrant populations is exerting
downward pressure on aggregate German performance in the PISA studies. This effect is more
clearly demonstrated in a report prepared by the German PISA Consortium, which shows a clear and
dramatic link between school performance, as measured by the PISA process, and the migration
status of the affected school children. Manfred Prenzel et aI., PISA 2003: Ergebnisse des zweiten
intemationalen Vergleichs: Zusammenfassung [Results of the Second International Comparative
Study: Summary], at 25-26, available at http://www.pisa.ipn.uni-kiel.delErgebnisse]ISA_2003.pdf
(last visited Nov. 21, 2005). See also Bericht der Beauftragten der Bundesregierungfor Migration,
Fliichtlinge und Integration iiber die Lage der Auslanderinnen und Auslander in Deutschland
[Report of the Federal Commissioner for Migration, Refugees and Integration on the Status of
Foreigners in Germany] (August 2005); Ingrid Gogolin et aI., Report der Bund-Lander-Kommission
for Bildungsplanung und Forschungsforderung iiber Fiirderung von Kindem und Jugendlichen mit
Migrationshintergrund [Report of the Federal-State Commission on Education and Research on
Support for Migrant Children and Youth], (2003) (proposing measures to meet the special needs of
young members of Germany's migrant community).
360. Seyran Ates, a leading Turkish-born legal activist in Berlin, supports linguistic
integration, but argues that this will not suffice to prevent "a shockingly high number of thirdgeneration children from becoming bilingual illiterates, many of whom are destined for a career as
social welfare recipients." Integration fonktioniert nur miteinander [Integration is a Two-Way
Street], SODDEUTSCHE ZElTUNG, Nov. 24, 2004, at 2.
361. Thalheimer, supra note 347, at 102-04.
362. ld.
363. Citizenship Regulations, supra note 272. The Regulations state explicitly that it is
insufficient to "simply get by" in spoken German, and additionally require the ability to read an
everyday text in German. They also contain detailed criteria regarding acceptable forms of proof of
language competence.
364. See, e.g., RENNER, supra note 39, para. 2.4.4, at 32-33 (discussing at length the
different linguistic standards imposed in various laws and arguing that the new requirements fall
somewhere in between the minimum and maximum levels required in other contexts). Renner argues
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resolved, at least in principle. The head of the Federal Office for Migration and
Refugees (BAMF) indicated in January 2005 that a "relatively high level" of
Gennan linguistic ability would be required "for day-to-day" communications,
and reiterated the need to demonstrate written as well as spoken knowledge of
Gennan. 365
In the immigration context, the integration requirement has been
crystallized under the Residence Act, which provides for the creation of a new
system of integration courses designed to impart language competence as well
as basic familiarity with history, culture, and the legal system. 366 While the law
often speaks of participation in the new integrations courses as an entitlement, it
is clearly obligatory for new migrants (including Jews 367 and ethnic Gennans),
as well as for certain foreigners already living in Gennany, insofar as places are
available for them. 368 In fact, sanctions are attached to failure to participate in
the required courses. In particular, renewal of a residence pennit is conditioned
upon participation in such a course (or otherwise satisfying the
requirements),369 and social benefits may be cut (up to 10%) for failure to
participate in a mandatory integration course. 370
The courses themselves will be developed and implemented by the new
BAMF, in accordance with extensive guidelines laid down in the Ordinance on
Integration Courses, which entered into effect January 1,2005. 371 The courses
involve a total of 630 hours of instruction: 600 hours of language and 30 for the
orientation component. The bulk of the costs will be born by the Federal
Government, which estimates that it will cost 188 million Euros per annum for
new immigrants (including repatriated ethnic Gennans), plus an additional 76

further that ideally, the test should be whether the applicant possesses sufficient ability to understand
the fundamental principles of political life and participate therein, particularly by voting. !d. At the
very least, however, he suggests that the standard must encompass age-appropriate ability to get
along in daily life and at work. !d. See also Davy, supra note 46, at 135-36, 142-43 (discussing the
history of and further ambiguities in the new language requirements).
365. Kragenow, supra note 46.
366. Residence Act, supra note 321, § 43.
367. The federal government announced soon after the Immigration Act entered into force
that it would apply the integration requirements to Jewish immigrants and place more emphasis than
in the past on German language ability. This decision was made in the context of a rising number of
Russian-speaking Jews and older petitioners who were past working age. However, a representative
of the Federal Ministry of the Interior (Bundesministerium des Innern) said that "certain groups" of
Jewish immigrants would be able to obtain residence permits outside the framework of the new
law." New regulations are to be worked out with the Zentralrat der Juden (Jewish Central Council).
Jfidische Einwanderer sol/en sich integrieren [Jewish Immigrants Should Integrate], FRANKFURTER
ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, Jan. 20, 2005, at I.
368. The right to participate in an integration course is spelled out in § 44 of the Residence
Act, supra note 321, while the obligation is spelled out in §44a. The affected groups of current
resident foreigners under Article 44a of the Residence Act are those drawing unemployment benefits
and those having "special integration needs."
369. Residence Act, supra note 321, § 8(3).
370. Residence Act, supra note 321, § 44a(3).
371. Verordnung fiber die Durchfohrung von Integrationskursen for Auslander und
Spataussiedler (IntV), BGBI2004 Part I, no. 68, at 3370 (Dec. 17,2004).
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million Euros to make the courses available to the 50,000 to 60,000 foreigners
already living in Germany. Course participants are expected to contribute
towards the courses on a graduated basis, according to their financial ability.
For their part, the Lander are expected to cover the cost of child-care incurred
by participants in these courses. Former Federal Interior Minister Otto Schily
stated that this program "does not make up entirely for the variety of
shortcomings of integration policy in the past," and has urged Lander and
municipal governments to step up their provision of measures aimed at
integrating immigrants already living in their territories. 372 Today, as in the
past, the Lander offer different levels and types of support and programs to their
foreign populations.
The contemporary German discourse on integration is not limited to
linguistic competence, however. The official rhetoric calls for "intercultural
competence" in which both immigrants and those already living in Germany
make an effort to get to know and learn how to get along with each other. 373 A
number of different types of programs are offered, ranging from intercultural
training to advice on how to manage day-to-day life in Germany. Another
important aspect of German policy recognizes that immigrants' experience of
discrimination has a direct effect on their willingness to integrate. Every
instance of discrimination has the potential to push immigrants in the direction
of ethnic segregation. 374 Public opinion data from Turkish residents in
Germany in the year 2000 revealed that 91 percent of the persons surveyed
viewed intolerance of foreigners (Auslanderfeindlichkeit) as the most important
problem that politicians should address. 375 More than one third of the surveyed
Turks cited experience with discrimination in connection with securing school
admission, a job, or housing. 376
Rights-based strategies may provide
immigrants with a constructive avenue for seeking redress of their grievances in
the future. 377
It is too soon to assess the impact of the integration requirements on the
targeted populations. Yet this empirical lacuna must not stand in the way of
asking how the new integration regime squares with former German policies and
practices regarding immigrant integration, or how it is likely to be received. On

372. Bundesministerium des Inneren (BMI), Schily: Principle of "Give and Take ";
Ordinance on Integration Courses Clearly Outlines Immigrants' Rights and Duties for the First
Time (Dec. 1,2004), available at http://www.bmi.bund.de(lastvisitedNov. 21, 2005).
373. BAMF 2004, supra note 299, at 84.
374. Thalheimer, supra note 347, at 105.
375. Thalheimer, supra note 347, at 104.
376. Thalheimer, supra note 347, at 104.
377. The long-awaited German antidiscrimination legislation (Gesetz zum Schutz vor
Diskriminierung) implementing EU directives aimed at combatting race- and gender-based
discrimination is pending. A bill was passed by the Bundestag (lower house) on June 17,2005, but
rejected by the Bundesrat (upper house) on July 8, 2005. The process was subsequently put on hold
by the federal elections in September 2005, and is due to be taken up again by the new Grand
Coalition government under Chancellor Angela Merkel.
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the one hand, there is a high degree of rhetorical continuity with earlier
statements calling upon Germans and immi~ants alike to meet each other
halfway on the road towards social integration, 78 as well as practical continuity
with earlier policies designed to further progress towards this goal. 379 On the
other hand, however, there are some reasons to expect real change in the wake
of Germany's new emphasis on integration, particularly if the language
requirements are strictly applied. 380
There were good reasons to anticipate that Germany's new push for
integration might encounter resistance within the affected population, even
before controversy erupted in early 2006 over Baden-Wiirttemburg's
discriminatory naturalization questionnaire. 381 In particular, the obligation to
attend integration courses may be perceived as a burden by some, whereas the
sanctions attached to failure may work a hardship in other cases.
B. GETTING TOUGH: DEPORTATION

Last but not least, the new Immigration Act attaches new security
limitations to the newly liberalized migration regime. Most significantly, the
Residence Act has introduced the possibility of deporting a foreigner with
immediate effect "on the basis of a prognosis based on facts, in order to avert a
special danger to the security of the Federal Republic of Germany or a terrorist
threat. ,,382 Such a deportation order can be issued either by the competent
Lander authorities or, in special cases, by the Federal Government. Only a
single avenue of appeal will be available, running through the Federal
Administrative Court in Leipzig. In addition, Articles 54 and 55 of the
Residence Act provide a broad range of bases for ordinary or discretionary
expulsion of foreigners, including anyone who: belongs to an organization
which supports terrorism or supports or has supported such an organization;383
endangers the free democratic basic order or the security of the Federal Republic
or participates in acts of violence or publicly incites to violence in pursuit of
political objectives or threatening the use of violence;384 or belongs to the
leadership of a banned organization;385 or is an "intellectual incendiary" who

378. BAMF 2004, supra note 299, at 83-84.
379. The new integration courses must be viewed in the context of earlier efforts by the
Federal Government, starting in early 2003, to provide language training. In 2003, for example,
more than 67,000 people from 172 countries participated in government-sponsored language
training. BAMF 2004, supra note 299, at 83.
380. For example, language is "perhaps the biggest problem" for some migrant
communities, such as the more than two million Russian-Germans who have come to Germany since
the 1980s. Ray Furlong, Ghetto Woes Afflict Russian-Germans, BBC NEWS (Dec. 8, 2004), at
http://news.bbc.co.ukIllhilworidleurope/4076245.stm (last visited Nov. 29, 2005).
38 I. This controversy is discussed supra in text accompanying note 356.
382. Residence Act, supra note 321, § 58a.
383. Residence Act, supra note 321, § 54(5).
384. Residence Act, supra note 321, § 54(5a).
385. Residence Act, supra note 321, § 54(7).
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(a) publicly, at a meeting or by disseminating literature, endorses or promotes a
crime against peace, a war crime, a crime against humanity or terrorist acts of
comparable importance in a manner conducive to disturbing public safety and
order, or (b) incites hate against sections of the population or calls for violence or
arbitrary measures against the same in a manner conducive to disturbing public
safety and order or attacks the human dignity of ot~~1(5' by insulting, maliciously
disparaging or slandering sections of the population.

Pursuant to the new national security provisions in the Residence Act,
Gennan officials commenced 'Operation Cleanup' (Kehrau~, which involves
compiling a 'black list' of Islamic extremists for deportation. 87 After the new
Immigration Act entered into force, numerous sources reported plans to deport
hundreds of people from Gennany in the near future. 388 The first Muslim cleric
facing deportation under the new Immigration Act is the Berlin-based cleric,
Imam Yakup Tasci, who has lived in Gennany since 1971 and become infamous
as a preacher of hate and intolerance. 389 His deportation would continue a trend
that started with the deportation of Metin Kaplan-the self-styled "Caliph of
Cologne"-in mid-October 2004. 390 While not alone, Gennany is, among EU
countries, the one making greatest use of "deportations via immigration
refonn. ,,391
In the end, Gennany's renewed (if not entirely new) emphasis on
integration and efforts to deport undesirable aliens have the potential to
386. Residence Act, supra note 321, § 55(2)(8).
387. 'Operation Kehraus ': Innenminister bereiten Ausweisung Hunderter Islamisten vor
['Operation Clean Up': Interior Ministers Prepare to Deport Hundreds of Islamic Extremists],
SPIEGEL ONLINE (Jan. 22, 2005), available at http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland (last visited
Nov. 21, 2005). See generally Liz Fekete, "Speech crime" and deportation, European Civil Liberties
Network (2005), at 1,3, available at http://www.ecln.org (last visited Nov. 21, 2005) (analyzing the
increasing tendency in some EU countries, including Germany, to extend the definition of terrorism
to include "speech crimes" in connection with fast-track national security deportations).
388. Id.; see also Ahmed AI-Matboli, Anti-Imam Drive Goes Unabated in Germany,
ISLAMONLINE.NET (March 23, 2005), available at http://www.islamonline.netlEnglishlNews/200503/23/article05.shtrnI (last visited Nov. 21, 2005) (reporting the preparation of "lists of thousands of
Muslim immigrants-whom the German authorities dubbed as suspects-for immediate
deportation").
389. Imam Jakup T. came under increasing scrutiny in 2004 after he publicly expressed
sympathy for suicide attackers in the summer and was filmed making inflammatory remarks while
preaching in November 2004. The Berlin Interior Minister issued the deportation order in December
2004. Berliner Hassprediger muss Deutschland verlassen! [Berlin Hate Preacher Must Leave
Germany!],
NET-TRIBUNE.DE
(Dec.
17,
2004),
available
at
http://www.nettribune.de/articleIl71704-09.php (last visited Nov. 21, 2005). However, the German Federal
Constitutional Court blocked his deportation in June 2005. Karlsruher Gericht: Kreuzberger Imam
daif vorerst nicht ausgewiesen werden [Karlsruhe Court: Kreuzberg Imam May Not Yet Be
Deported], DIE WELT (June 23, 2005), available at http://www.welt.de/datalI005/06/231735922.html
(last visited Nov. 21, 2005).
390. Deutschland: Kaplan in die Tiirkei abgeschoben [Germany: Kaplan Deported to
Turkey], 8 MIGRATION UND BEVOLKERUNG I, 12 (Nov. 2004). Kaplan's deportation was upheld by
two competent courts, the Oberverwaltungsgericht Nordrhein-Westfalen (Supreme Administrative
Court for North Rhine-Westphalia), case 17 B 2251104, and the Leipzig-based
Bundesverwaltungsgericht (Federal Administrative Court), BVerwG I C 14/04, Judgment of
December 7, 2004.
391. Fekete, supra note 387, at 3.
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exacerbate ethno-cultural tensions, and even to provoke a response by some
sectors of Germany's immigrant population. The German legal reforms invite a
series of long-term empirical inquiries about how they are implemented by
German authorities, how they affect the immigrant populations, and whether
they foster social peace or provoke polarization and conflict. These reforms
equally compel further reflection on the relationship between the experience and
practice of belonging, on the one hand, and the legal framework in which they
are embedded, on the other.
V.
CONCLUSION

Recent German reforms of citizenship and immigration laws radically alter
the opportunities for many non-Germans who already live or wish to live in
Germany, though experts continue to debate whether they provide conclusive
evidence of a paradigm shift. Whatever their actual impact may be in the long
run, it would go too far to assert that German legal reforms have resolved
fundamental tensions over political, socio-economic or cultural inclusion. If
anything, the recent legal and institutional reforms have channeled divisive
social questions onto the front burner of public debate and created conditions
that might well produce occasions for confrontation in the short term.
Meanwhile, outbreaks of violence in the Netherlands and France have created a
climate of heightened tension that is exacerbated by-though not necessarily
causally linked to-developments on the political far right. 392
Debates over multiculturalism are back in the headlines, as a result of
increasingly visible events, blundering politicians, and vocal minorities. Tens of
thousands of people, mostly Turkish men, demonstrated peacefully in Cologne
in November 2004, where they protested against terrorism and pressed their
claims for acceptance as members of German, as well as European society. 393
The Cologne demonstration, which denounced violence and voiced the
participants' commitment to social harmony and human rights, provides one but
by no means the only conceivable model for migrant politics in Germany.
While many members of the non-German population living in Germany have
welcomed the opportunity to learn German (largely at government expense), not
all have enthusiastically embraced the new official insistence on greater

392. For an analysis of mobilization against immigrants by moderate, nonviolent Germans
operating at the sub-national level, see Roger Karapin, Protest and Reform in Asylum Policy: Citizen
Initiatives versus Asylum Seekers in German Municipalities, 1989-1994,21 GERMAN POL. & SOC'y
I (2003). Karapin's goal is to supplement but not displace analyses linking anti-immigration politics
to the radical right or to other causes. Id. at 45. For examples of such scholarship, see HANS-GEORG
8ETZ, RADICAL RIGHT-WING POPULISM IN WESTERN EUROPE (1994); SHADOWS OVER EUROPE:
THE DEVELOPMENT AND IMPACT OF THE EXTREME RIGHT IN WESTERN EUROPE (Martin Schain,
Aristide Zolberg & Patrick Hossay eds., 2002).
393. Peter Schilder, Islam heifJt Frieden [Islam Means Peace], FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE
ZEITUNG, Nov. 22,2004, at 3 (reporting a peaceful demonstration of approximately 30,000 persons).
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integration into Gennan society. At the very least, there appear to be different
opinions among migrant groups about the desirability of integration and the best
way to ensure social peace.
Neither of the traditional metaphors-melting pot or boiling kettle-aptly
captures changing conditions in Gennany's de facto multicultural society.
While I do not wish to exaggerate the level of current tensions, I believe that a
frying pan metaphor is more appropriate. Radical legal refonn is too often
viewed as the end of a long process of debate and struggle. In my view,
however, Gennan legal refonns mark the beginning of a new phase of
increasingly contentious politics, during which the new rules are implemented
and their impact on existing societal relations is felt. In this sense, immigration
and citizenship in Gennany have moved 'out ofthe frying pan, but into the fire'
of civil society. My initial choice of the tenn 'fire' was intended to invoke the
notion of combustion and suggest the likely intensification of public debate and
political confrontation, rather than to predict conflagration and violence.
Regrettably, European developments in 2004, 2005 and 2006 have confinned
even the literal meaning of this metaphor, although Gennany remains thus far
virtually unaffected by the eruption of migrant rage that has badly shaken the
Netherlands, France, Denmark, and other neighboring countries.
The efforts by the EU and its Member States, including Gennany, to
enhance both internal and external dimensions of belonging by means of legal
refonns, including measures aimed at promoting integration of immigrant
populations, stand in stark contrast to the enonnity of the socio-economic
problems on the ground. The outbreak of violence in Europe in late 2005
vividly illustrates the limitations of exclusively cultural or identity-based
approaches to the question of belonging. While essential to human well-being,
identity and culture provide no real substitute for education, adequate housing,
or jobs. It would be a mistake to view the rioting that started in France merely
as an expression of "the wrath of a Muslim community.,,394 Rather, the
violence that erupted in France in October 2005 and spread to other EU
countries should be seen as the "temporary rising up of one small part of a
Western underclass culture that reaches from Paris to London to Los Angeles
and beyond" to "express simmering anger fueled by unemployment and
racism.,,395 Similarly, while EU-prescribed anti-discrimination laws are likely
to provide a growing avenue for underprivileged persons to seek legal remedies,
they cannot fully resolve the inequalities, and may even serve to exacerbate
social tensions by fueling resentment against migrant groups. Such risks aside,
it is far better to address the manifold challenges of belonging from all available
angles, than to insist blindly on any fonn of mono culture-be it the CSU's
vision of 'Christian-occidental culture' or French Republicanism-in the face of

394. Olivier Roy, Get French or Die Trying, NEW YORK TiMES, Nov. 9, 2005, at A27
("[T]here is nothing particularly Muslim, or even French, about the violence. ").
395. ld.
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real existing multiculturalism and socio-economic inequality in Europe.
Special considerations warrant further attention to the position of the EU's
Turkish population, which is the largest foreign group in Germany but present in
other EU Member States as well. This population's situation is complicated by
the ongoing discussions over Turkey's desire to join the ED. Despite heated
debates over this historical decision throughout the EU, this overarching
question of belonging generated little uproar among the local Turkish
population. Rather, the largest public demonstrations supporting Turkish
accession to the EU took place in Turkey itself. Investigation of this
phenomenon could provide valuable insight into notions of belonging among
this population and attitudes towards formal legal guarantees, as well as into the
dynamics of diasporic politics.
In the end, this survey of the contemporary German and EU legal
landscapes affecting citizenship and migration suggests that we must greet
claims that we live in a postnational world with skepticism. 396 Dramatic
changes in the legal framework affecting migrants in Europe in general, and
Germany in particular, have loosened the grip of narrow notions of belonging in
small but significant ways. Still, the ability to opt into Germany, and by
extension the EU, remains elusive, even for the highly ~ualified and low-risk
applicants who are favored by recent legislative reforms. 39
The limiting notion of the territorial state remains the crux of legal
belonging, despite the fact that the everyday realities of "diasporic lives,,398 lead
many people to "live between different spaces.,,399 I join the many who reject
"the assimilationist demand to centre experience and loyalties in a single
space,'AOO and adopt instead a posture in which "both the nation and migration
form a loci of sentiments and emotions crucial to a sense ofhome.'AOI

396. See, e.g., WESTWOOD & PHIZACKLEA, supra note 15, at 7 (urging those "who have
suggested we are not in the era of postnationalism ... to re-examine the ways in which they have
arrived at this conclusion," which is premised on the false binary "idea that either there are nations
or there is globalisation which ruptures the national project"). Rather, "nations are constituted in
multi-centric ways which means that they are not unitary and that they hold within them a vast array
of both centring and decentring mechanisms." ld.
397. Decision of the Stadt Koln Amt flir offentliche Ordnung-Arbeitsmigration (Aug. 15,
2005) (denying permanent settlement to an applicant who fulfilled all formal legal requirements).
398. WESTWOOD & PHIZACKLEA, supra note 15, at 4.
399. SEIDLER, supra note 15, at xi.
400. ld.
401. WESTWOOD & PHIZACKLEA, supra note 15, at 11 (emphasis added).

